Judging from the way an intelligence network is set up, such a scam is actually a conspiracy by an external hostile force in India, and this hostile force may well be from China.
Taipei: Recently, there have been rumours in India that the Taiwan Institute for Defence and Security Research (INDSR) is recruiting experts in India and offering them money to write analyses of India’s political and economic policies. This is a complete scam. In the contact email, we can clearly see that the real email address of the INDSR is indsr.org.tw, not indsr.com.tw. But even so, here is a special reminder that there are likely to be experts in India who are being scammed.
The INDSR is a think-tank funded by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) to study a wide range of issues related to Taiwan’s national defence and regional security. It does not currently recruit people to work outside Taiwan.
If one may speculate, such a development would serve several purposes:
First, to take advantage of the current friendly relations between India and Taiwan to recruit and pay Indian experts and scholars on behalf of the INDSR to steal useful information.
Secondly, even if it is discovered after some time and the scam is exposed, or if these scammers do not cooperate well with the local experts and scholars in India, they can completely blame the INDSR in Taiwan for the scam, thus ruining our reputation.
Judging from the way an intelligence network is set up, such a scam is actually a conspiracy by an external hostile force in India, and this hostile force may well be from China.
The construction and operation of global intelligence networks varies across different countries. It is typical for powerful countries to share relevant intelligence information with their allies to varying degrees, thereby facilitating mutual learning. China, as a rising power, is still at the nascent stage of expanding and operating its global intelligence network, employing an “open audition” approach that is less common in mature intelligence networks. This is because it is relatively easy for the local authority to notice, and it is inefficient and a waste of effort and money.
China’s intelligence-gathering strategy in Central Asia can also be described as a “vacuum cleaner” or “sand painting” approach, whereby the objective is to gather as much information as possible about a target, regardless of its relevance. This approach to intelligence gathering entails the penetration of societal structures, the accumulation of information, and the subsequent synthesis of this data into a comprehensive representation of the target. In other words, through an amorphous exchange of information, data is assimilated through a network of professionals dispersed across different public and private sectors. These individuals may not be conscious of their role in the broader context, but they are in fact embedded at all levels of society.
While there may be room for improvement in terms of efficiency and productivity, the associated risks are minimal. The Chinese approach emphasises the establishment of a presence and the acquisition of access, which may be regarded as a form of testing. This differs from the contemporary orthodox and professional international intelligence collection strategies. It would be beneficial to ascertain whether the local state will impede the expansion of Chinese intelligence networks or permit their growth to a certain extent.
Additionally, China employs the use of local Chinese social networks for the purpose of gathering intelligence. These networks can be utilized to gather information on individuals engaged in activities abroad, including students and educators, as well as business professionals and immigrant Chinese communities. In other words, China is developing a comprehensive global social network, comprising a non-professional, informal intelligence network that gathers a diverse range of information to create the necessary content. A Chinese intelligence network of a similar nature was uncovered in Afghanistan in late 2020, preceding the Taliban’s assumption of power.
Furthermore, the necessity to safeguard the Belt and Road Initiative has prompted China to proactively enlist a diverse array of elite informants from various backgrounds in Central Asia in recent years. To illustrate, China may provide financial assistance or special discounts on specific goods to small-scale traders engaged in cross-border trade in exchange for comprehensive intelligence on the industry. As an alternative approach, China may seek to foster allegiance among the local intellectual elite by recruiting specific scholars or university professors to fund research projects and facilitate short-term research visits to China, which are fully subsidized. Over time, these Chinese practices serve to cultivate pro-China social forces in the local country, while also recruiting and gathering intelligence from specific professionals.
It should be noted that INDSR in Taiwan is not currently seeking to recruit researchers in India to conduct policy research and analysis. Should any Indian colleague receive a formal offer of employment, it is likely to be a scam. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the likelihood of China utilizing “open auditing” and “vacuum cleaner” techniques to establish an intelligence network in India. In light of this, it is imperative that Indian authorities exercise caution and vigilance in response to such developments.
* Chienyu Shih is Associate Research Fellow, INDSR Taiwan.