Trump has projected the meet as a huge success. But it achieved nothing. His statements seemed to be made more to boost his own falling ratings before the midterm elections in November, than anything else.
Trump announced his upcoming trip to Beijing with a gush on Truth Social, “Xi will greet me with a big fat hug.” Chinese formality did not provide him a hug, though he received a warm welcome complete with a military parade, cheering school children and a visit to a forbidden garden. But it was part of a carefully choreographed spectacle designed to demonstrate not just equality between the two powers, but dominance.
Trump’s visit to Beijing is the first by a US president in almost a decade. The last was his own trip in 2017. But much water has flown down the Potomac and Yangtze rivers since then. China, in spite of an economic slowdown, has slowly enhanced its military and diplomatic imprint across the world. The USA meanwhile, has alienated allies, walked out of treaties and international institutions, ceded strategic space in Europe and Afghanistan and entered a disastrous war in Iran from which it desperately seeks an exit strategy.
The two leaders met from a position of equals, but it was China that seemed to hold the cards. China already held the upper hand when Trump’s tariff war rebounded spectacularly—struck down by his own Supreme Court. China had responded to the 150 percent tariffs by imposing tariffs of its own. It also clamped down on exports of rare earths and semiconductors essential to US industry, forcing the US to back off. And though the economic agenda was the main issue for both sides, other subjects—especially Taiwan and the Iran war—would have keenly discussed behind closed doors.
Both sides had differing priorities. For Washington, it was the three ‘Bs’—Boeing, Beef, and Beans. Trump boasted that China had agreed purchase 200 Boeing aircraft and “billions of dollars” of beef and soya beans from the USA. This would have brought cheer to its ailing aviation industry and US farmers, but there was no mention of it from the Chinese side. Even the large entourage of CEO’s and business leaders who had accompanied Trump left with little to show. The only concession the Chinese made was to agree to a reciprocal visit by Xi to Washington, sometime in September.
For China, its priorities lay in three ‘Ts’—Taiwan, Tariffs and Technology. It had clearly laid down its sensitivities on Taiwan, by warning that any mishandling of the Taiwan issue could “lead to clashes, even conflict.” Taiwan’s defence hinges on US intervention in case of a Chinese attack, but the US policy is ambiguous on that. Trump did make a conciliatory statement saying he was against Taiwan’s independence, implying he supported the ‘One-China two-systems’ approach that earlier governments have upheld. He also delayed approval for the $11 Billion of arms sale to Taiwan—after all, US arms is always a sore point with China. But as China gets more assertive to reunify Taiwan, US ambiguity and diminishing stature could be well exploited. The US has been weakened in the war with Iran—in terms of national will, allies and in the expenditure of critical weapons systems—especially Air Defence and long-range missiles. Its inability to subdue Iran, would also make it wary of other confrontations with an even stronger adversary. All this could embolden China to hasten its often-stated goal to “complete reunification by 2027, by military force, if required.”
The Iran war too would have had a great bearing on the talks. Trump claims he did not ask China for help to end the war, but it is a major player and has emerged stronger after the US-Iran war. China has close ties with Iran, whose foreign minister visited Beijing just a few days earlier. Its influence could help end the war and its disastrous impact. That would enable it to present itself as the stabilising force for the world economy, in a sharp contrast to the USA and Trumpian policies.
What emerged from the Chinese perspective was that it “seeks stability in its relations with the USA”—as long as it does not impinge on Chinese interests. It does see itself not only as a ‘near-peer’ (as the US does) but as an equal—perhaps as part of the ‘G2’. It is telling that Xi Jinping told Trump “We all need to work together to avoid the Thucydides trap”—a reminder of the dangers of war that can occur when an established power sees a rising one threatening its own position—which had been the main cause of the disastrous Sparta-Athens wars, when a dominant Sparta felt threatened by a rising Athens.
But that seems to be the long-term aim of China. To take over as the leading global power—either in conjunction with the US, or in confrontation with it. The USA has ceded strategic space across the world which it is slowly occupying. The US has also turned away from institutions like the UN, WTO, GATT, NATO, which had upheld the world order for decades, and China is exploiting the churn. The US has also spurned issues of global concern like climate change and global warming. These are areas in which China seeks a greater leadership role, and it could well usurp it. As of now it “seeks stability in its relations with the USA.” But as US and China compete for global influence, whether the relationship will be that of competitors, adversaries or partners could well determine the global order of this century.
Trump has projected the meet as a huge success. But it achieved nothing—no acknowledgement by China to buy Boeings, beef or soyabeans from the US, or provide any other concession, except for a vague cooperation in Artificial Intelligence and semi-conductors. His statements seemed to be made more to boost his own falling ratings before the midterm elections in November, than anything else. However, in the strategic and messaging sphere, it was China that came out Trumps. It projected itself as an equal and forced the US to recognise its key positions on Taiwan and trade. One of the achievements of Trump’s first term as President was that he recognised China as the main threat and saw the Indo-Pacific as the area of main focus. He took his eyes of the threat in his second term, and got distracted by tariff wars, Nicaragua and Iran. All this allowed China to rise untrammelled and the weakening of US global influence contributed to China’s growing stature. The long-term implications could be dangerous for India, Russia, Japan and Europe, and other ‘middle powers’ who will have to seek their own alliances and recalibrate their policies in the shifting balance of power.
Ajay Singh is the international-award winning author of eight books and over 250 published articles. He is a regular contributor to The Sunday Guardian.
