The Japanese solution was to diversify and not divorce. It maintained the American connection at the core and constructed a tentacle structure of other connections around it.
The Japanese Precedent
Postwar Japan made a purposeful deal. The Yoshida Doctrine was that Tokyo was to hand over its security to the United States, limit the growth of its military and concentrate on economic reconstruction. This dependence was enshrined in the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security that was signed in 1960. It had been doing its job for decades. The alliance was said to be the backbone of stability in Asia, and Japan became prosperous behind American guns. As China ascended, the cornerstone started to rock. Beijing’s military modernisation, pressure over its Senkaku Islands, grey-zone coercion at sea, and the missile programme of North Korea led to a question Tokyo had long been reluctant to ask: would the United States bleed for Japan, and for how much? Doubt was added to doubt by episodes of American ambivalence: from trade friction in the 1980s to periodic calls from the allies for more money for protection. There was never really any question of forsaking the alliance. There was a risk of going through life with only a single friend. The Japanese solution was to diversify and not divorce. It maintained the American connection at the core and constructed a tentacle structure of other connections around it. The Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation with India of 2008 was a precursor. The elements behind Shinzo Abe’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the resurrection of the Quad, reciprocal access pledges with Australia and the United Kingdom, and his historic call to double defence budgets all stemmed from the same logic. The political gamble that Japan made in Asia as an India partner, in common with other partners, was that it had no colonial or wartime baggage in Asia, but had its own concerns about the rise of China. Tokyo stayed with Washington. It was just that it no longer felt lonely.
The question is the same: what is the answer?
Israel has been dependent on America, but in a different sense and to a similar extent. Washington, in the view of many, has become Israel’s only indispensable ally, having vetoed UN resolutions, consistently provided military aid of the order of $3.8 billion annually under the current agreement, and ensured Israel’s military superiority with guarantees and through joint missile defence programmes. The assumption was recently put forth, and the response to that assumption is what makes this the moment for Israel to be the “Japan”. In his meeting with Israeli opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu, the American vice president publicly called on Israel to respect Washington’s efforts to implement diplomacy with Tehran, claiming the United States is Israel’s only powerful ally and “Israel must not attack it”. The instruction was clear – go with the flow, you have no other place to be, so get in line. President Trump has said the same thing, stating that Israel wouldn’t exist without him or the United States. Netanyahu’s reply was clear. He said the alliance with America is unrivalled, but that Israel has other friends: a country of 1.4 billion people, to which Israel enjoys “tremendous support” and with which it is building “new alliances and new relationships,” he said, “I am doing this right now with India.” This was not a throwaway sentence, coming as it does amid what appeared to be some visible tensions with America over diplomacy with Iran and how Iran’s proxies are being managed. It was a signal, given in the register that the Japanese leaders once used: the alliance exists, and exclusivity is gone.
The question is, why India and why is terrorism the test?
The Israelis are not looking for an alternative superpower. There is no substitute for it. They are looking for true friends: states that do not change sides based on the electoral cycle and have a sense of the essence of Israel’s security issue from their own personal experience. That problem is the terrorist threat and proxy warfare. In this, India is a natural interlocutor. Cross-border terrorism and state-sponsored proxies have been an ongoing issue in India for a long time – from Punjab to Kashmir to Mumbai (2008). It has never denounced Israel’s legitimacy as a legitimate response to terrorism, even when it has disagreed with Israel’s specific actions. Since October 7, there has been remarkable sympathy among the public for Israel in India; after the attack, the official statement in New Delhi unequivocally condemned the attack while maintaining that it was Israel’s traditional stance that a two-state solution is to be pursued. The two nations already engage in close defence trade and intelligence-sharing, cybersecurity, and counterterrorism cooperation. In times of crisis, Israel has proved to be one of the most reliable arms suppliers to India, including in the Kargil War, and India is now among the biggest markets for the Israeli defence industry. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and I2U2 provide institutional and economic underpinnings to the relationship beyond arms deals. For Israel, the charm lies in the same place as it did for Japan in India: a great, growing non-Western power with common threat perceptions, that is looking for strategic independence rather than bloc discipline, and which will not use friendship as a currency. As Washington grows weary or delegitimises Israel’s fears over Iranian proxies to coincide with its own diplomatic calendar, allies such as India come into their own, as one thing Washington is lacking is loyalty when it comes to the issue that matters most to Israel’s security: Iranian proxies.
The Limits of Analogy
One has to make a mention of where the parallel strains are. Japan moved from a wealthy and institutionalised ally towards diversification outside a formal treaty-military alliance. Israel has no treaty of defence with anyone, and in times of war, its reliance on American arms, spares, and diplomatic protection is much greater than Japan’s reliance in peacetime. In turn, India is in no way an ally in the treaty sense and will never be one. It keeps working relations with Iran and the Gulf Arab countries, respects its own freedom of action and abstains at the United Nations as many times as it votes on matters regarding West Asia. Netanyahu’s reference to India is in part a bludgeoning tactic directed at Washington, and that should be interpreted by New Delhi as such. However, the only way that diversification can start is through leverage. Japan’s early hedging was also dismissed as theatre until it hardened into a strategy. The lesson of the Japanese precedent is not that Israel will leave America. It is that no serious state, once told it has only one friend, ever again allows that to remain true.
