This assessment is based on two sets of internal Pakistan Air Force documents that came into existence post the Indian air strikes, and were accessed by The Sunday Guardian.
New Delhi: The series of air strikes by the Indian Air Force under Operation Sindoor appears to have inflicted targeted damage across multiple Pakistani air bases, disrupting a mix of command and communication infrastructure, power systems, and digital networks. This assessment is based on two sets of internal Pakistan Air Force documents that came into existence post the Indian air strikes, and were accessed by The Sunday Guardian.
Until now, assessments of the damage to Pakistani Air Force (PAF) assets have relied largely on satellite imagery and open-source intelligence.
These records show a sweeping effort to repair damaged equipment, replace compromised infrastructure, and bolster cyber and operational resilience across at least seven air bases and Air Headquarters Islamabad. The timing and nature of the records suggest they were not routine or pre-scheduled.
Instead, they appear to be direct responses to the fallout of the IAF’s operation that started on 7 May post the 22 April Pahalgam massacre.
The bases that were impacted by India’s military activities, as per the internal documents, include PAF Base Nur Khan in Rawalpindi, PAF Base M.M. Alam in Lodhran, PAF Base Faisal in Karachi, PAF Base Mushaf in Sargodha, PAF Base Minhas in Kamra, PAF Base Masroor in Karachi, PAF Base Islamabad, and the Central Command at Air Headquarters Islamabad.
At the forefront are documents seeking the repair of high-value aircraft components. The aircraft types mentioned by name include the AW-139 utility helicopter and the Dassault Falcon DA-20 electronic warfare jet.
The DA-20 aircraft is directly listed in records from PAF Base Nur Khan, highlighting required maintenance for the French-built electronic warfare platform operated by No. 24 Squadron “Blinders.” These aircraft conduct electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) missions, including jamming and radar deception. Their inclusion in the post-strike maintenance orders suggests that Pakistan’s electronic warfare capabilities were significantly impacted by the IAF operation.
Reinforcing the extent of electronic warfare disruption that was caused by India, PAF Base M.M. Alam has sought “jammers (all types),” indicating a likely effort to replenish or enhance its signal-denial systems in the wake of the strikes.
Infrastructure and power support systems also appear to have taken a hit. Multiple bases filed internal requests for vehicle-mounted generators in 500 KVA and 45 KVA capacities. These are mobile field-level power sources used when permanent infrastructure is damaged or unavailable. Bases Nur Khan, M.M. Alam, and Faisal submitted these requisitions, pointing to significant strain or compromise in their existing electrical systems.
Simultaneously, Nur Khan and M.M. Alam also initiated recovery efforts for telecom infrastructure at technical facilities, suggesting base-wide communication disruptions.
Additionally, Nur Khan issued a repair order for fiber optic cables, indicating that its high-speed communications backbone was also likely affected.
Supporting this pattern is the procurement of new digital radio sets and, notably, Thuraya XT-Lite satellite phones. These are typically used in scenarios where traditional ground-based communication is unavailable or compromised. Their inclusion implies that critical nodes of PAF’s communication network were blacked out or deemed insecure during or after the strike.
One of the most revealing entries comes from PAF Base Nur Khan, requesting tools described as “advanced attack valid for vulnerability assessment.”
In cyber defence terminology, this language refers to offensive-grade simulation or red-teaming tools used to test the strength and weaknesses of digital systems. This indicates a potential cyber breach or an urgent reassessment of cyber security posture triggered by the strike.
In parallel, both tactical and strategic infrastructure upgrades are visible across the documents.
Nur Khan, Mushaf, Minhas, and Islamabad bases have requisitioned high-end Intel i9 processors, Nvidia A6000 GPUs, servers, RAID storage systems, and network controllers—likely to restore or enhance mission planning, data processing, and cyber defence capabilities.
Requests for RAID storage, server racks, and data handling infrastructure further support the likelihood of compromised digital assets or preparation for future cyber operations. Network-attached storage systems and data recovery devices were also included in several documents, underscoring efforts to rebuild or secure operational data stores.
Video monitoring systems, electronic kits, and mechanical workshop equipment also feature prominently, reflecting efforts to restore operational readiness across the board.
Minhas air base, known for hosting sophisticated assets, has demanded CNC machines, welding equipment, and hydraulic presses—tools consistent with structural recovery or airframe-level repair.
In an unusual inclusion, several bases requested high-end ophthalmic equipment and medical lasers, hinting at infrastructure damage to base hospitals. Cold chain medical equipment such as refrigeration units and chillers further pointed to expanded base hospital capability. Technical medical systems, including ENT diagnostic units and DNA processing boards, were included as part of broader medical infrastructure recovery.
Precision calibration tools such as oscilloscopes, multimeters, and diagnostic meters were also procured, indicating a technical reset of avionics and communication support systems. Fire suppression systems, gas detectors, and first aid kits too have been sought, indicating reinforcement of safety protocols and emergency infrastructure.
Procurements also extended to combat gear and personal protective equipment, including tactical vests, gloves, torches, flight suits, and combat boots, reflecting heightened operational readiness and possibly precautionary deployment measures.
Bases like Masroor have asked for biometric access controls and security scanners, pointing to heightened physical security protocols in the aftermath of the strikes. Restoration of administrative systems was also visible through requests for photocopiers, scanners, and digital presentation systems.
Battery management systems and UPS arrays were requisitioned to stabilize power flow across sensitive communication and server nodes.
While the internal documents do not explicitly mention the F-16 Fighting Falcon—Pakistan’s US-supplied frontline multirole aircraft—the possibility of these platforms being affected by the IAF’s strike cannot be ruled out. Given the sensitive nature of Pakistan’s F-16 fleet and the strict end-use and disclosure conditions tied to US Foreign Military Sales agreements, any damage, maintenance, or logistics involving the F-16 is typically managed through classified or centralized channels that would not appear in standard domestic procurement records. If F-16s were indeed impacted, either directly or through proximity to targeted infrastructure, those details are likely withheld for strategic and diplomatic reasons.
PAF Base Mushaf has sought HVAC units, IT accessories, paints, and batteries, suggesting broad recovery operations. PAF Base Minhas, home to core production and repair facilities, filed orders for compressors, motors, rubber seals, hangar equipment, as well as mechanical and calibration tools—indicative of high maintenance tempo or structural damage.
PAF Base Islamabad’s records included video surveillance systems, civil transport parts, and telecom controllers, supporting a broader effort to re-establish central coordination and logistics.
All procurements appear centrally managed through Air Headquarters Islamabad, reflecting a system-wide, top-down response. The scale, scope, and urgency of these internal documents indicate the operational aftershocks of the IAF strike.
Though the Indian operation was limited in time, the response indicates it achieved one of the core goals of modern airpower: degrading function, not just destroying form. The push to restore communications, power generation, digital integrity, medical readiness, and mission systems paints a picture of a military scrambling to reconstitute core capabilities.
In the absence of official disclosures, these internal records represent the clearest available account of what may have been hit, what was broken, and what Pakistan’s military is now racing to repair.