As for Teesta III itself, even a cursory search of public information reveals multiple accidents in construction, even leading to loss of life, multiple regulatory missteps, poor management, and, flawed design.
After learning of the recent tragedy which saw the Teesta III dam washed away, along with large sections of the North Sikkim Highway, the loss of over a hundred lives, and 14 bridges, I have been deeply concerned about the people of North of Sikkim. Someone or the other is always on this highway: to visit children studying in Gangtok, or for medical reasons.
This is an opportune moment to re-examine Sikkim’s development model. Given the depth of public sentiment, the state could finally come up with a better balance between development, the environment, and national security.
THE TEESTA III DAM
We know that a Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) originated from the South Lhonak Glacier at around 2230 hours on 3 October, washing away the 1,200 MW Teesta III hydropower project, the largest in the state, and spreading unprecedented disaster downstream. But is it enough to blame the GLOF? What about the dam itself?
An official from the Central Water Commission (CWC) has stated, “If there is a series of dams, a cascading effect happens downstream in flash flood scenarios.” The collapse of Teesta III most likely added a colossal amount of water to the flood, given its reservoir capacity of 5.08 mcm, reportedly nearly full at the time. According to Prof Vimal Khawas of the JNU, hydropower “definitely played a role in maximising the disaster.” He added, “We may call the GLOF and cloudburst natural, but the disaster that has happened after the breaking of the dam is entirely human-made.”
There have been multiple efforts to study and monitor the South Lhonak Lake for over a decade. As late as September, two early warning system devices (EWS) from Switzerland were sought to be installed on the upper lakes. In 2021, an inter-university study stated that “many settlements and assets located along the river channel at Chungthang are potentially exposed to future GLOFs, indicating the need to conduct a full environmental impact assessment (EIA) and potentially undertake GLOF risk mitigation measures.” This disaster was predicted and avoidable.
As for Teesta III itself, even a cursory search of public information reveals multiple accidents in construction, even leading to loss of life, multiple regulatory missteps, poor management, and, flawed design.
As an example of the last category, the spillway was reduced to 7,000 cumecs. If this had not been done (to lower costs), it is plausible the dam could have been opened faster. A CWC official states, “They never addressed the issue of a possible glacial lake burst even though it was a ticking time bomb barely 50 km upstream. Provisioning for 7,000 cumecs is barely sufficient for rain-induced floods. A GLOF demands spillways of much higher capacity.”
We learn the risk of Teesta III’s collapse was higher being a rock-filled concrete dam. Himanshu Thakkar of SANDRP, states, “The Teesta V dam, which is further downstream, was also seriously damaged, but not washed away, partly because it’s a concrete dam.” Thakkar adds, “However, even the gates of this dam, where the floods reached about an hour after Teesta III was washed away, could not be fully opened, showing how pathetic our disaster communication and preparedness is.” This is inexcusable.
RESPONSIBILITY
Who is responsible for the collapse of Teesta III? Ordinarily, it would be the project owners and the state would step in in case of such a catastrophe. If the owner is the state itself, who steps in? The Sikkim government already owns 60% since the previous owners failed to complete the project after the last disaster. Will the minority shareholders be penalized? Will the O&M operator apparently chosen against a Swiss party be held responsible? Who will service the debts now?
And what of the now-discredited environment impact assessment (EIA)? Having seen failures on multiple Himalayan rivers will we still use cut-paste EIAs ignoring climate risks? In 2006, the Affected Citizens of Teesta (ACT) filed an appeal to the National Environment Appellate Authority regarding Teesta Urja. The petitioners argued that the environmental impact report for Teesta III did not include any environmental risk assessment of earthquakes and GLOFs. These concerns were ignored.
The ACT now reminds us, “It is clearer than ever that compromised environmental security while planning hydropower projects in the Teesta river basin will also lead to compromised economic security in the long-term.”
FRESH DIRECTIONS
What process will Sikkim now follow if it tries to rebuild Teesta III? And what of the stalled Teesta IV dam at Dzongu which had zero public support even before this disaster? Would Sikkim even now be ready to commit to not developing dams and infrastructure projects near glaciers?
Even for the highly dammed Teesta, can Sikkim come up with the appropriate aviral dhara or e-flow? In 2015, the Ministry of Water Resources stated no dam is to be considered without factoring in e-flow for the survival of the river and its ecology. Just using an appropriate figure for dry season flow would automatically rule out many future dam projects.
Can we at last agree with the residents of Lachen and Lachung who pushed for the decision to reject the dams in their high valleys for environmental reasons? In hindsight, there would have been no EWS for these projects as well; these higher valleys would have had even less warning.
The debacle forces us to prioritize environmental risks: to examine other aggravations to the water resources of the upper Teesta. For example, sand mining inside Singba Sanctuary, which includes the famous Yumthang Valley. This reduces the riverbed’s ability to store water and increases the chances of flooding downstream.
The colossal amount of debris which is being dumped in the Lachung stream and on the Mangan-Toong road from the new Bharatmala road being built to connect Katao to Natu La is worth re-examining. Patrolling tracks to the Chola range could make defence sense but a new road to a hitherto uncontested and unpopulated border area with no history or even possibility of passage from either side (typically evidenced by a pass) given the topography? How can this even be rationally assessed given the cloud around national security? Isn’t the ecological integrity of the land the highest consideration for national security?
Can Sikkim put its remarkable public spirit into reviving the unique freshwater Gyamtsona lake which has been allowed to perish by sheer apathy? It would be most heartening to channel public anguish to revive Gyamtsona; and to accord protected status to other lakes nearby, all sources of the Teesta.
All over Sikkim roads are being doubled and expanded without traffic studies. The new road from Ravangla to Kewzing has destroyed hundreds of ancient oak or “katus” trees, causing the rash of fresh landslides, and there is nary a traffic jam anywhere. Why was this done? There are multiple roads from Ravangla to Singtam, each the size of highways I have not seen in Uttarakhand; typically sized out of proportion to usage.
CONCLUSION
The Prime Minister has said, “The opportunity to learn from a disaster must not be wasted.” Can we learn from the multiple disasters in Sikkim and bring this learning to appraise future projects critically? Climate change and Santyana caution us, “those who do not learn history are doomed to repeat it.”