China’s PLA suffers from politicised leadership, lacking combat experience, risking strategic failures despite technological advancements and ambitious global military posturing.
With the evolving world and technology, the modern battlefields necessitate technology backed by trained numeric strength who are led by adaptable, decisive and experienced military leadership. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China is often portrayed to be amongst the formidable forces of the world. It is perceived to be equipped with cutting edge technology, rapid modernisation and perpetually expanding global presence. However, a deeper analysis and beneath this veneer of strength lies a structural weakness because of its politicised leadership. The PLA is tightly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), prioritizing ideological loyalty over professional merit which secures regime security. Nevertheless, during high intensity conflict this might result in military inefficiency and failure.
Politicisation of PLA and Anti-Corruption Purges
The politicisation of PLA holds a historical legacy as it has been the armed wing of CCP rather than National Military Force. Unlike other militaries of the world which swear allegiance to the state, PLA’s primary duty remains to safeguard the Communist Party’s regime. This is rooted in Mao Zedong’s doctrine of “the Party commands the gun” which is deeply manifested in China’s political structure and further translated in military promotions, strategic decisions and operational capability. The higher leadership in the PLA is often rewarded as a result of ardent loyalty which has led to risks of ideological purity over military competence. Adding on, President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption purges have further exaggerated this issue. While these purges were aimed to root out graft, they have been more often used to remove potential rivals leading to senior commanders fighting for political survival than military effectiveness.
In 2023 and 2024, a string of high-profile firings rocked the PLA Rocket Force, the elite branch in charge of China’s conventional and nuclear missile arsenal. Former leaders like Gen Li Yuchao and Gen Zhang Zhenzhong vanished from view before being discreetly taken out and replaced. Frequently concealed under evasive allusions to “disciplinary violations” or “anti-corruption measures,” these purges point to a larger problem.
Additionally, another layer of Bureaucracy of officials within the PLA to ensure ideological conformity playing the role of Political Commissars is a prominent factor in the divided chain of command with political consideration overriding strategic necessity. The PLA’s chain of command passes directly through the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is presided over by Xi Jinping, in contrast to democratic military regimes where the armed forces are institutionally distinct from political parties. Within this system, tactical savviness, military experience, or operational competence are not the criteria for advancement, allegiance to the party is!
The Taiwan Strait and Potential Battlefield Collapse
Although the PLA has made large investments in modernising its military, it has not fought a major battle since the Sino-Vietnamese struggle in 1979, which revealed serious operational shortcomings. The PLA›s theories are still entirely unproven in contemporary conflict, in contrast to the US, Russia and other powers with decades of actual combat experience. The most probable hotspot for a significant PLA operation is the Taiwan Strait. Although China does boast of significant military equipment both in scale and sophistication, its usefulness in actual combat situations, especially in complicated amphibious assault operations, is debatable. Taiwan is separated from the Chinese mainland by the Taiwan Strait which is 130 kilometres wide with rough seas. It has limited landing zones protected by formidable obstacle systems and a highly motivated modern defence force. On top of it there is strong support from the United States which is committed to Taiwan’s defense under the Taiwan Relations Act 1979.
Amphibious operations are acknowledged to be the most complex of the military manoeuvres. They require seamless and intricate coordination of various specialities and wings of the defence forces in all its domains. No doubt China has modernised its defence forces, but they are yet to be battle-tested and as they say it is not the machine but the individual behind the machine who ultimately shapes the outcome of any conflict. If attempted, the amphibious landings on Taiwan’s coast would be one of the most challenging and complicated operations to perform. Combined with a highly politicised command structure and a dearth of commanders with combat experience, the possibility of errors in judgment, delays in decision-making, and disintegration of the battlefield of the Chinese Army are highly probable. Having had the privilege of conducting joint training between the Indian and the Chinese Armies a few years back as a General Officer Commanding a Division, one witnessed the lacklustre performance of the junior leadership of Chinese Army personnel from close quarters. One of the reasons that could be ascribed to the poor performance on ground was the lack of realistic training and a rigid hierarchy that discourages initiative from junior commanders. PLA’s emphasis on central control undermines decentralised command, a core tenet of modern warfare, especially in a contested domain like the Himalayas or the Taiwan Strait. Be that as it may, the Chinese have been shrewd practitioners of realpolitik and students of strategic doctrine vastly different from what finds favour with the West. Turbulent civilisational history has taught the Chinese leaders that not every problem has a solution and total mastery over specific events could upset the harmony of the universe. Rarely have the Chinese statesmen risked the outcome of a conflict on a single all-or-nothing clash; elaborate multi-layered manoeuvres have been closer to their style. Where the Western tradition prized the decisive clash of forces emphasising feats of heroism, the Chinese ideal stressed subtlety, directional ambiguity and patient accumulation of relative advantage. Considering Chinese emphasis on ‘Mianxi’ i.e. The concept of Face, it is felt that China may not use force/wage a war until it is absolutely certain of a favourable outcome. In the case of Taiwan too, China may, rather than an outright invasion, resort to blockade of Taiwan and impede trade, continue to intimidate by massive exercises along its periphery, disrupt the connectivity of the island nation with the outside world by cutting undersea cables and such like operations, to try and break the will of the Nation to fight.
Legal Precedents and International Court of Justice Judgments
The claim that the politicisation of military formations compromises operational integrity is supported by international legal frameworks and International Court of Justice (ICJ) decisions. Ineffective military operations and violations of international law can result from excessive political meddling in military matters, as demonstrated by cases like Nicaragua v. United States (1986). The ICJ concluded that the United States’ political, not strategic, backing of the Contras in Nicaragua resulted in an illegal use of force and ultimately fell short of its goals. This decision emphasises the perils of political meddling exceeding military effectiveness and legal restraints. In a similar vein, the ICJ denounced Uganda’s military actions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda (2005) for lacking adequate command structures and accountability, which resulted in operational failures and human rights violations. These instances highlight the dangers that a politically controlled PLA faces, such as strategic errors and ethical transgressions brought on by a lack of independent military leadership. Furthermore, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) determined in Philippines v. China (2016) that China’s military actions and expansionist policies in the South China Sea violated the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), even though the ICJ has not directly ruled against China’s military operations. The decision disregarded China’s claims to historical rights in the area and emphasised how Beijing’s assertive military posture, motivated more by political aspirations than by legal requirements, jeopardises global stability. The hazards of an unaccountable and overly politicised military leadership are further illustrated by China’s complete rejection of the ruling. These rulings show that a military force that is too much influenced by political orders is vulnerable to ineffectiveness, breaking the law, and failing on the battlefield. The PLA is susceptible to similar mistakes in any future conflict because of its strict political monitoring, which is demonstrated by its command structure and promotion system.
Strategic Consequences: A Hollow Spear
The implications of the PLA’s leadership crisis extend beyond China’s borders. As Beijing projects power in the Indo-Pacific, from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and beyond, its strategic ambitions may be undercut by an internal deficit of capable commanders. Its Military leadership lacks battlefield-tested decision-making skills, making it uncertain how they would perform under real wartime pressure. Modern warfare requires seamless air, land, sea, cyber, and space coordination, but the PLA has little real-world experience integrating these forces. Though China has been conducting military exercises, these are not a substitute for real combat, where unpredictability, quick decision making and initiative with field commanders are the key. Also, unlike some of the major powers of the World like; the United States, Russia or India, which have battle-hardened troops and where command is earned through years of operational experience and merit-based evaluations, the PLA’s leadership architecture remains deeply politicised, opaque, and alarmingly detached from battlefield realities. The result is a structurally flawed institution led by Generals loyal to the Communist Party of China (CCP) but largely untested in war. Chinese soldiers and officers have never experienced the chaos of war. With its family system, due to its erstwhile single-child policy, under severe strain with a rapidly declining number of women of reproductive age, it is unclear how well the Chinese leadership and public at large would handle high casualties, especially if the conflict is drawn-out. Also, military miscalculations driven by inexperience, miscommunication, or poor judgment could trigger unintended escalations, a risk that regional actors must factor into their contingency planning.
Additionally, China’s dependence on coercive diplomacy and military signalling, frequently without the intention to engage in actual conflict, undermines the credibility of its deterrence strategy. Recent disputes with the Philippines and Japan over maritime zones, as well as with India along the LAC, illustrate this inconsistency: a vocal military presence lacking substantial warfighting capability.
Militaries are ultimately evaluated based on their performance in combat rather than ceremonial displays. The leadership crisis within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), stemming from decades of politicisation, corruption, and structural decay, significantly hampers its ability to function as a modern military force. Although China invests substantially in military technology, without corresponding investments in professional leadership and combat-proven command structures, the PLA’s foundations remain weak.
As India navigates a progressively unstable security environment, it must rely on its institutional strengths. This includes a non-politicised military that emphasizes merit, fosters leadership development
Maj Gen Deepak Mehra, Kirti Chakra, AVSM, VSM (Retd.), is a former Indian Military Attache to Moscow, Founding Director and CEO of Thorsec Global Pvt Ltd and Dr Sunandini is an Assistant Professor- Gr II (Law) at Amity Law School, Amity University Noida, U P.