At the outset, India’s participation in the SCO, especially through high-level ministerial visits, paving way for Prime Minister Modi’s participation in the summit in August, reflects its commitment to multilateral diplomacy, even with difficult partners. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh‘s visit was emblematic of India’s balancing act, engaging with China within multilateral frameworks while maintaining a firm stance on core interests. His decision to abstain from signing the final joint statement, reportedly due to differences over the references to Pahalgam terrorist attack, sends a clear signal: while India is willing to cooperate multilaterally, it will not hesitate to draw red lines when national interests are at stake. A month later in mid-July India’s External Affair Minister, S. Jaishankar reiterated India’s position that the SCO should not compromise on terrorism. Surprisingly, what was earlier described as “Indian diplomacy’s S. Jaishankar problem” brought “optimism for rebuilding mutual trust,” according to the Global Times.
Two, the opening of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra route through China was welcomed with cautious optimism. For India, it marks a cultural and religious milestone, enabling pilgrims to visit a sacred site revered in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism after a gap of six years. However, Indian media responded with a cacophony of interpretations: some hailed it as a thaw in icy bilateral ties, while others warned against reading too much into a move that is primarily symbolic. The truth lies somewhere in between. For China, such gestures serve dual purposes, to offer the appearance of rapprochement while maintaining broader strategic goals in other domains. It is an open secret that the Yatra is believed to be tied to the resumption of direct flights and issuance of tourist visas to Chinese nationals. Nonetheless, going by the reports, the Chinese remain unenthusiastic due to a relatively higher threshold for visa applications.
Three, on the economic front, India continues to walk a tightrope. Despite ongoing geopolitical frictions, India has cautiously invited Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in sectors like electronics manufacturing, where China remains a global leader. The underlying logic is clear: India’s domestic electronics and semiconductor sectors require capital, expertise, and supply-chain linkages that Chinese firms can provide. Joint ventures, technology transfers, and greenfield investments are being considered on a case-by-case basis, subject to regulatory scrutiny. Whether China would be interested in supporting Indian manufacturing, given fears of competition from India, remains uncertain. Nonetheless, India’s economic engagement with China should be guided by a long-term policy perspective, rather than short-term compulsions or knee-jerk reactions to crises.
India’s military missions, including Operation Sindoor, underscore the growing breadth of its capabilities. However, these efforts also highlight China’s active role in constraining India’s regional outreach. Whether it is through military support to Pakistan, infrastructure investments in contested territories like Gilgit-Baltistan, or increasing influence in Bangladesh, China appears to be operationalizing a strategic “triangularity”, a calibrated attempt to box India within South Asia. This triangulation involving China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh is not an ad hoc development; the dysfunction of SAARC and BIMSTEC further amplifies this equation. It reflects a long-term Chinese strategy aimed at limiting India’s emergence as a regional and global power. For India, this calls for a rethinking of regional diplomacy—one that prioritizes long-term resilience over episodic responses.
Five, India’s strategic behaviour in recent years has oscillated between assertiveness and recalibration. India’s relations with the US reflect a complex yet predictable phase under Trump-2. A key divergence is India’s refusal to join Western sanctions on Russia and its ongoing ties with Moscow. On China, the US seeks a more assertive Indian stance, while India maintains strategic autonomy and avoids being seen as part of a containment bloc. While tech cooperation, e.g., iCET has advanced, tensions remain over data localization, tariffs, and market access. Hyphenating India with Pakistan has raised concerns; however, this strategic mistrust appears cyclical and manageable, not a rupture. Both nations in long run view each other as essential partners, navigating an evolving geopolitical and economic landscape.
This has compelled the Indian leadership to realign its post-Galwan relations with China, despite the absence of substantive de-escalation along the border and China’s failure to address India’s concerns over its construction of a massive cascading dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), three times the size of the Three Gorges project. Nonetheless, this reset arguably bolsters China’s global standing in its opposition to US bullying, unilateralism and protectionism. Talks of reviving the Russia-India-China (RIC) triangle can also be viewed in this context—not as substantive strategic moves, but more as symbolic gestures aimed at irritating Washington. However, such oscillations risk diluting strategic coherence. China’s dominance in both BRICS and the SCO, coupled with Russia’s growing dependence on Beijing, further complicates India’s strategic space. With the Russia-India defence relationship facing structural challenges due to Russia’s proximity to China and international sanctions, New Delhi must carefully reassess its long-term security partnerships.
Six, one of the key takeaways since the 2020 Galwan Valley clash is the difficulty of reducing dependence on China-dominated supply chains. Despite policy initiatives and international calls to build resilient supply chains, including partnerships with the US, Japan, and Australia, progress has been slow. India-China trade volume remains high, even surpassing previous records. India continues to rely heavily on China for active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), electronics components, rare earths, and telecom equipment. This structural dependency highlights the difficulty of decoupling in a hyper-globalized world. While selective de-risking is possible, full-scale decoupling is neither economically feasible nor strategically prudent at this stage. Instead, India should pursue diversification, domestic capacity building, and strategic stockpiling as part of a long-term effort to reduce vulnerabilities.
Finally, India’s current approach to the US as well as China is reactive in many ways, a response to immediate provocations or shifts in the global environment. What India needs is a comprehensive, long-term major power strategy that aligns with its national interests and global ambitions. Here, India could take a leaf from China’s own playbook: calibrating bilateral engagement while never losing sight of long-term goals; segmenting issues instead of seeking an all-or-nothing resolution; and engaging multilaterally to shape outcomes, not merely participate. India must also recognize that China sees its strategic pivots in India’s neighbourhood as part of a broader design. India must not respond episodically, but build enduring partnerships in its periphery based on economic, cultural, and strategic trust.
B.R. Deepak is Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
