Xi Jinping’s ability to rein in Kim Jong Un remains doubtful, even as South Korean President Lee Jaemyung’s state visit to Beijing underscores China’s desire to project regional stability. North Korea’s missile launches during Lee’s trip reveal the limits of Xi’s leverage and the enduring unpredictability of Pyongyang. China has long been regarded as North Korea’s patron, its economic lifeline and political shield. Yet the events of early January 2026—South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s landmark state visit to Beijing and North Korea’s missile barrage timed to coincide with it—highlight the paradox at the heart of Xi Jinping’s regional strategy.
The first South Korean presidential state visit to Beijing since 2017, Lee emphasized a “new phase” in ties and sought to restore strategic cooperation with China. Xi responded with calls for “friendly cooperation” and regional peace. Kim’s defiance: Just as Lee arrived, Pyongyang fired multiple ballistic missiles into the sea, a deliberate signal that North Korea will not be sidelined or controlled—even by Beijing.
This juxtaposition illustrates the limits of Xi’s influence over Kim Jong Un. While China provides North Korea with critical trade and diplomatic cover, Kim has repeatedly demonstrated his willingness to act independently, even provocatively, when Beijing seeks to showcase stability.
Kim Jong Un views nuclear weapons and missile tests as existential guarantees of regime survival. No amount of Chinese pressure can dissuade him from demonstrating strength, especially when regional diplomacy threatens to marginalize North Korea. China’s Calculated Tolerance. Xi tolerates Kim’s provocations because they serve a dual purpose: reminding Washington and Seoul that Beijing remains indispensable in managing the Korean Peninsula, while also ensuring North Korea remains a buffer state against U.S. influence. The missile launches during Lee’s visit were not accidental. They were a message to both Seoul and Beijing: North Korea will not be ignored in any regional realignment. Xi’s inability—or unwillingness—to stop them underscores the fragility of his supposed control.
For South Korea: Lee’s outreach to Beijing is a pragmatic attempt to balance ties amid U.S.-China rivalry. Yet the missile tests remind Seoul that China cannot deliver North Korean restraint, limiting the utility of Beijing as a partner in peninsula security. For China: Xi’s credibility as a regional stabilizer is undermined when Kim openly defies him. Beijing risks being seen as a patron without discipline, unable to translate economic leverage into strategic compliance. For the U.S. and allies: The episode reinforces the argument that only sustained deterrence and trilateral coordination (U.S.-South Korea-Japan) can manage North Korea’s provocations, rather than reliance on Beijing’s mediation.
Xi Jinping may wish to project himself as the arbiter of East Asian stability, but Kim Jong Un remains uncontrollable. The missile launches during Lee Jae-myung’s Beijing visit were a stark reminder that North Korea charts its own course, often at the expense of Chinese diplomatic theatre. For Seoul, the lesson is clear: engaging Beijing may ease tensions, but it cannot substitute for hard security measures against Pyongyang’s defiance.
In the end, Xi can influence Kim—but he cannot control him. And that distinction will continue to shape the geopolitics of Northeast Asia.
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Nephew of the Dalai Lama, Khedroob Thondup is a geopolitical analyst.
