A lot depends on the Israeli response. Their immediate aim would be to get retribution and they will target Hamas and its leadership, including the shadowy head of the Qassam Brigade, Mohammed Deif.
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The last time Israel was taken by surprise like this was exactly 50 years and one day earlier. Then on 6 October 1973, the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched an attack on the holy day of Yom Kippur, broke through the surprised defences and pushed Israel to the brink of defeat before it managed to retrieve the situation. The land, air and sea invasion of Hamas into Israel on 7 October was not so large in scale, but the effect it can have on the psyche of the nation and the geopolitics of the region could be equally significant.
At 6.30 a.m. on 7 October, Hamas fighters fired over 5,000 rockets into Israel from the Gaza Strip. The sheer number of missiles swamped the formidable Iron Dome air defence system, and struck targets at far inland as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Under cover of this barrage, around 500 Hamas fighters (some put the figure as high as 1,000) broke through the heavily fortified protective fence with bulldozers and cranes, and even used para gliders, micro lights and speed boats to enter Israel. Entering from 22 different locations, they reached almost 30 kilometers deep, entering the towns of Sderot, Beeri and Magen, and penetrated three military installations, including the Gaza Division Headquarters at Reim. In the carnage that followed over 900 Israelis were killed—260 of them at the Nova music festival in the Negev Desert—and over a hundred taken hostage. It was the largest number of casualties the nation has endured in a single day, and if we compare the scales of population of the United States and Israel, even more devastating than 9/11.
Israeli response was fast and predictably violent. By 10.30 a.m. the first wave of air strikes had pounded Hamas targets and residential areas in the Gaza strip to rubble. Gaza was placed under siege—“No water, no gas, no electricity, NOTHING”, as Israel closed in to eliminate Hamas, irrespective of the human cost. But the attackers had achieved what they wanted to. Israel was wounded, the Palestinian issue was back on the world stage. Most importantly, Israel’s growing rapprochement with the Arab world was under a cloud, and the Middle East peace process had gone back 20 years in just a day.
THE AFTERMATH
The most significant aspect of this attack was the manner in which Hamas managed to conceal its preparation and execution from Israel’s Shin Bet and Mossad—arguably the world’s premier intelligence agencies. But then, Hamas chose their moment well. Not only did they attack on Simchat Torah—a day of prayer and celebration—but the attacks came at a time when the country was increasingly divided from within.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s divisive policies, including a controversial new law to curtail judicial powers had set off street protests for months now, and a large portion of security and intelligence operatives had been tied up in containing these. Netanyahu’s fragile coalition government is dependent on right-wing extremists for political survival and he had been forced to acquiesce to many of their outrageous actions. The spate of Jewish settlements in occupied territories, the eviction of Palestinians from their traditional homes, and police action against worshippers in Al Aqsa Mosque—the third most revered Islamic shrine—this April had triggered off a wave of resentment. Appropriately, Hamas codenamed their operation Al Aqsa Storm, a name that would find resonance in the Muslim world.
There is a deeper motive. Israel was slowly gaining acceptance in the Arab world with the signing of the Abraham Accords with the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. A historic accord between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia and Prime Minister Netanyahu was in the offing. This deal would amalgamate Israel firmly with the Arab world, make it a security and technology provider and transform the economic architecture of the Middle East. One of the Saudi demands for the deal was “reduction of tensions and concessions to the Palestinian people from the Israeli government.” But it was ironic that its first statement was that the attacks were “due to the occupation and deprivation of the Palestinian people and provocations against holy sites.” In other words, the onus of the attacks has been shifted squarely on to Israel, and Saudi may be a little hesitant in moving forward now.
Other Arab states have endorsed similar sentiments, with Qatar holding Israel “solely responsible” for the action. In Egypt, a policeman shot dead two Israeli tourists, an indicator of the deep angst that still exists. In one stroke, the attacks and the Israeli response that followed have succeeded in fraying the peace process. Israel’s aura of invincibility has also been shorn, and it is significant that the Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh warned Arab nations against coming close to Israel, stating that a nation that could not protect itself would not be able to provide protection for its neighbours.
Even though Iran has been conspicuously silent—barring the usual condemnation of Israel—its role needs examination. Iran has recently signed a Beijing brokered peace agreement with Saudi, but it still considers both Saudi and Israel as enemies.
Should Israel and Saudi come together, its own position in the Middle East would be at threat—more so since the Sunni Arab states are traditionally antagonistic to Shia Iran. Both Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon are proxies of Iran and have been funded and supplied by it. There is no way that Hamas could have planned and executed an attack of such magnitude without Iranian support. Hezbollah has been on the sidelines ever since the last Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006, but they too have fired rockets into Israel, to express their solidarity with Hamas. Should Hezbollah open a front, Israel will be severely tested. The more Israel is pushed to the wall, the more severe would its response be, which is just what Hamas and their supporters are hoping for. A disproportionate response will again put the spotlight on the Palestinian issue and could revive the two-state solution, which has been almost forgotten.
A lot depends on the Israeli response. Their immediate aim would be to get retribution and they will target Hamas and its leadership, including the shadowy head of the Qassam Brigade, Mohammed Deif, who was the reported mastermind behind the attack. Israeli jets and missiles have pounded Gaza to rubble as they prepare for a ground invasion. Although Israel now has world sympathy, it could soon be seen as an aggressor. More so, since the 2.3 million Palestinians in the 41 kilometer long and 7-10-kilometer broad strip of coastal land have been under blockade for 16 years now and suffer unimaginable deprivations. Israel could soon launch a land invasion of Gaza to physically eliminate all Hamas operatives and seize their rockets and weapons. But it will not be easy.
Earlier wars with Hamas have been long and bloody, lasting up to 50 days and claiming immense civilian casualties. Hamas is better prepared now, and they could prolong the war, thus increasing casualties and drawing world attention. The longer the war goes, the greater are chances of sympathies shifting to the other side.
One restraining factor may be the 100 odd hostages taken by Hamas. Freeing them will be a priority, but they would be widely dispersed and hidden. They could become pawns in the bargaining game that will follow. Israel is very sensitive about the lives of its people and in 2011 freed 1,027 prisoners in exchange for one Israeli soldier. They may be coerced to release the 5,200 Palestinian prisoners languishing in Israeli jails, in exchange for the hostages. That itself would provide a huge boost to Hamas, irrespective of the overall outcome.
IMPACT
India has rightly stood in solidarity with Israel—after all, we too have suffered in a horrific terrorist strike in 2008 and understand the need to wipe out terrorism and the organizations that propagate it. We have a great stake in a peaceful Middle East. We have friendly ties with most Arab nations, Israel and even Iran. Over 90 lakh Indians reside and work there and the region accounts for 50% of our oil. The I2U2 grouping of India, Israel, the US and UAE which was to be the “Middle East Quad” may not take off, if tensions continue. Even our ambitious India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, and the activation of Chahbahar port depends on a stable Middle East. The war could put a cloud on these aspirations, and if divisions grow, we may need to recalibrate our policies.
The US is squarely behind Israel, even sending two carrier groups to the region to express solidarity, but the resurgence of the Middle East as a flashpoint will test US policies greatly. More so, since it is already engaged with the ongoing war in Ukraine (whose aid could be diverted to Israel) and the looming one with China. The instability of the Middle East will have repercussions on all. And if the price of oil increases because of the conflict (which it will) it could provide another whammy to world economies.
And while Israel’s security concerns are understood and its response can be justifiable, perhaps it too should realize that the long-term solution to the problem is not just the elimination of Hamas. They will be able to do so, but it is a hydra and will emerge in another form. They may be tempted to harden their stance even more now, but that may be counter-productive. To prevent a recurrence of such actions, they need to review their ultra-nationalistic policies, and give some concessions to the Palestinian people (even if the 2-state solution is a non-starter). That, coupled with enhanced security and intelligence, may be a better guarantor of peace in the future.
Ajay Singh is the international award-winning author of six books and over 200 articles. He is a regular contributor to The Sunday Guardian.