From Constantinople’s fall to IMEC ambitions, geography continues shaping trade, power, and India-Europe strategic convergence.
Introduction
As the first rays of the sun struck the horizons over the Bosphorus Strait and Ottoman flags rose over the walls of erstwhile Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul) on May 29, 1453, the Byzantine singer Manuel Doukas Chrysaphes lamented the fall of his city famed as the “Eye of the World”. As the candles in Hagia Sophia flickered for one last time while the city was struck by cannons and imperial ambition, it was not merely a city or dynasty that collapsed; control over trade strategic routes, and memory linking Asia and Europe had shifted. And speaking of memory, the recent meeting between American President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing still lingers before fading into oblivion in today’s frantic digital space. Yet material and geographical realities do not indefinitely yield to the flux of digital algorithms. The avoidance of themes like Taiwan and Iran hint at a reality catching up with both sides: beneath rivalry, US–China ties remain deeply interdependent, where competition is tempered by caution. What unfolded reflects an older pattern: great powers rarely pursue total dominance when geography and economics impose limits. In this evolving backdrop, the continuous upgradation of India–EU ties—reflected recently when India and Italy elevated relations to a “Special Strategic Partnership”—is partly a consequence of the Mediterranean’s growing relevance in wider Indian Ocean engagements.
When Constantinople fell and the Ottomans took control of the Black Sea–Mediterranean corridor through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, trade flowing through it would amount to hundreds of billions in today’s terms. While the fall of Constantinople neither directly triggered the Renaissance nor marked immediate civilisational collapse, it turned a corridor into a choke point, forcing European merchants to adapt to new geographical realities. Nearly six centuries later, the impulse remains strikingly familiar.
The Discipline of Geography
It is a regular occurrence these days to know, hear, and learn of developments unfolding globally through a predictable parlance framed in the language of rupture and novelty. Such developments—especially conflicts—are often described as “unprecedented”, “game-changing”, or as heralding a new era of warfare. These assumptions create the impression that events stand outside historical continuity. Yet history and geography suggest otherwise. Coverage of the ongoing conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran has remained fixated on immediate factors—the kinetic aspects, military hardware, tactics employed, and a ceasefire too tenuous to inspire confidence. Yet the crisis in West Asia cannot be reduced merely to today’s power politics. It also evokes older geopolitical realities, where maritime routes had become contested spaces shaping conflicts and civilizations across centuries. It reflects how competing states increasingly cooperate because of strategic and economic necessity. The United States and China, despite their strategic rivalry, remain deeply interlinked systemically. The US economy stands at around $31 trillion compared to China’s roughly $20 trillion. Of nearly 4,500 major global intelligence and technology companies, around 2,000 and 1,300 are based in the US and China alone, reflecting technological interdependence that imposes restraint on both powers. Such realities are equally evident in Iran’s geography. It sits astride the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical energy corridors. According to the US Energy Information Administration, roughly 21 million barrels of oil transited the corridor daily before the conflict broke out. The ongoing tensions in the Persian Gulf have pushed global oil prices upward, with Brent crude briefly crossing the $100 per barrel threshold. Iranian authorities also launched the Persian Gulf State Authority (PGSA) on 18 May 2026 to regulate vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz and levy transit fees. Invoking historical echoes, European merchants once found themselves dependent on routes regulated and taxed by the Ottomans after their control over Constantinople. Over time, these anxieties accelerated Europe’s search for alternative routes. The outreach between India and Europe today carries echoes of those impulses set in motion nearly six centuries ago.
India-EU Strategic Alignment: Between Facilitation and Systemic Inhibition
The widely publicised meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Italian counterpart Giorgia Meloni—perceived in some quarters as mere theatrics and optics—is reflective of a functional convergence unfolding discreetly across the Indo-Mediterranean region. Beneath viral photographs and video reels lie a growing awareness in Rome and New Delhi that the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean are gradually becoming part of the same integrated strategic space. As Europe confronts volatility in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, Mediterranean nations such as Italy, Greece and France are giving fresh impetus to their ties with India. France has maintained a naval footprint extending from the Mediterranean to the larger Indian Ocean Region (IOR), while Italy’s expertise in maritime infrastructure and undersea cable capacities, and Greece’s position as the world’s largest ship-owning nation and gateway between Asia and Europe, attest to the Eastern Mediterranean’s enduring strategic relevance. In this backdrop, discussions involving Greek authorities and Indian companies over acquiring stakes in the strategically located port of Alexandroupolis assume geopolitical value beyond commerce. The Eastern Mediterranean is increasingly viewed as a strategic space connecting Europe’s technological and industrial core with the expanding markets of the Indian Ocean region and beyond. For European Union, pursuing deeper economic, technological and industrial ties with New Delhi is emerging as a strategic priority, with bilateral annual trade at around €180 billion and poised to expand through the imminent Free Trade Agreement. Simultaneously, Europe’s nearly €350 billion trade deficit with China is making deeper technological and economic dependence on Beijing increasingly difficult.
Conclusion
The fall of Constantinople nearly six centuries ago compelled merchants and empires to reconcile altered corridors and equations of power. The world is again witnessing the structural force of geography. A geoeconomic corridor like the IMEC risks being reduced to headlines and conference communiqués if not implemented through coordinated action by participating nations. It is in this regard that the Eastern Mediterranean, linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Arabian Sea, attains renewed relevance.
Yet history warns against excessive exuberance. Unlike geographically insulated and centralised states, democratic states must balance foreign policy objectives with domestic political realities. For India and Europe, the coming years demand institutional discipline, measured diplomacy and an instinct to view statecraft within the longue durée of history rather than fleeting spectacle. Guided by sound policies, they can emerge as pillars of equilibrium in a fragmenting world. In hindsight, Napoleon Bonaparte was right in remarking that “the policy of all powers is inherited in their geography”.
Dr. Manish Barma holds a PhD from the Centre of European Studies, School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has been a Visiting Scholar at the International Hellenic University at Thessaloniki.
