India is hosting the 2026 Foreign Ministers-level meeting of BRICS on May 14-15, marking a significant diplomatic moment amid the ongoing hostilities in West Asia. The meeting has brought face to face Iranian, Emirati and Saudi foreign ministers for the first time since the escalation of conflict following the United States-Israel and Iran war on February 28, 2026. The meeting is also being attended by and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and is becoming a rare multilateral setting where key non-Western stakeholders are converging amid regional tensions.
REGIONAL TENSIONS AND INTERNAL DIVISIONS
However, the road to the BRICS meeting has already revealed the depth of regional divisions within the grouping. The recent BRICS deputy foreign ministers and special envoys meeting which took place in New Delhi on April 23-24 failed to end with a joint statement largely due to disagreements between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over the ongoing conflict. Both sides condemned attacks on their respective territories. This lack of consensus has also reinforced criticism of BRICS as an effective platform during the ongoing crisis. Despite Tehran’s repeated calls for BRICS to intervene, the grouping currently under India’s presidency has refrained from issuing a unified stance given that some of its members were “directly involved” in the conflict. Such an interpretation however risks overlooking the broader diplomatic functions of multilateral forums such as BRICS which are not always designed to deliver immediate breakthroughs, rather they create structured convening spaces where dialogue can persist despite disagreement.
Although a ceasefire was agreed earlier this month, peace talks in Pakistan have stalled and tensions have shifted towards the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime chokepoint for global energy flow. Iran’s near closure of the Strait and the US counter blockade has intensified geopolitical tensions in the region, while divisions within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have become more pronounced. The UAE and Bahrain have adopted a more confrontational stance towards Iran including “by all means” re-opening of the Strait while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait have leaned towards more cautious, defensive approaches including Qatar’s participation in European-led maritime security frameworks.
BRICS AS A PLATFORM FOR DIALOGUE
In this context, BRICS continues to offer a rare platform of non-Western countries that includes both Iran and key Gulf actors. The UAE is already a member, Saudi Arabia remains engaged through BRICS+ mechanisms, while Bahrain has reportedly expressed interest in joining. A common thread across its membership has been the desire to navigate US dominance while providing a platform for greater economic cooperation beyond Western-led institutions. In the past, the grouping has shared common objectives on terrorism, intelligence sharing and condemning armed violence and conflict in Africa and West Asia in its declarations, including opposition to military solutions in Syria in 2019. More recently, in June 2025, BRICS issued a joint statement condemning military strikes against Iran reflecting its willingness to issue political condemnations, even if limited on regional crises. Thus, the foreign ministers’ meeting should not be seen as a last opportunity, but as the next phase in the ongoing process of negotiations vis-a-vie persisting regional tensions.
INDIA’S APPROACH FOR REGIONAL MEDIATION
This is where India’s role becomes particularly significant. While New Delhi has rarely positioned itself as a formal mediator, it has consistently engaged in quiet mediation prioritizing stability and diplomacy over overt intervention. During the 2002-2006 Sri Lanka peace process, India’s backchannel talks supported Norway’s formal mediation. In Afghanistan after 2001, India supported Afghan-led initiatives and reconstruction efforts while limiting direct involvement in US-Taliban talks. A similar pattern is visible even today. Amidst the ongoing tensions, New Delhi has opted for quiet diplomacy and engagement with its regional partners. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent visit to the UAE, where he met President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, signalling India’s intent to remain actively involved behind the scenes. These engagements, coupled with parallel outreach such as Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri’s visit to Qatar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval’s high-level talks in Riyadh continue to highlight India’s continued focus on maintaining political ties, economic stability and uninterrupted trade flows amid the crisis. In addition, Iran occupies a significant position in India’s West Asia policy, and apart from historical ties, it remains important in terms of economic and geostrategic interests. Unlike Western actors, India’s approach has remained anchored in non-interference and economic cooperation. This has enhanced its acceptability across diverse political contexts in the region.
Moreover, India’s stakes in region stability are substantial. Its energy dependence combined with a large diaspora in the Persian Gulf whose livelihoods are tied to the region, creates strong incentives for de-escalation. At the same time, emerging connectivity initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) despite current disruptions, reinforce the importance of long-term stability in West Asia for India’s strategic and economic ambitions. The weaponisation of trade routes has intensified global interest in alternative supply chains, further elevating the strategic relevance of India-GCC cooperation. In this evolving landscape, India’s approach appears to rest on three interlinked pillars. First, leveraging multilateral platforms like BRICS to facilitate dialogue among adversarial actors. Second, deepening bilateral partnerships particularly with the GCC and Iran to anchor regional stability. And third, advancing connectivity and economic initiatives that bind the region through interdependence rather than confrontation. Importantly, India has also demonstrated strategic restraint, declining calls to align with coercive measures such as forcibly reopening the Strait of Hormuz. This reinforces its positioning as a credible power capable of engaging all sides without being perceived as biased given its growing ties with Israel.
As BRICS leaders prepare to convene next month and then later this year, expectations should remain measured. The grouping is unlikely to immediately produce tangible outcomes or fundamentally alter its trajectory. However, its value lies in serving as an important off-ramp for dialogue, helping bring together Iran, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE amid heightened tensions. For India, this presents with an opportunity to quietly shape the conditions for dialogue, continuing to position itself as a trusted bridge between competing regional and global interests.
* Rhea Abraham is an independent researcher based in Bahrain, and a board member of the Migrant Workers Protection Society, an organization focused on raising awareness and safeguarding the rights of low-skilled expatriate workers.
