According to senior officials familiar with the matter, Pakistani ‘diplomats’ in Dhaka have leveraged their presence to penetrate key institutions, including the legal system, media, and educational bodies.
A Pakistani cargo ship, carrying 25 metric tonnes of rice, is expected to arrive at Bangladesh’s Mongla Port soon, potentially marking the first time in 53 years that a Pakistan-flagged vessel will unload cargo at the country’s southern gateway. The development, under a newly inked government-to-government trade agreement, has stirred diplomatic ripples across South Asia, raising questions about Bangladesh’s evolving geopolitical alignment.
For decades, Bangladesh’s maritime infrastructure has primarily served as a conduit for regional connectivity, with India enjoying preferential access under agreements brokered during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure. But the decision by Bangladesh’s interim government to allow Pakistani ships to dock at its ports—just weeks after a political transition in Dhaka—signals a potential recalibration in the country’s foreign policy.
SHIFTING TIDES IN SOUTH ASIA
Since its independence in 1971, Bangladesh has maintained a complex relationship with Pakistan, shaped by the scars of the Liberation War and decades of political distrust. Under Sheikh Hasina, ties between Dhaka and Islamabad remained largely transactional, with the Bangladeshi government prioritising closer economic and strategic cooperation with India.
However, the arrival of an interim administration under Professor Muhammad Yunus has introduced new variables into Bangladesh’s diplomatic approach. The port access granted to Pakistan follows a series of high-profile interactions between Dhaka and Islamabad, including the quiet resurgence of Pakistani diplomatic engagement within Bangladesh’s institutional framework.
According to senior officials familiar with the matter, Pakistani “diplomats” in Dhaka have leveraged their presence to penetrate key institutions, including the legal system, media, and educational bodies. These efforts, reportedly backed by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), have sparked concerns in India about the potential resurgence of anti-India networks within Bangladesh.
“Pakistan’s influence in Bangladesh isn’t new, but the scale at which its diplomatic corps is engaging key sectors is worrying,” said a senior Indian security official, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “Their support for radical elements within Bangladesh, particularly Islamist student groups, poses a direct threat to regional stability.”
A DELICATE BALANCING ACT
For Bangladesh, granting port access to Pakistan may be part of a broader strategy to assert its regional autonomy. The country’s new leadership, facing internal political challenges and mounting economic pressures, appears keen on diversifying its diplomatic engagements rather than relying solely on India.
Over the past decade, Dhaka has positioned itself as a key player in South Asian connectivity, hosting infrastructure projects supported by India, China, and Japan. The port of Mongla, strategically located near the Sundarbans delta, has become a focal point of regional trade, with India using it for the transshipment of goods to its northeastern states.
“The interim government is playing a careful game,” said a Bangladeshi political analyst based in Dhaka. “By allowing Pakistan access to Mongla, they are sending a message—not just to India, but to all regional powers—that Bangladesh is not beholden to a single partner. It’s a move to reinforce strategic autonomy, but the risks of unintended consequences are high.”
Yet, Bangladesh’s pivot away from India could have repercussions. Top defence and security officials recently raised concerns over increased Pakistani and ISI activities in Bangladesh, particularly in areas close to India’s strategic Siliguri Corridor—commonly referred to as the Chicken’s Neck. The narrow strip of land connects India’s northeastern states to the rest of the country, making it a security flashpoint.
It is being seen that Pakistan’s agenda is no longer limited to Kashmir. Top officials urge that it must be ensured that anti-India elements do not exploit Bangladeshi territory to send terrorists into India.
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
India’s concerns extend beyond mere port access. Security analysts argue that Pakistan’s deepening presence in Bangladesh, coupled with growing ties between Dhaka and Beijing, could shift regional power dynamics in ways that disadvantage New Delhi.
Pakistan’s ISI has historically maintained links with Islamist groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami and its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, both of which have been accused of fomenting radical ideologies in Bangladesh. The rise of these elements under a new government could strain India’s already fragile counterterrorism coordination with Bangladesh’s security agencies.
“Under Hasina, Bangladesh actively collaborated with India on counterterrorism operations, dismantling terror networks that used Bangladeshi soil to launch attacks on Indian territory,” said a senior Indian intelligence officer. “A weaker security partnership between the two countries would embolden these groups,” the officer added.
While the Bangladeshi government has insisted that the port access granted to Pakistan is purely economic, Indian policymakers remain sceptical. The timing of the agreement—coming just months after a political transition—suggests a broader recalibration of Bangladesh’s external engagements.
A CHANGING REGIONAL ORDER
Bangladesh’s evolving foreign policy does not exist in isolation. As China expands its influence in the region through its Belt and Road Initiative, and as Pakistan deepens its economic and military ties with Beijing, India finds itself in a precarious position.
In recent years, Bangladesh has signed major infrastructure deals with China, including agreements to develop its deep-sea port in Payra and expand its energy sector. At the same time, Dhaka has quietly increased its defence cooperation with Turkey, purchasing Bayraktar TB2 drones—a move that has raised eyebrows in New Delhi.
Observers warn that Bangladesh’s shifting alignments could redraw the strategic map of South Asia. While Sheikh Hasina’s government maintained a delicate balance between India, China, and the West, the interim administration appears more willing to engage actors traditionally seen as adversarial to Indian interests.
“The risk for Bangladesh is that it may overplay its hand,” said a South Asia expert at a leading think tank in Washington, D.C. “It’s one thing to assert autonomy, but alienating India could have long-term economic and security consequences.”
WHAT’S NEXT?
For now, Bangladesh’s decision to open its ports to Pakistan remains largely symbolic. But as geopolitical tensions rise in South Asia, even symbolic gestures carry weight.
India is unlikely to react aggressively in the immediate term, given its longstanding ties with Dhaka. However, New Delhi will closely monitor Pakistan’s activities in Bangladesh, particularly if Islamabad seeks to leverage its newfound access for strategic purposes.
What remains unclear is whether Bangladesh’s interim government views this move as a temporary measure or as the foundation of a broader foreign policy shift. With national elections expected later this year, the future trajectory of Bangladesh’s regional engagements will depend largely on its next elected leadership.
For now, a single cargo ship may not tilt the balance of power. But in a region where history looms large, every diplomatic manoeuvre carries the weight of decades of unfinished business.
* Ashish Singh is an award-winning senior journalist with over 18 years of experience in defence & strategic affairs.