Trump's invasion lacks clear objectives, risks prolonged war, and may strengthen Iranian hardliners rather than achieving stability.
President Donald Trump and Putin
LONDON: Let’s face it, President Donald Trump’s decision to attack Iran is already looking catastrophic. After only two weeks, the Middle East is in flames, with over a thousand deaths and serious civilian casualties, including a deadly strike on the Iranian Shajarah Tayyebeh girls school, killing at least 165 children and injuring many others. Goaded by Israel’s President Netanyahu, whose aim is to control the Middle East, Trump’s invasion lacks clear objectives, risks prolonged war, and may strengthen Iranian hardliners rather than achieving stability.
When Trump gave the order to attack Iran, the move was framed as a strategic necessity, aimed at weakening Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and deterring regional aggression. Yet geopolitics rarely produces outcomes as clean as policymakers intend and in the short term, perhaps even the long term, one person appears to be quietly benefiting from the fallout: Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The Kremlin did not fire a missile, deploy troops, or risk escalation. Instead, it has largely watched events unfold from the side-lines while a conflict between Washington and Tehran reshapes global markets, strategic priorities, and alliances in ways that play directly into Putin’s hands. Three dynamics explain why Russia may ultimately emerge as the biggest winner: soaring energy prices, a strategic distraction for the United States, and the further fragmentation of the Western alliance.
The most immediate effect of the conflict has been a dramatic surge in global oil prices. Markets reacted swiftly as fears spread that fighting in and around the Persian Gulf, particularly near the Strait of Hormuz, a two-mile wide shipping channel and one of the world’s most important energy choke points, could severely disrupt supply. Critics say that Donald Trump grossly miscalculated Iran’s ability to choke off global oil supplies, leading to an entirely foreseeable price shock. Brent crude prices have already surged above $119 a barrel, rising more than 60 percent since the start of hostilities, although prices at the time of writing are fluctuating around $100. Unsurprisingly, this has unleashed chaos across global markets, with stocks sinking and government borrowing costs soaring. For Russia, a major oil and gas exporter already operating under Western sanctions, this price spike is a geopolitical gift. As one of the world’s largest producers of oil and gas, higher oil prices translate directly into increased revenues for the Kremlin. It has been calculated that every $1 increase in the price of oil, if sustained over a whole year, increases Russia’s annual oil export revenues by $2.7bn. Even with sanctions and discounted exports, Russia’s fiscal stability remains closely tied to energy markets, as every additional dollar per barrel helps finance the Russian state and crucially, its war effort in Ukraine. In effect, Washington may have unintentionally boosted the primary revenue stream of the very adversary it has spent years trying to economically isolate. History offers plenty of precedent. During periods of Middle Eastern turmoil, from the Arab oil embargo to the Iraq War, energy exporters outside the conflict zone have routinely benefited. Russia now occupies exactly that position: a major supplier that is geographically distant from the battlefield.
If higher oil prices are the economic benefit for Vladimir Putin’s Russia, strategic distraction is the geopolitical one. For over two years, the United States and its allies have been deeply engaged in supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. That commitment has required enormous political attention, financial resources, and military equipment, from air-defence systems to ammunition stockpiles. The sudden emergence of a major Middle Eastern war inevitably diverts those resources. Some analysts have already noted that Iranian missile attacks have forced the United States to deploy and expand air-defence systems that are also in high demand in Ukraine. After all, every Patriot interceptor fired in the Gulf is one that cannot be sent to Kyiv.
Beyond military hardware, political attention is also a finite resource. Foreign policy crises demand focus from policymakers, military planners, and intelligence agencies. A large-scale confrontation with Iran shifts shifting Washington’s strategic priority from Eastern Europe to the Middle East. For Moscow, this shift could be invaluable. Russia’s leadership has long calculated that Western unity over Ukraine would eventually weaken as other crises emerged, and a new war in the Middle East does exactly that: it complicates decision-making, divides attention, and strains already stretched defence budgets. From Putin’s perspective, the timing could hardly be better.
Another advantage for Moscow lies in the diplomatic fallout of the attack. Even before the first missiles struck Iranian targets, Western unity over global security was showing signs of strain, and the attack has widened those divisions. The United States launched the operation with limited consultation with some of its allies, leaving European governments scrambling to respond. Such unilateral actions inevitably generate friction within alliances. Some countries worry about escalation, others fear economic disruption, and still others question the legality or strategic wisdom of the operation. These disagreements weaken the unified front that has defined Western policy towards Russia since the invasion of Ukraine. Vladimir Putin thrives in exactly this environment. For years, Russian strategy has focused on exploiting divisions among Western powers, whether through energy dependence, political influence campaigns, or diplomatic manoeuvring. A contentious new war in the Middle East gives Russia additional opportunities to position itself as a critic of Western intervention while courting non-Western states skeptical of U.S. military action. It was not unnoticed that Russian officials quickly condemned the attack as an act of aggression and called for diplomacy, framing Moscow as a defender of international law and sovereignty, ignoring the fact that it had itself illegally invaded a sovereign country, Ukraine. This narrative resonates across parts of the Global South, where many governments remain wary of Western military interventions.
At first glance, the idea that Russia benefits from attacks on Iran may seem counter-intuitive. After all, Moscow and Tehran have developed increasingly close ties in recent years, particularly in military cooperation and sanctions evasion. Iran has supplied drones and other weapons used by Russia in Ukraine, while Moscow has deepened economic and defence ties with Tehran. Yet their relationship is more pragmatic than ideological, as Russia and Iran are partners of convenience, united primarily by their shared opposition to Western influence. Moscow has historically been careful to maintain flexibility in the Middle East, balancing relations not only with Iran but also with Israel, Gulf states, and Turkey. This balancing act allows Russia to benefit from regional instability without becoming entangled in it. Indeed, Moscow has so far limited its response to rhetorical condemnation rather than direct military involvement. That restraint reflects a strategic calculation: Russia gains more by letting the conflict drain Western attention than by risking escalation itself.
The broader significance of the crisis, however, lies in how it is accelerating a global shift toward multipolarity. The United States remains the world’s most powerful military actor, but its ability to manage multiple simultaneous crises is being clearly tested. A war with Iran, on top of commitments in Europe and Asia, stretches even American capabilities. Russia, by contrast, has fewer global responsibilities and can operate opportunistically. In a world where multiple regional conflicts erupt at once, the advantage shifts toward actors willing to exploit chaos rather than resolve it. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly demonstrated his skill in doing exactly that, from Syria to Africa to Eastern Europe. The Iran crisis may therefore reinforce a pattern in which Putin’s Russia plays the role of geopolitical spoiler—not necessarily winning wars outright, but ensuring that his rivals face constant instability.
None of this means Russia’s gains are guaranteed, of course. Prolonged conflict could destabilize key regions, disrupt trade routes, and trigger unpredictable escalations, including the possibility of wider war. Such outcomes could harm Russia as well. There is also the possibility that a major U.S. victory over Iran could reshape the regional balance of power in ways unfavourable to Moscow. But geopolitics is rarely about perfect outcomes; it is about relative advantage. Right now, the relative advantage unquestionably favours Russia. Energy prices are rising, Western attention is divided, and global alliances are under strain. Vladimir Putin did not initiate the crisis, but he is positioned to benefit from it.
History is full of unintended geopolitical consequences. The ill-advised U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 reshaped the Middle East in ways few anticipated. The Syrian civil war created opportunities for Russia to reassert itself as a major power in the region. And now, the attack on Iran may inadvertently strengthen the strategic position of one of Washington’s principal rivals. The lesson is a familiar one, which Donald Trump fails to understand: military power can achieve tactical objectives, but its broader consequences are often unpredictable. In this case, the biggest beneficiary may not be those directly involved in the conflict. Instead, it may be the one watching from afar—Vladimir Putin, who must be a very happy man!
* John Dobson is a former British diplomat, who also worked in UK Prime Minister John Major’s office between 1995 and 1998. He is currently a visiting fellow at the University of Plymouth.
