While the pact has no organisational structure, strategic poise and diplomatic weight, it boosts security to Riyadh, gives access to weapon system markets for Ankara and does give some strategic depth to Islamabad.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif signed the Mecca Defence pact during the “Makkah Al-Mukarramah Summit for Joint Defence” this month. While the overall details are not known, the fine print envisages an armed attack against one would be deemed as an attack on all three. It is based on the similar lines of Article 5 of NATO, which is based on collective defence. It is notable that NATO has invoked Article 5 only once in its history following the attacks on 11 September 2001.
On the very face of it, this pact is less of alliance and more of strategic hedging with Iran’s sustained belligerence and the ongoing war in West Asia. The three states have supposedly aligned, apparently to garner some insurance for the prevailing uncertainty by signing this agreement. This grouping could alter the security architecture of West Asia with a possibility of Egypt, Jordan or other smaller, oil rich states joining in the future.
This green triangle effectively constitutes the three vertices with Saudi Arabia being a major oil producer, a well procured Air Force and outsourced boots on ground. Turkey is trying to exert influence with a farfetched “Ottoman Syndrome” and has the largest army in NATO, an alliance which is undergoing an existential crisis. The third vertex consists of the cash strapped, nuclear armed Pakistan which seems to be imploding from within and has historically been a rentier state, tilting towards the highest bidder. To begin with, this construct is certainly not an equilateral triangle and looks scalene, geometrically.
There is, however, an uncanny resemblance to “The Baghdad Pact” which was signed in February 1955 and was originally a “Pact of Mutual Co-operation” signed between Iraq and Turkey. The pact, at its core, was an attempt by the West to create a prowestern security belt towards the southern flank of the erstwhile USSR. It was based on what the West called its “Northern Tier Strategy”. Subsequently in the same year, the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Iran joined the pact. The United States, although in support, did not officially become its member. This pact served as a medium through which the British could establish informal control over the region. In 1959, Iraq withdrew from the pact, thus changing its very name to the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Owing to this, its headquarters was shifted from Baghdad to Ankara, in Turkey. However, CENTO eventually collapsed in 1979, owing to its members having varied interests, geographical disconnect and the revolution in Iran.
Historically, pacts based on geography than on religion have thrived better and convenience rather than identity with geography has assembled this agreement. It is extremely pertinent to factor Pakistan’s Shia population and its historical neutrality in 2015 on Yemen, Turkey’s Alevi population and Iran between them as their permanent neighbour.
This could, however, be a waypoint to coalition building but it finds its roots in the Saudi ArabiaPakistan Defence Pact of 1982. The 2025 Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA), post the sharp 88 hours Op Sindoor, however, does signify this lofty aspiration, through such a modular, bilateral arrangement that may collectively form a security pact across the Middle East. The probability of the same, however, looks a little low as of now.
Prima facie, the three countries have very different strategic priorities. Security for Saudi Arabia with an increasingly belligerent Iran, the age-old Shia-Sunni quagmire and an apparent loss of trust in the US security umbrella in the current dispensation is palpable. The Turks have a flagging economy; a burgeoning defence industry and an old caliphate dream with a desire to project influence across littoral Europe and the Middle East. An India-centric agenda, leveraging the Chinese security umbrella without a formal alliance and a steady supply of money are the three pillars for Pakistan.
This agreement must also be viewed with Central Asia and the energy rich nations, quietly deepening cooperation across the Caspian in transport, trade and connectivity to strengthen regional links to bolster the regions’ role in the key East-West energy corridor. This region is similar in demographics, religion and in potential alliances of the future.
Pakistan needs to be watched diplomatically and militarily. While imploding from within and its armed forces being committed in massive uprisings from the Northern areas, PoK to Balochistan, it has been trying every trick in the book to stay relevant and forge relationships with financial, farcical or fanatic underpinnings. While the country has historically aligned itself to the western pacts quickly, this regional agreement needs to be watched closely.
While this is being touted as a regional partnership, Turkey has its commitments to NATO and this agreement could be in contradiction to the stated charter of NATO, eventually. India has a strong economic and strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, and this complicates the mosaic further.
The agreement aims to strengthen collective deterrence as stated in the text. It is officially “Defensive” but, if expanded, it possesses the wherewithal to alter the region’s security calculus. The fulcrum of this is the nuclear question and its extension to the others. While officially, it was clearly stated by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif that nuclear aspects were not a part of Saudi-Pak defence agreement last year, there is ambiguity and that translates into hidden policy. This is a classic gap where Pakistan does not commit and others speculate in uncertainty.
It should neither be an alarm nor accrue indifference to India, though. As the world turns increasingly transactional, India’s intensive strategic outreach to Europe as well as the Middle East in parallel with its pursuit of deeper ties with Australia, Japan and the United States is treading two paths without reshaping New Delhi’s strategic space. In terms of policy, a new Middle East strategy could be considered.
Beyond all, the narrative war needs to be handled delicately and astutely. While the pact has no organisational structure, strategic poise and diplomatic weight, it boosts security to Riyadh, gives access to weapon system markets for Ankara and does give some strategic depth to Islamabad, plagued with internal strife in nearly all provinces except Punjab. The long visioned concept of an “Arab NATO” has never taken shape with policy divergences, leadership rivalries and incompatible trade and threat perceptions.
The long-term significance remains to be seen with establishment of a formal structure including a secretariat, joint headquarters, expanded membership and a clearly defined charter. Till then it’s just a symbolic pledge and needs to be carefully analysed and navigated with diplomatic poise and corresponding military preparedness for contingencies in the future.
*Anurag Awasthi is a veteran, and CEO of Escape Velocity Mediaworks. He is a known policy expert and a columnist who writes extensively on critical technologies, security and geopolitics. Views are personal.
