Exiled journalist Zhao Lanjian claims China’s military purges are pre-war preparations, not reforms.
New Delhi: Independent journalist Zhao Lanjian, who first reported the detention of several top Chinese generals months before Beijing’s official confirmation, is one of the few exile reporters whose early disclosures on China’s military power structure have repeatedly matched later official announcements.
A former citizen-journalist from mainland China now based in the United States, Zhao is regarded as an independent source on elite politics within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
His reports — from the purges in Rocket Force to the fall of Defence Minister Li Shangfu — have often preceded state-media confirmation by months.
In December 2023, Zhao coined the term “Great Purge” on social media to describe the arrest of Li Shangfu and the sweeping cleanup within China’s military-political apparatus, even as prevailing commentary framed it as “Xi losing control of the military,” “factional infighting,” or “an imminent coup.”
Now, as Xinhua published in its 20 October 2025 editorial — just before the Fourth plenary session — emphasising “security first, war readiness as priority,” Zhao says this confirms what he warned two years ago: Xi Jinping’s purge was never about internal rivalry; it was a pre-war mobilization.
Zhao spoke to The Sunday Guardian on the newly announced expulsion of nine senior officers, describing it as “a wartime reorganization disguised as discipline enforcement.”
The Sunday Guardian also contacted the Chinese Foreign Ministry seeking its version on Zhao Lanjian’s remarks. A response was awaited till the time of publication.
Edited excerpts.
1.You first reported the arrests months before Beijing’s confirmation. What does that delay reveal about how the CCP manages information during internal purges?
A1: In my observation, the core of CCP information control is not simply censorship—it is rhythmic manipulation. They control the exact timing of every disclosure. Through delay, selective editing, and staged release, they create an illusion of “order and control still intact.”
Since October 2023, I have released reports listing the names of generals and senior officials arrested—covering the Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, aerospace industry, and diplomatic corps. Each piece of information came from multiple insider channels, and every case was later confirmed officially—often months afterward.
For example, when Xinhua officially announced on October 17, 2025 that nine top generals were under investigation, I had already exposed their detention a year and a half earlier.
This deliberate delay is a form of political engineering. The CCP doesn’t deny the truth; it neutralizes it.
By controlling timing, it dilutes emotion, deflects attention, and reconstructs narrative stability both domestically and abroad. It confirmed that China’s propaganda system is not about facts—it’s about manufacturing an illusion of stability.
2. In your view, what is the political logic behind the purge of nine generals
A2: The nine investigated generals come from the most critical sectors of China’s military system—the Rocket Force, Navy, Eastern Theater Command, Armed Police, Political Work Department, Army Political Branch, and Navy Political System.
Such a sweeping purge was no coincidence; it was a deliberate reprogramming of the military-political command structure.
Xi’s objective is not merely anti-corruption—it is to shatter the entrenched “mountain factions” that have existed for decades, to eliminate anyone loyal to previous leaders or regional power networks.
He is reconstructing a military that obeys only one man—himself.
In late 2023, I first stated that this campaign was essentially a pre-war reorganization. Through carefully planned personnel reshuffles, Xi is building a purely politicized chain of command, one designed to function as an “automatic execution system” during wartime—no questioning, no hesitation.
The ultimate goal of this purge is to strip the PLA of independent thought and humanity—leaving only obedience and conditioned reflexes.
3.How much of this purge is genuine anti-corruption, and how much political consolidation by Xi Jinping?
A3: If there is any truth to the term “anti-corruption,” it is purely superficial. I have spoken with multiple insiders in China’s diplomatic and defense sectors who were interrogated during investigations.
All described prolonged torture and political coercion, mirroring the methods later associated with the Qin Gang case.
The real issue is not whether corruption exists, but who defines it. Xi Jinping has weaponized “anti-corruption” into a mechanism of political cleansing. In his system, corruption is not a problem—it is an excuse.
Loyalty is the only metric that matters.
Since 2023, entire leadership lines of the Rocket Force and the Equipment Development Department have been replaced. Even the Navy’s internal reviews extended to third-tier research institutes.This is not moral reform—it is political programming.
He uses “anti-corruption” to eliminate dissenting officers, “purges” to create fear, and fear to forge obedience. The result is a perfect political reconstruction—at the cost of an army stripped of all independent judgment.
4.What impact does removing an entire generation of commanders have on China’s military readiness?
A4: In the short term, this purge weakens the army; in the long term, it rewires it.
Eliminating nearly an entire command generation means reprogramming the psychology of war preparation. It’s not just a loss of experience—it’s a reconstruction of mentality.
After the Rocket Force purge, I noted two types of newly promoted commanders:those with technical backgrounds but no factional ties, and those with security and political policing origins.
Xi replaces skill with loyalty, and leadership with fear. Militarily, this creates massive gaps—lost expertise, fragmented command chains, and hyper-centralized decision-making.
Politically, however, it yields greater control: a fully politicized, fear-driven, and submissive army.
This army may commit strategic blunders—but it will never betray him. And that is exactly what Xi wants.
5. Does this indicate instability within the PLA, or a stronger centralized control structure emerging?
A5: To understand this question, one must place it in the context of a disinformation-saturated era. Over the past two years, almost every major Chinese-language outlet abroad has spread the same narrative:
“Xi has lost power.” “The Party elite is split.” “A coup is imminent.” These myths were endlessly amplified, often dressed in pseudo-religious language by commentators claiming “divine revelation.”
But the more than ten pieces of exclusive intelligence I obtained—combined with continuous analyses by my insider sources—showed the opposite. I saw Xi consolidating, not collapsing.
He systematically restructured the military, aerospace, and foreign policy apparatuses. This is not chaos—it is control perfected.
Most outlets refused to cite my reports, because doing so would shatter their profitable “palace-coup myth.”
Only when Xi personally reopened the Xizhuxin Battle Memorial for his father, presided over the National Day military parade, and approved the mass arrest of nine generals before the Fourth Plenum, did reality finally destroy the “Xi losing power” illusion.
6. How might these developments shape China’s external posture — particularly on Taiwan and the South China Sea?
A6: To grasp China’s external posture, one must see the “Great Purge” as a prelude to war. It was never about internal power struggles—it was political mobilization for conflict. When I coined the term “Great Purge” in 2023, few understood its true intent—it was preparation for war in the Taiwan Strait.
From the Rocket Force’s dismantling in 2023, to the aerospace, intelligence, and diplomatic purges in 2024, to Xinhua’s 2025 announcement of nine generals detained, this is not random—it is a systemic cleansing designed to ensure the entire state apparatus can enter wartime synchronization on command.
Based on my intelligence, internal personnel shifts, and linguistic analysis of Xinhua’s rhetoric, I forecast that the likelihood of a Taiwan Strait conflict will rise sharply by 2026.
When propaganda shifts from “development first” to “security first,” when every branch of the PLA is “rectified,” when Xinhua editorials speak of “braving turbulent waves”—these are all pre-war signals.
China’s direction will unfold in three dimensions:
1. Taiwan Front: Real Combat Rehearsal
Expect continuous, high-frequency, multi-branch military operations around Taiwan—essentially a “quasi-blockade.” It is not just deterrence—it’s a rehearsal for war tempo.
2. South China Sea: Peripheral Diversion
Beijing will escalate friction near the Philippines and Vietnam to distract global attention and test U.S. intervention response. The aim is not victory—it’s timing manipulation.
3. Narrative Front: Peace Rhetoric as War Cover
The CCP’s external propaganda machine—through co-opted overseas Chinese media—will keep repeating “peaceful development” and “mutual prosperity.” Their mission is to convince the world that China remains rational and restrained—precisely while it accelerates war readiness.
In short, Xi’s purge is both a political and psychological mobilization—a campaign to sanctify obedience and make war a patriotic reflex.
7. What role does the defense-industrial network play in these investigations?
A7: Corruption in China’s military is not incidental—it is structural. Since the 1980s, the PLA was allowed to “do business,” expanding into real estate, logistics, and trade. By the 1990s, “Red,” “official,” and “military” princelings had captured the entire defense industry, turning every command post into a profit chain.
The result: the military lost independence, professionalism, and creativity.
A force bound by family interests cannot think strategically; it exists to serve political masters, not national defense. Under such conditions, corruption became not a crime but a way of life—a systemic enslavement of personality.
They no longer think; they obey. Xi’s purge does not aim to remove corruption—it aims to replace one set of loyalists with another. He knows the rot is incurable; he only wants absolute obedience.
The purge of nine generals is not anti-corruption—it is a loyalty reset, replacing officers tied to previous leaders or industrial interests with his own loyal machines.
This military is no longer a “national army”; it is a household guard.
It lacks creativity, honor, and purpose.
In real conflicts—such as the China–India border clashes—this essence is revealed: rigid command, paralyzed decision-making, fear-driven passivity.
Therefore, the “anti-corruption” justification is only a mask for terror. This was never a moral campaign—it was political blood replacement. The outcome: a less professional, less independent, and more obedient army.
Future wars, including one over Taiwan, will not be professional conflicts—they will be political rituals, performed by a servile army.
8. Do you expect further purges, or has the ‘anti-corruption campaign’ achieved its goal?
A8: In the CCP system, purges never end — they sustain fear, the regime’s most efficient instrument of control. Xi’s “Great Purge” will not stop with the military; it will expand into the security, financial, propaganda, and ideological sectors.
To prepare for a Taiwan conflict, Xi is turning China into a wartime society — where soldiers, intellectuals, businessmen, and civilians operate under one command structure.
The arrests of nine generals were not to fight corruption, but to train obedience through fear — a modern form of behavioural conditioning.
This method continues China’s imperial tradition of rule through terror.
From Qin Shi Huang’s executions to Yongzheng’s secret surveillance, the philosophy was constant: destroy dignity to create submission.
Xi has updated these techniques — “discipline inspection” replaces torture, “public-opinion trials” replace exile, and digital surveillance enforces self-censorship.
The goal is unchanged: to make obedience instinctive.Under this design, loyalty becomes a survival reflex. The PLA is no longer a national army but a political guard serving power, not people.
That’s why, in border conflicts such as with India, Chinese soldiers often appear rigid and hesitant — they fight for survival, not ideals.
The purge will not end because its purpose is not cleansing but fear itself.
Each cycle of arrests is a ritual reminder that punishment is the system’s foundation — Xi rules through fear, not trust. That is the core of his political theology: “Order through fear, obedience through destruction.”
