Within the Communist Party, the discontent with Xi is an open secret. But the reality is that a man this incompetent, crude, unreasonable, who has enemies on all sides, and is hated by everyone, is secure in power.
Sometimes when observing the political situation in China, the more one ponders the more bewildering it becomes. Xi Jinping’s strong grip on power is one example.
Everyone knows that in the decade since Xi Jinping took power, he has made a mess of China and created enemies on all sides. The economy is plummeting, the people have lost confidence in the government, and by normal standards this man has no political achievements to speak of. When Xi Jinping first came to power, some people had high expectations and respect for him. But now, except for a few people who are not clear headed, the vast majority of Chinese people are disgusted with him, but they dare not speak out against him. He has lost the popular support of the people. Even within the Communist Party, the discontent with him is an open secret. From princelings in Beijing to regional bosses, from Communist Party patriarchs to Premier Li Keqiang, he has offended almost every interest group there is. Even his past supporters—Wang Qishan, Liu He, etc.—are all now keeping silent. However, everyone knows that the chance of his renewing his term in office as Communist Party leader at the upcoming 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China looks very strong. In other words, he will hold unparalleled power in China, and his consolidation of authority is secure. It is paradoxical, but the reality in China is that a man this incompetent, crude, unreasonable, who has enemies on all side, and is hated by everyone, is so secure in power.
There are many explanations for this, such as control over the military and personnel decisions, but this is not the whole story. The most dangerous people are often cronies, such as Khrushchev* abroad and Wang Dongxing** here at home. Human hearts are hard to know. People are unreliable. The other theory is that political factions are unable to reach agreement and cooperate with each other, so Xi Jinping plays them against each other and defeats them one by one. Of course, there is also the problem of Chinese cowardice, not daring to revolt or create a crisis for the Chinese Communist Party. And since there is no crisis, it is difficult to challenge the ruler. But I believe all of these factors are just drops in the bucket. The most important factor is structural, that is to say Xi Jinping’s position as paramount leader, which is determined by the rigid Chinese Communist Party system.
Looking at China and the Chinese Communist Party through a modern lens is already a mistake. Because China’s political system is far from modern, and retains to a large extent the characteristics of a feudal imperial dictatorship. These characteristics include not only the fact that the emperor holds all the power and is difficult to overthrow once he is enthroned, but also the important fact that the emperor and state power are interconnected. Xi Jinping often says: the people are state power, and state power is the people. Of course he is talking nonsense. In fact in China, the leader of the Communist Party is state power, and state power is the leader of the Communist Party. In other words, if the top leader of the Chinese Communist Party is overthrown, it means that state power has been challenged, not just that individual. That is why most people in the Communist Party are unhappy with Xi Jinping, but few are willing to challenge him. Challenging him is no big thing, but challenging him is de facto challenging the single party dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party. Those inside the system—no matter how much they dislike Xi Jinping—will not challenge the system because they are the system and they depend on it for survival.
At the end of the [1966-76] Cultural Revolution, from the masses to the old Communist Party cadres, there was a lot of anger and dissatisfaction with the originator of the Cultural Revolution Chairman Mao. At the 11th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1977, demand for the complete negation and criticism of Mao Zedong became almost mainstream. However, Deng Xiaoping issued an edict: he ordered everyone to look ahead, and rejected ongoing criticism of Chairman Mao. Mao’s portrait still hangs on the Tiananmen Square rostrum. During the Cultural Revolution Deng Xiaoping suffered political blows, he was purged three times and rehabilitated three times, and his eldest son Deng Pufang was persecuted to the point of attempting suicide by jumping from a building and being left a wheelchair bound paraplegic for life. Deng cannot in his heart of hearts have love and respect for Mao Zedong. So why maintain the personality cult of Chairman Mao? The reason is as mentioned above, attacking Mao is tantamount to attacking the system. Deng Xiaoping had to rely on this system to remain in power and the Communist Party to continue to rule China. The reason Xi Jinping cannot fall is the same reason Mao’s portrait cannot be taken down from where it hangs above the Tiananmen Gate.
Some people ask, then why were Communist Party leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang purged? Did Deng Xiaoping not fear shaking up the system then? That is because neither Hu nor Zhao were paramount leaders of the Communist Party. Although they served as General Secretary of the Communist Party, they were only puppets of Deng Xiaoping. As long as Deng Xiaoping remained paramount leader, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang being purged did not threaten the survival of the system. Xi Jinping is different. He is now both General Secretary and the paramount leader of the Communist Party, with no patriarchs to keep him in check. In the tradition of the Chinese Communist Party, no matter how badly he mismanages and harms the nation, as long as he does not endanger the rule of the Chinese Communist Party there is no pressing reason to overthrow him.
* Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev was the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953-1964. During his rule, Khrushchev stunned the communist world with his denunciation of his predecessor Joseph Stalin’s crimes, and embarked on a policy of de-Stalinization. He enacted relatively liberal reforms in domestic policy. After some false starts, and a narrowly avoided nuclear war over Cuba, he conducted successful negotiations with the United States to reduce Cold War tensions. In 1964, the Kremlin leadership stripped him of power, replacing him with Leonid Brezhnev as First Secretary and Alexei Kosygin as Premier.
** Wang Dongxing was a Chinese military commander and politician, famous for being the chief of Chairman Mao Zedong’s personal bodyguard force, the 9th Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (which included the 8341 Special Regiment). Wang held many important positions, both in the Chinese Communist Party and the government. He was Deputy Minister of Public Security in 1955-1958 and again in 1960-1970, and notably served as CCP Vice Chairman from 1977 to 1980, under Chairman Hua Guofeng. Wang and his trusted security force played a very significant role in ending the Cultural Revolution by arresting Mao’s widow Jiang Qing and the Gang of Four shortly after the chairman’s death.
Wang Dan is a well-known Chinese dissident and leader of the Chinese democracy movement. He is director of the Dialogue China think tank.
Translated from Chinese by Scott Savit. This article was written ahead of the Communist Party’s 20th national congress.