NEW DELHI: On April 12, Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the US Middle East Envoy, Steve Witkoff, met in Muscat, hosted by the Omani Foreign Minister, to outline a plan for negotiations regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. Although their respective interactions with Omani mediators lasted over two hours, they met face-to-face briefly in what marked the highest-level meeting between Iran and the US since 2018. This meeting occurred as Iran approached the mid-May deadline that Trump claimed to have established to bring Iran’s nuclear programme to the negotiating table, warning of “great danger” if they failed to do so, in a letter delivered to the Iranian regime by Anwar Mohammad Gargash, a close aide to the UAE’s President. The Trump Administration has not ruled out military action as a policy option, though it remains a red line for the Iranian regime.
This and several other disagreements between the two regimes make the opportunity for a negotiated, peaceful settlement increasingly narrow. The US and Iran will hold their next round of talks on Saturday, although the terms and procedural modalities remain unclear. Different narratives have emerged from the United States and Iran, with uncertainty about whether the engagement is happening through direct dialogue or mediated channels. The location of the anticipated meeting on Saturday presents another point of contention, with ambiguous reports of European capitals hosting the delegates, while Iran remains committed to Oman facilitating mediation.
The significance of this move in amicably settling one of the most polarising issues in the region, against the backdrop of the Israel-Gaza War and the breakdown of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, cannot be overstated. The Middle East has been a theatre of proxy warfare between Iran, acting through its proxies in Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen, and US allies in the region. The US imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iran after the previous Trump Administration unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was signed between Iran and the permanent members of the UNSC, along with Germany and the European Union, crippling the Iranian economy. While this initiative is not a thaw, it certainly represents an opening for lasting peace in the region and the return of Iran from economic and geopolitical isolation.
However, as this article will demonstrate, it is unlikely that this outreach will reach its logical conclusion. Procedural divergences are easy to navigate when there is a concurrence of aims. Both countries have become intractably distant since the breakdown of the JCPOA, and their bilateral relations and regional status have become intertwined with domestic rhetoric and their reputation for resolve; any semblance of concession from one side to the other will weaken their reputation for resolve, potentially undermining their maximalist stance among their core support base and escalating audience costs. The ambiguity surrounding the use of mediators in the upcoming negotiations results from their grandstanding for domestic political purposes, as they seek to convince their respective domestic audiences that they are driving the negotiation on their own terms. The US desires direct talks, while Iran prefers mediated negotiations, both reaffirming their mutual distrust of each other’s commitment to the negotiations.
Drivers of Engagement: Position of Weakness
Despite deep distrust, what compelled the US and Iran to negotiate a new nuclear deal? The implementation of sanctions and maximum pressure, combined with the mounting costs of war led by its proxies in Gaza and Lebanon, has crippled Iran’s economy. Inflation has exceeded 30% since 2018, and for a country where the median citizen is aged 34, bleak economic prospects are typified by high youth unemployment. The citizens ‘economic woes and the erosion of state capacity to provide welfare and jobs have incited insurrection against the regime’s repressive social and political laws, making the survival of the regime tenuous. As a result, the ultra-conservative Ebrahim Raisi was replaced by Masoud Pezeshkian, who campaigned on a reform-oriented platform aimed at improving relations with the West and gamered the support of the Ayatollah for his policies. In addition to its domestic challenges, Iran’s regional position is a shadow of its former self, with the pillars of its Axis of Resistance-Hamas, Hezbollah, Bashar al-Assad-either deposed or weakened.
However, it is not only Iran that approaches the negotiations from a position of weakness. Trump criticised the Biden Administration’s policies on Ukraine and Gaza, restoring confidence in his ability to end these wars of attrition. Trump’s attempts to mediate a ceasefire in Ukraine and Gaza ended in failure, instead escalating the conflict. While he announced baseline and reciprocal tariffs with great fanfare, he has had to dilute them repeatedly, realising their impact on American businesses and consumers. The Department of Government Efficiency’s cutbacks to federal grants and reduction in workforce have drawn backlash, bolstering reports of Elon Musk’s impending departure and undermining Trump’s plans to streamline the federal government.
Trump, therefore, comes to the negotiating table equally desperate to salvage his presidency by achieving at least one foreign policy objective: neutralising Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Trump and Pezeshkian are becoming increasingly unpopular due to their failure to achieve their campaign objectives. The frustration over their aims is likely to make them more hardline in their dealings with each other. Anti-Americanism is peaking in the Islamic world, and Pezeshkian can ill afford to appear weak by making concessions to the Israeli and American agenda. The Trump administration is composed of Iran hawks like Marco Rubio and Michael Waltz, increasing the probability of groupthink and, consequently, hardline policies. Moreover, Trump’s Middle East policy has prioritised Israeli strategic calculus, making the odds of a rapprochement slim.
Indivisible Ends
Due to the breakdown of communication channels, Iran and the US do not see eye to eye on what the next deal should contain. Iran seeks an easing of sanctions and a return to the terms of the JCPOA, which allowed Iran to enrich uranium to 3.67% purity, far below the weapon-grade threshold, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The Trump-Netanyahu duo interpreted this arrangement as a betrayal of Israeli and Arab interests, with Israel viewing Iran’s reintegration into the international financial and trade system as equivalent to empowering the Axis of Resistance. Israel endorsed Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the implementation of “maximum pressure” policies on Iran. This time as well, Netanyahu and Trump aim to dismantle Iran’s nuclear programme, thus precluding the use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes. By making their goals indivisible and infusing their rhetoric with radical policy steps, they have constrained the space and agenda for Iran to negotiate. Iran’s relations with Israel and the West are framed in emotive and religious terms of honour and duty, making the possibility of a “compromise” on their terms equally unlikely.
The Iran-USA ties are thus clouded by pessimism. They are unlikely to foster lasting peace in the region or limit Iran’s nuclear programme to civilian use and eventually bring it into the mainstream. The domestic audience costs of these negotiations have been exacerbated by hardline elements on both sides; the influence of Israeli strategic interests on Trump’s foreign policy narrows the path to reconciliation between the US and Iran. The role of mediating states, particularly Oman and the UAE, will be intriguing but will have little impact. Both Trump and Pezeshkian approach these negotiations from a position of weakness, but rather than becoming more amenable to compromise, such a position will interact with other factors outlined in this article to produce indivisible, hardline, and intransigent stances.
* Parth Seth is a research fellow at India Foundation. He studies the Middle East and North Africa and Pakistan.