The three countries are united by Sunni Islam, although their political and religious traditions differ considerably.
Agreement, signed in the holy city of Mecca by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, marks one of the most significant strategic developments in the Islamic world in decades. The agreement brings together a Sunni bloc stretching from Anatolia through the Arabian Peninsula to South Asia, uniting three countries with a combined population of approximately 380 million people, including around 320 million Sunnis. According to the publicly released provisions, an armed attack against one member will be treated as an attack against all three. The agreement expands military cooperation, intelligence sharing, defence industrial collaboration, joint planning and strategic coordination. All three governments have stressed that the pact is defensive in nature, is not directed against any particular country and is not intended to replace existing alliances such as NATO or bilateral defence relationships.
Rather than representing a completely new framework, it should be viewed as a natural extension of the Saudi Arabia Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed in 2025. The three countries are united by Sunni Islam, although their political and religious traditions differ considerably. Saudi Arabia, as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, derives much of its legitimacy from being the birthplace of Islam and of the first Rashidun Caliphate. Turkey, meanwhile, was home to the Ottoman Caliphate, the last universally recognised Sunni caliphate before its abolition in 1924. Pakistan, despite lacking comparable religious symbolism, has long aspired to play a leadership role within the Islamic world through its military strength and nuclear capability.
Yet beneath this apparent unity lie profound ideological and geopolitical differences. For decades, Ankara and Riyadh competed for influence across the Sunni world. President Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), rooted in Turkey’s Islamist political tradition, has frequently been associated with movements sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, an organisation viewed with deep suspicion by the Saudi monarchy. Although relations between Ankara and Riyadh have improved considerably in recent years, this historical rivalry has not entirely disappeared. Pakistan’s role is equally complex. Its long-standing military partnership with Saudi Arabia has traditionally been underpinned by Saudi financial support and extensive military cooperation. Pakistani officers have trained Saudi forces for decades, while thousands of Pakistani troops have served in the Kingdom. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan became the operational hub of the U.S.-Saudi programme supporting the Afghan mujahideen, a campaign that profoundly shaped the region’s subsequent security environment. The largest strategic question surrounding the Mecca Pact is Iran. While the agreement stops short of identifying any adversary, its timing naturally invites speculation. Yet despite the mutual defence clause, it remains difficult to envisage either Pakistan or Turkey entering a direct military conflict with Iran in defence of Saudi Arabia. Pakistan’s growing diplomatic importance following the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran has been built in part on its ability to maintain channels of communication with Tehran.
Field Marshal Asim Munir’s relationships with Iranian military and intelligence officials have enhanced Islamabad’s value as an intermediary rather than as a participant in any confrontation. A direct Pakistani military commitment against Iran would undermine precisely the strategic position that has recently increased Islamabad’s regional relevance. Turkey’s calculations are equally constrained. Ankara has developed a pragmatic relationship with Tehran despite competing interests in Syria, Iraq and the Caucasus. While the two countries remain strategic rivals, they have consistently avoided direct military confrontation. Nor is there obvious enthusiasm within either Pakistan or Turkey to become involved in Saudi Arabia’s long-running confrontation with the Houthis in Yemen. That conflict has exposed one of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s principal strategic vulnerabilities. Whether Turkey would ultimately contribute naval or logistical support in the event of further Houthi attacks on Saudi shipping remains uncertain. Ankara has invested heavily in Somalia and seeks to maintain a permanent strategic presence along the Red Sea, giving it interests that extend beyond the Arabian Peninsula itself. Equally absent from the agreement is any indication of NATO-style integrated command structures, unified operational planning or permanent joint headquarters. This suggests that the pact should be viewed less as a fully integrated military alliance than as a strategic framework for defence cooperation. Each country also has a different relationship with Israel. Turkey recognises Israel, though currently relations are at an all-time low.
After the Abraham Accords, a Saudi-Israeli rapprochement is the only logical next step to ambitious infrastructure projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), and there is always a chance of a deal before President Trump’s second term ends. Pakistan, however, is in a delicate situation. A hint of recognition of Israel would cause tremendous social strife in a country that is already socially and economically fragile and on the precipice of civil war. Indeed, one of its most immediate consequences may be the integration of the three countries’ defence industries. Saudi Arabia contributes financial resources and procurement capacity. Pakistan offers one of the world’s largest Muslim armed forces, together with the Islamic world’s only declared nuclear deterrent. Turkey provides NATO-standard military expertise together with one of the fastestgrowing defence industries in the world, particularly in drones, missiles, naval systems and electronic warfare. Pakistan may also serve as a bridge to Chinese military technology. As Beijing expands its defence exports throughout the Global South, Pakistan could potentially facilitate cooperation with Saudi-funded programmes in regions such as Africa without direct Chinese involvement, allowing Beijing to reduce political exposure while expanding its strategic influence. Saudi Arabia has already demonstrated its willingness to finance Pakistani defence and infrastructure initiatives in countries such as Sudan and Libya.
While Pakistan’s implementation capacity has sometimes been questioned, Turkey has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to execute complex military and industrial projects abroad. For both New Delhi and Washington, the Mecca Pact deserves careful attention, although not necessarily alarm. Despite Turkey’s military assistance to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, Ankara has simultaneously invested significant diplomatic capital in improving relations with India. It is difficult to imagine Turkey becoming directly involved in any future India-Pakistan conflict. Saudi Arabia faces similar constraints. Under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Riyadh has developed an exceptionally close strategic and economic partnership with India, investing heavily in infrastructure, energy and technology. Entering a conflict against India would fundamentally contradict Saudi Arabia’s broader regional strategy. The greater long-term significance of the pact may therefore lie elsewhere. With an increasingly visible Israel-India-UAE strategic partnership already emerging across defence and technology, the Mecca Pact could become an alternative platform for military-industrial cooperation across parts of the Islamic world and the Global South. Its greatest strategic impact may not be collective defence but rather the transfer of military technologies, industrial partnerships and security assistance to third countries. This possibility deserves close attention in Western capitals.
The United States should continue engaging Saudi Arabia while maintaining pressure on Pakistan to prevent destabilising technology transfers. NATO, meanwhile, has a strong interest in ensuring that Turkey’s expanding defence exports remain consistent with Alliance security interests. Of particular concern would be the indirect transfer of advanced military technologies, whether Turkish or Chinese, to fragile states or non-state actors through intermediary partnerships. History offers an important cautionary lesson. The U.S.-Saudi-Pakistani cooperation launched in 1979 to support the Afghan mujahideen contributed to the emergence of militant Deobandi-Wahhabi networks whose consequences extended far beyond Afghanistan, ultimately culminating in the attacks of 11 September 2001 and leaving a legacy of instability across South Asia and the wider region. The Mecca Pact is fundamentally different in its objectives and context. Nevertheless, its long-term significance will depend not on the language of the agreement itself but on how it is implemented. Whether it evolves into a genuine collective security architecture or primarily serves as a vehicle for defence industrial cooperation and proxy engagement will determine whether it reshapes regional stability or merely adds another layer to an already complex geopolitical landscape.
Vas Shenoy is an Italian entrepreneur of Indian origin and the founder of the Indo-Mediterranean Initiative (cnky.in). He is the Chief Representative for Italy of the Indian Chamber of Commerce.
