The use of civilian settlements as military positions by Pakistan’s armed forces is not a recent innovation. It is a practice with roots that extend back to the earliest wars fought by the Pakistani state.Â
Historical evidence from both the 1965 India–Pakistan War and the 1971 India–Pakistan War demonstrates that Pakistan extensively utilised villages and civilian settlements for active firing positions and gun areas. What we observe today along the Line of Control and in conflict operations like Bunyan um Marsoos is, in many ways, a continuation of a doctrine developed over six decades ago.
During the 1965 war, the use of villages as firing positions and staging grounds was documented on multiple occasions. The practice allowed Pakistan’s military to take advantage of existing structures — homes, walls, and lanes — for cover and concealment, while using the civilian presence as an implicit deterrent against Indian countermeasures. The 1971 war saw similar patterns, with civilian settlements in both East and West Pakistan reportedly used to host military equipment and personnel.
Along the Line of Control in the decades since, the pattern has persisted. Mortars and artillery guns have been positioned inside villages and populated settlements as a matter of routine. Civilian houses have been used as staging points and launch pads for infiltration attempts into Indian territory. This is not exceptional conduct — it appears to be standard operating procedure for elements of the Pakistan Army deployed along the LoC.
The continuity of this practice across different wars, different decades, and different generations of military leadership strongly suggests that it is not the result of individual commanders’ improvisation. It reflects an institutional approach — a doctrine, even if an undeclared one — that treats the civilian landscape as a legitimate operational resource.Â
The village is not just a place where people live; it is, in the military calculus of the Pakistan Army, a potential gun position, a launch site, a staging area.
This historical perspective is important for understanding the May 2025 deployments. The use of civilian airports, villages, and school vicinities as military sites during Operation Bunyan um Marsoos was not an emergency departure from normal practice. It was, by all indications, the application of a deeply embedded institutional doctrine — one that has been refined and repeated over six decades of military operations.
Understanding this historical continuity is essential for any serious effort to address the problem. It means that diplomatic protests and after-action reports are insufficient.Â
The practice will not end unless the underlying doctrine changes — and doctrinal change requires sustained international pressure, legal accountability, and, ultimately, a shift in the Pakistan military’s own assessment of the costs and benefits of this approach.
