OTTAWA: In June 2023, in an unprecedented moment in Canada’s Parliament, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau rose in the House of Commons to deliver a grave statement: “Over the past number of weeks, Canadian security agencies have been actively pursuing credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen,” he said. “Any involvement of a foreign government in the killing of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil is an unacceptable violation of our sovereignty. It contradicts the fundamental rules by which free, open and democratic societies conduct themselves.”
That citizen, Hardeep Singh Nijjar, had been shot dead outside the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara Sahib in Surrey, British Columbia, on June 18, 2023. The diplomatic rupture that followed—denials, expulsions, demands for evidence—reshaped Canada’s foreign policy debate almost overnight. As I wrote then, Ottawa’s focus shifted abruptly from concerns about Chinese interference to India, and Parliament closed ranks in defence of Canadian sovereignty.
Nearly three years later, Prime Minister Mark Carney arrives in Delhi in a different, though no less complex, environment. Criminal proceedings against four accused men continue. As Stewart Bell reported in Global News, Ottawa is now seeking to prevent certain classified material from being disclosed in court, arguing that its release “would be injurious to international relations and national security.” Bell also noted that “State actors such as China, India and Iran have long sought to intimidate and silence members of Canada’s diaspora communities, a practice known as transnational repression.”
Questions have also emerged about Canada’s internal intelligence culture. In his national security newsletter, Wesley Wark observed, “The suggestion from the background briefing on Indian foreign interference is that all is not well with Canadian intelligence culture.” His critique pointed out not outward, but inward—toward how intelligence is processed and communicated within government.
It is against this backdrop that Carney’s visit must be understood. Engagement with India is not indifference to sovereignty concerns or judicial proceedings. It is recognition that estrangement in a volatile Indo-Pacific serves no one’s long-term interests. The world has grown more unstable: supply chains are weaponized, critical minerals hoarded, maritime routes contested, and intelligence disputes bridged in courtrooms. Canada cannot opt out of this turbulence. It must decide where—and with whom—it stands.
The strategic case for deeper engagement with India is compelling. Bilateral trade remains modest relative to its potential. A serious objective should be to increase Canada-India trade fivefold within a decade, anchored in long-term commodity agreements in energy, potash, uranium and agriculture, alongside secure supply chains for lithium, nickel and rare earth elements. India’s demographic scale, industrial demand and geopolitical weight make it indispensable to any Indo-Pacific economic architecture.
Technology and security must accompany trade. Cyber standards, trusted telecommunications frameworks, artificial intelligence research, maritime coordination with ASEAN partners, and defence technology collaboration are essential guardrails. Economic expansion without security alignment would replicate past mistakes, where market optimism eclipsed strategic caution.
This broader coordination raises the possibility of a renewed Pacific Treaty Organization concept—not a NATO replica, but a structured Indo-Pacific framework integrating economic defence, maritime security, intelligence dialogue and critical infrastructure protection among democratic partners. Canada, India, Japan, Australia and ASEAN states all face coercive trade practices and transnational repression networks. Institutional cooperation is no longer optional.
Leaving that aside, Prime Minister Carney’s trip to Delhi, then Australia and Japan, should therefore aim beyond diplomatic symbolism. Given Carney’s need for a hedge to his ill-thought-out Strategic Partnership with China, this trade and diplomatic mission’s success is imperative for all.
Canada’s own Indo-Pacific Strategy acknowledges that the “Indo-Pacific region will play a critical role in shaping Canada’s future over the next half-century” and represents “significant opportunities for growing the economy here at home.” Those words must now translate into durable agreements and tangible infrastructure—particularly the political will to develop Canada’s vast reserves of critical minerals, oil and uranium, move them to tidewater, and supply trusted partners at scale.
India has been explicit about untapped potential. Its Ministry of External Affairs describes trade and investment linkages as “well below the business potential of the two countries.” Two-way trade reached approximately CAD 830.9 billion in 2024, making India Canada’s seventh-largest trading partner. Both governments have discussed doubling that figure to more than $70 billion by 2030 through a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). That target should be viewed as a baseline. With coordinated policy and sustained commitment, significantly greater expansion is achievable.
Energy cooperation is central. Canada possesses the world’s largest high-grade uranium deposits and decades of safe nuclear expertise through CANDU technology, alongside emerging small modular reactor (SMR) capabilities. India requires reliable, low-carbon baseload power to sustain growth while reducing emissions. A long-term nuclear partnership—spanning uranium supply, reactor collaboration and SMR deployment—would deliver clean, affordable energy for India while supporting skilled employment and export growth in Canada. It would also deepen strategic interdependence in a sector vital to long-term competitiveness.
Critical minerals form a parallel pillar. Canada’s Critical Minerals Strategy calls the sector “a generational opportunity” to create wealth and sustainable jobs nationwide. Existing mechanisms, such as the Canada–Japan Sectoral Working Group on Critical Minerals, aim to facilitate commercial engagement, strengthen government-to-government coordination and encourage cooperation on international standards. Expanding similar frameworks to India and Australia would align four resourced and technology partners in building secure supply chains for lithium, cobalt, nickel, rare earths and uranium, reducing vulnerability to market coercion or supply disruption.
Difficult conversations cannot be avoided. Concerns about foreign interference and transnational repression remain real. Yet the diplomatic template for stabilization exists. The October 13, 2025, India–Canada joint statement referred to “calibrated measures to restore stability in the relationship” and a partnership grounded in “respect for each other’s concerns and sensitivities” alongside growing economic complementarities. That language provides space for candid engagement without strategic paralysis.
In a world gone mad, diplomacy must be both principled and pragmatic. Carney’s task across Delhi, Canberra and Tokyo is to convert calibrated language into a durable Indo-Pacific economic-security compact—one that strengthens trade, secures supply chains, expands clean energy cooperation and reinforces the strategic autonomy of middle powers. Such alignment would serve as a counterweight to coercive economic practices or hegemonic ambitions, ensuring that Canada and its partners shape regional dynamics rather than simply react to them.
The stakes are considerable. All parties stand to benefit from deeper coordination, and all would lose if great-power rivalry dictated their economic futures. If this trip yields concrete commitments in trade, nuclear energy and critical minerals, it will mark more than a diplomatic reset. It will signal a strategic pivot toward long-term resilience and shared prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.
May the negotiations begin and prosperity flow.
*Dean Baxendale is President of Optimum Publishing International and CEO of China Democracy Fund.
