India’s handling of the US-Venezuela crisis reinforces a simple truth: strategic ambiguity is no longer a transitional posture for India; it is a mature doctrine.
The art of balance: Why India’s strategic ambiguity is a feature, not a bug
As the global order fragments into overlapping crises and competing blocs, a familiar question is being asked with renewed urgency in Western capitals: Where does India stand? The question has resurfaced again because of India’s notably restrained and carefully calibrated response to the United States-Venezuela crisis—an episode that has again revealed New Delhi’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” and how it is a constant feature of its foreign policy. India’s response has been neither aggressive nor compliant. And that is precisely the point.
New Delhi’s much-debated “strategic ambiguity” is often portrayed as hesitation or moral evasiveness. In reality, it is a carefully constructed strategy—best described as strategic autonomy with a visible tilt, but without submission. Recent events, including India’s handling of Russian crude amid tightening US pressure, show that this approach is not reactive or ad hoc. It is systematic, deliberate, and increasingly confident.
At first glance, India’s foreign policy posture appears riddled with contradictions. India is a central pillar of the Quad alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, yet resolutely rejects anything resembling a NATO-style alliance. It confronts China along a live and contested Himalayan frontier, while simultaneously deepening economic engagement with Beijing-controlled supply chains. It is often courted by Washington as a strategic partner, yet it openly pushes back against US moralising—on Ukraine, on energy trade, and now, implicitly, on Venezuela.
These are not signs of incoherence. They are the markers of a multi-aligned power navigating a system where rules are increasingly weaponised. India’s reaction to the latest Venezuela crisis has been telling. In the wake of a dramatic US military operation in Caracas that resulted in the capture and removal of President Nicolás Maduro to the United States—an action that has drawn sharp international debate over sovereignty and international law—New Delhi’s response was cautious and carefully worded. Rather than condemn Washington or endorse the raid, India described the developments as a “matter of deep concern,” urged peaceful dialogue and de-escalation, and stressed the safety of Venezuelans while advising Indian nationals to avoid non-essential travel amid rising tensions.
This muted stance—eschewing explicit criticism of the US action yet avoiding alignment with its justification—underscores a consistent principle in India’s foreign policy: decisions on energy, security, and diplomatic posture will be driven by sober calculations of national interest, not compelled by third-party power politics.
This mirrors India’s earlier stance on Russian oil. Venezuela is not a one-off exception; it is part of a broader doctrine.
India’s strategic convergence with the United States is most visible in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad has evolved into a practical, flexible platform that serves Indian interests exceptionally well. It enhances maritime domain awareness, strengthens supply-chain resilience, and expands cooperation in critical technologies—all without treaty obligations or automatic military commitments.
For India, the Quad is not an alliance but a force multiplier. It signals resolve to Beijing, especially after repeated Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control, while preserving freedom of action. The deepening defence and technology relationship with the US—from GE jet engines to advanced ISR cooperation—reflects a genuine and growing alignment on China.
But this alignment has limits. India has been careful to ensure that participation in US-led frameworks does not translate into endorsement of Washington’s broader worldview, particularly its tendency to divide the world into moral binaries and enforce compliance through economic coercion.
India has drawn a clear lesson from recent years: sanctions regimes are proliferating, politically selective, and often misaligned with the interests of energy-importing developing economies. Whether it is Russian crude, Iranian oil in the past, or Venezuelan supplies today, India has consistently argued—sometimes explicitly, often implicitly—that energy markets cannot be sustainably governed through unilateral pressure.
New Delhi’s stance is not ideological. It is structural. India is the world’s third-largest oil importer, with limited domestic buffers and enormous development needs. Accepting US secondary sanctions as a routine instrument of global governance would amount to outsourcing its economic sovereignty.
India’s continued engagement with Russia remains the most criticised aspect of its foreign policy, yet the underlying logic has not changed. Defence dependence, UN veto calculations, and the imperative of preventing a tighter Russia-China condominium continue to shape Indian thinking.
What has changed is India’s growing comfort in saying “no” to Washington—without theatrics, but without apology. The US response, notably, has been pragmatic, rather than punitive. Washington understands that India’s value in the Indo-Pacific outweighs its discomfort over Moscow, Caracas, or any other third theatre.
At its core, India’s strategy reflects a sober assessment of the international system as it exists—not as Western policy documents would like it to be. Trade, finance, technology, and energy are now routinely weaponised. Alliances come with expectations of conformity well beyond security cooperation.
India’s answer has been to cooperate intensely where interests converge—China, maritime security, advanced manufacturing—while ringfencing autonomy where interests diverge. This is why New Delhi resists formal alliances, hedges on sanctions, and insists on issue-based partnerships rather than ideological camps.
India’s handling of the US-Venezuela crisis reinforces a simple truth: strategic ambiguity is no longer a transitional posture for India; it is a mature doctrine. In a world demanding alignment, India is asserting independence. In a system addicted to coercion, it is privileging resilience.
This may frustrate those in Washington who seek clarity and compliance. But for a rising power with continental threats, energy vulnerabilities, and global ambitions, ambiguity is not weakness—it is leverage. In an era of hardened blocs and shrinking room for manoeuvre, India’s greatest strategic asset may well be its refusal to be boxed in.
Shishir Priyadarshi is President, Chintan Research Foundation (CRF), New Delhi.
