The deeper question is whether this moment marks the end of American multilateralism or its recalibration.
US President Donald Trump (Image: File)
For more than 70 years the United States has been the principal architect, funder, and guarantor of the modern multilateral system. From the United Nations to Bretton Woods institutions and scores of specialized agencies, Washington underwrote an order designed to prevent global conflict, stabilize markets, and promote development. Today, the US is increasingly withdrawing—formally or functionally—from dozens of international organizations, conventions, and treaties it now views as misaligned with its interests.
This shift is not ideological caprice. It reflects a long-running reassessment of whether many multilateral bodies still deliver tangible value to the US—or whether they have drifted into dysfunction, politicization, and strategic free-riding.
At the core of the US critique is performance. Many international organizations were designed for a post-World War II world that no longer exists. Their mandates have expanded, but their effectiveness has not. Governance structures remain frozen in time, accountability mechanisms are weak, and outcomes are often disconnected from stated objectives. For Washington, the question has become brutally pragmatic: What does the US get in return for its money, legitimacy, and constraint on sovereignty?
Consider funding asymmetries. The US is routinely among the largest contributors—often the largest single contributor—to global institutions, yet its influence is increasingly diluted. In bodies such as the United Nations Human Rights Council, voting blocs dominated by authoritarian or illiberal states have repeatedly shielded egregious violators while singling out US allies for disproportionate scrutiny. From a US perspective, this is not principled multilateralism; it is reputational risk subsidized by American taxpayers.
Similar concerns have arisen with technical agencies once viewed as politically neutral. The World Health Organization, for example, has faced criticism over transparency, crisis management, and susceptibility to Chinese pressure. Whether one agrees with the severity of those critiques, the underlying US frustration is clear: institutions that fail at their core missions during moments of crisis forfeit the presumption of continued US deference and funding.
Treaties and conventions have not escaped scrutiny either. Agreements that impose binding constraints on US economic, regulatory, or security autonomy—while lacking credible enforcement on other parties—are increasingly viewed as asymmetric bargains. The logic is simple: if compliance is optional for rivals but mandatory for the US, the agreement ceases to be mutually beneficial. Withdrawal, in this framing, is not rejection of cooperation but rejection of one-sided restraint.
There is also a deeper strategic shift underway. The post-Cold War assumption that global institutions would gradually converge around liberal norms has eroded. Instead, many organizations now reflect a multipolar reality in which illiberal states actively shape rules, norms, and agendas. For US policymakers, continued participation under these conditions can amount to legitimizing outcomes that directly undermine American interests, values, or alliances.
Critics argue that US withdrawals weaken global governance and create vacuums that rivals will fill. That risk is real—but incomplete. The counterargument, increasingly persuasive in Washington, is that unconditional US participation has already produced those outcomes. Staying inside institutions that no longer function effectively can entrench failure rather than reform it. In some cases, withdrawal is intended as leverage: a signal that legitimacy and resources are not automatic entitlements.
The implications for multilateral organizations are profound. US disengagement exposes structural vulnerabilities that were long masked by American funding and credibility. Institutions may be forced to confront questions they have deferred for decades: Are the multilateral working and are they working for their stakeholders? How are leaders selected? How are failures measured and penalized? How are mandates prioritized? How is politicization constrained? Without reform, many organizations risk sliding into irrelevance—or becoming arenas for symbolic diplomacy detached from real problem-solving.
In terms of implications for US relations with other nations, the consequences are more complex. Allies accustomed to US leadership within multilateral forums may feel abandoned or destabilized. At the same time, many share Washington’s private frustrations but lack the political weight to force change themselves. A more selective US approach—engaging deeply where institutions work and disengaging where they do not—may ultimately catalyse reform rather than fracture alliances, if managed with discipline and diplomacy.
The deeper question is whether this moment marks the end of American multilateralism or its recalibration. Withdrawal does not necessarily mean isolation. It can signal a shift toward smaller, more functional coalitions; outcome-driven agreements; and institutions built around performance rather than permanence. In that sense, US disengagement is less a rejection of cooperation than a demand that cooperation once again serve shared, measurable interests, with accountability.
The postwar multilateral system was never meant to be immutable. It was meant to work. When it stops doing so, the US—like any rational actor—will reconsider the terms of its participation. The challenge ahead is ensuring that withdrawal becomes a catalyst for renewal, not merely a symptom of decline.
Daniel Wagner is managing director of Multilateral Accountability Associates and co-author of The New Multilateralism: Making Multilateral Organizations Accountable and Fit in the 21st Century.
