LONDON: The curious thing about the group of four is that they are not natural bedfellows. All of the historical grievances and anxieties that they have with each other have not magically disappeared.
One of the most sinister and troubling trends in world affairs today, other than the potential re-election of convicted felon Donald Trump with his nominated isolationist vice president, J.D.Vance, is the challenge to the US-led rules-based international order by the group of nations led by dictators: Russia, Iran, North Korea and China. “We’re confronted by a deadly quartet of nations increasingly working together” said former NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, last week. Flanked by UK’s new defence secretary, John Healy, Robertson was reflecting on western concerns that the quartet is increasingly sharing arms, components and military intelligence, primarily in Russia’s illegal invasion of its neighbour, Ukraine. Adding to anxieties last week, President Joe Biden highlighted his view that the four countries are increasingly working together. “It’s a concern that you have China, North Korea, Russia and Iran, countries that have not necessarily coordinated in the past, are now looking to figure out how they can have a better impact”, said the Covid-stricken Biden, without offering any solution. The Washington Post went further last week, calling the quartet an “alignment of evil”
The figures speak for themselves. Since the invasion in February, Moscow has deployed some 4,000 Iranian-designed drones and is now collaborating with Teheran to build a drone factory inside Russia, so that it can boost its own production from the current 300 per month. On 30 December last year, Russia for the first time used ballistic missiles against Ukraine supplied by North Korea, which is believed to be selling many more to Moscow as the war continues. Pyongyang has also supplied Russia with anti-tank missiles and portable surface-to-air missiles, as well as rifles, rocket launchers, mortars, 5 million artillery shells and more than 2.5 million rounds of ammunition.
For its part, China has become Russia’s most important lifeline, ramping up its purchase of Russian oil and gas which has topped up Moscow’s coffers to the tune of billions of dollars. In a display of “friendship without limits”, Xi has supplied Vlad with vast amounts of war fighting technology, from semiconductors and electronic devices to radar and communication jamming equipment as well as parts for Russia’s fighter-planes. Analysts have estimated that Russia’s imports of vital computer chips and components are approaching pre-war levels, all thanks to the supply of dual-purpose goods arriving from China.
The curious thing about the group of four is that they are not natural bedfellows. All of the historical grievances and anxieties that they have with each other have not magically disappeared, they have simply been sublimated by their collective resistance to US pressure. Beijing, for example, can hardly be overjoyed to see its allies in Pyongyang drawing so close to Moscow, thereby diluting Chinese influence in North Korea. Beijing and Moscow, have been at loggerheads over a proposed gas pipeline from Russia to China.
Putin has been desperate to sell gas to Beijing that he can no longer sell to Europe, but the Siberia2 pipeline project has stalled because Xi Jinping would not commit China to buying as much gas as Russia wants to sell at the price that it wants to charge. There are a myriad of fissures and distrust that plague their relationship, but their shared and overarching geopolitical objective, to undermine the US-led global order, provides powerful motivation for their partnership.
The coming together of members of the quartet is not new. Ever since the end of the Cold War, Russia and China have been strengthening their relationship, which accelerated rapidly following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. The greater the sanctions by the West on Russia, the greater became the trade between Moscow and Beijing. In the three years between 2018 and 2022, Russia supplied more than 80 percent of China’s arms imports.
Russian technology has been used by China to enhance its submarine capabilities as well as improve its air-defence and anti-ship systems. When Syria collapsed into civil war in 2011, Russia joined Iran in keeping its besieged president, Basher al-Assad, in power, while protecting Teheran from Western sanctions. Iran has also benefitted from China’s purchase of its oil and its own purchase of North Korean missiles since the 1980’s.
It was Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that supercharged the relationships between members of the quartet. Because of sanctions, Saudi Arabia has been displaced by Russia as China’s largest source of crude oil, and in 2023 trade between the two countries exceeded $240 billion. Russia is believed to be helping Iran-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon with both intelligence and weapons, at the same time defending Iran’s proxies at the UN. Over the past 3 years, Russia has carried out joint naval exercises with China and Iran in the Gulf of Oman and earlier this year Moscow proposed the same with China and North Korea. Putin received a lavish reception in Pyongyang earlier this year when he signed a bilateral strategic partnership agreement with North Korea that includes a mutual defence provision, echoing NATO’s Article 5 clause. This could tempt an emboldened Kim Jong Un to strike out against a close Western ally, South Korea, in a move that could destabilise both Asia and Europe. Since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, European and Asian security have become increasingly interconnected.
Clearly, the four dictatorships do not constitute a formal security alliance like NATO or the old Warsaw Pact and probably never will, but they are broadly united in their desire to challenge the United States and its allies, ranging from Ukraine to Israel to South Korea. This desire is rooted in their shared opposition to what they see as the Western-dominated global order and exacerbated by their frustration with a system that they believe does not allow them the status or freedom of action they deserve. Each member of the quartet claims their own sphere of influence. For Russia this is the “near abroad”, which Putin identifies as those countries that constituted the former Russian Empire. For Iran, it’s the set of proxy groups that give Teheran leverage over its neighbours, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, which Israel describes as Iran’s “axis of evil”. For North Korea it is Pyongyang’s claim to the entire Korean peninsula, and for China it’s Beijing’s claim over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Russia also benefits from the four countries’ enhanced trade and efforts to reduce their dependency on the US dollar, as this further dilutes the effects of US sanctions and export controls. Also, taking advantage of their shared borders and littoral zones, they are building trade and transportation networks safe from US interdiction. Iran, for example, ships drones to Russia across the Caspian Sea, where the US has little power to stop the transfers. Were Washington to engage in conflict with Beijing in the Indo-Pacific, China could seek support from Russia, which could increase its overland oil and gas exports to China or send arms across their shared border, which would allow China to better sustain its war effort.
Should the “deadly quartet or alignment of evil” decide to move in the direction of a formal security alliance, their primary challenge would be in the role of India. While Russia, North Korea and Iran see India as an integral power essential for countering US influence across Eurasia, China, the dominant player among the four, views New Delhi as a competitor in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific. They are all acutely aware, however, that without India’s involvement, the feasibility of an anti-American Eurasian alliance is compromised.
A formal security alliance or not, the quartet of the world’s illiberal countries clearly identify their common interests and are working together to tear down the rules-based international order. The question is, in the increasingly likely event of a Trump victory in November, which by all accounts will result in an isolationist America, who will be there to stop them?
John Dobson is a former British diplomat, who also worked in UK Prime Minister John Major’s office between 1995 and 1998. He is currently a visiting fellow at the University of Plymouth.