NEW DELHI: There is a wide asymmetry in the conventional combat capability (including nuclear arsenal) of an Israel backed by the US and Iran along with its proxies, therefore Iran has been more comfortable in fighting a war through its regional proxies instead of a direct confrontation.
BACKDROP
A series of successful strikes on commanders of Iranian proxies in Tehran and Beirut has escalated tensions in the Middle East. The sequence of events indicates more professional strategy of Israelis in targeting the commanders, which is certainly better than mass punishments of Palestinians. The ball is currently in the court of Iran, which is evaluating options to recover from the embarrassment of the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh who was in Iran as a guest. Although few interim exchanges have taken place between Hezbollah and Israel, and a US strike on Iraqi non state actor and retaliation in US base, post assassination, but these are routine exchanges as major retaliation is yet to come. Iran’s next could shape the future escalation dynamics of the region.
THE ASSASSINATION DRIVE
Israel has not owned its hand in the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, while the United States has announced that it was neither informed, nor was it involved in it. But the Iranians have assumed it to be a successful covert operation by Israeli spy agency Mossad.
While the ownership of the killing of Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in southern Beirut, Ali Nazih Abed Ali a senior officer in southwestern Lebanon, Hamas leader Mohammad Deif in Gaza and some Iranian Republic Guard Corps (IRGC) Commanders in Syria is well established, it’s the assassination of Haniyeh that is the most important trigger for escalation, where Israel is exercising the option of plausible deniability.
The western media’s initial narrative of internal feud within Hamas, with hardliners seeing Ismail as too moderate, or Iran not being happy of the Hamas handshake with Fatah in Beijing being cause of the assassination, hasn’t found any takers. The intention, benefits and capacity to do so in the past (Israel successfully knocked out a few nuclear scientists by covert operations in the past) pinpoints Israel as the prime suspect. The fact that most of the killings of important commanders happened after Netanyahu’s visit to the United States and Fuad Shukr was on the target list of the US because of the 1983 Beirut barracks bombing killing 241 US Service members, creates suspicion of a silent US hand or a clearance given to undertake such strikes. It’s understandable that Ismail’s assassination in Qatar, Egypt or Jordan would have been very uncomfortable for the US; hence, Iran was the right place, from US perspective.
There are many theories about the methodology of assassination from a bomb planted months in advance and activated remotely through AI or IRGC narrative of strike by a short range projectile, but all indicate a major breach in Iranian security structure and a major embarrassment for Iran. It leaves Iran with no option but to take some action to prove its credibility to its proxies and domestic audience, which has taken a big hit by exposure of its vulnerability.
IMPACT ON ISRAEL
From the military perspective, these assassinations have boosted the sagging morale of IDF, extended a political lifeline to Netanyahu, pushed all ceasefire proposals out of the window in the near future, created a do or die situation for all proxy fighters of Iran and put Iran’s military credibility to a serious test. Netanyahu has every reason to be happy, but he may have put the lives of the remaining hostages at grave risk. This may cause some internal friction/dilemma with the IDF, Mossad and many Cabinet members pushing for ceasefire and the release of hostages and Netanyahu with some hardliners pushing for prolonging the war to achieve an impractical goal of “Complete Destruction of Hamas” as a precondition to permanent ceasefire.
Israel is also communicating with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Bahrain to defend against any Iranian attack by allowing it to use their airspace and help in neutralising some projectiles. Prolonging the war and the refusal to accept a two-state solution are also widening the gap between Netanyahu and Joe Biden, who finds himself getting increasingly and reluctantly involved in chasing Netanyahu’s impractical for political survival.
THE IRANIAN OPTIONS
There is a wide asymmetry in the conventional combat capability (including nuclear arsenal) of an Israel backed by the US and Iran along with its proxies, therefore Iran has been more comfortable in fighting a war through its regional proxies instead of a direct confrontation. Iran knows that an all-out war cannot give it any favourable outcome. Iran and the Houthis don’t have any land access to Israel; hence, they have very little option other than launching standoff attacks through missiles, drones and rockets of varying intensity, magnitude and impact.
Hezbollah is the only strong group which has some capability to fight an intense ground battle, but it’s no match to the collective capability of Israel and the US. It would therefore prefer standoff attacks and covert operations over conventional war. The capability of the Hamas has been weakened considerably, but it will continue with small tactical clandestine actions against IDF under the leadership of Yayha Sinwar, its leader in Gaza and one of the alleged planners of the October 7 terror attack on Israel. A hardliner, he is now appointed the new head of Hamas’ political bureau, replacing Ismail Haniyeh.
Many backdoor negotiations are going on and Iran has given adequate time to Israel and the US to prepare against its possible attack to minimise casualties. This indicates that there could be a symbolic attack, bigger than its strike carried out in April 2024, in response to the Israeli attack on its consulate in Syria, to satisfy its proxies and the public. Hezbollah maintains that keeping Israel waiting is part of the punishment. In the absence of credible options of an all-out attack by Iran, it appears that the actual revenge could also come through some terrorist action/clandestine operations/new hostage crisis, for which its proxies will be on the lookout for targets anywhere in the world as terrorism has no boundaries.
AMERICAN STAKES
The US has no choice but to defend the strategic location of Israel, which is its most trusted ally. Netanyahu continues to encash on this to fulfil his political agenda, forcing the US to oblige, despite the optics of trying to control the excesses by IDF, to amuse its domestic audience/voters and some allies not comfortable with excessive civilian casualties in Gaza. Simultaneously, it’s still trying to push negotiations for ceasefire, release of hostages and its peace plan with all parties.
The US is sending more fighter planes, warships, and a carrier strike group to the Middle East. As per Pentagon, additional cruisers, destroyers, and a fighter squadron are part of the deployment, along with the carrier strike group USS Abraham Lincoln, to strengthen defences and assist Israel in its defence against a possible military attack by Iran and its proxies Hezbollah, Hamas and Houthis.
OTHER STAKEHOLDERS
Meanwhile, as show of support, Russia had sent former Defence Minister and Head of National Security Council Sergei Shoigu to meet Iranian President Pezeshkian and counterparts to Tehran. Russia has reportedly started sending advanced air defence systems and radars to Iran and Iran has reportedly asked for Russian-made Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets. Iran has deployed Russia’s most powerful jamming communication system, Murmansk-BN, at strategically important locations. Reportedly, President Vladimir Putin too has asked Iran’s supreme leader for a restrained response to avoid civil casualties in Israel, as Russia may not be keen to overstretch itself at this point of time.
Iran could count on political and diplomatic support from China and Russia at the United Nations, which may not be not good enough to go for a full blown war.
Turkish President Erdogan made statements suggesting that Turkey could potentially intervene militarily in Israel to support Palestinians, drawing parallels to his past interventions in Karabakh and Libya. His comments look more like political posturing than for real, as being a NATO member it may not be easy for him to do so, with the US standing firmly with Israel. Erdogan is using this opportunity to score a point in the Islamic world. Turkey has stopped trade with Israel since May 2024 and might continue with such gestures. North Korean posturing seems to be more of optics at this stage.
The Arab world hasn’t supported Palestinians beyond lip service, hence Iran can’t expect any help from them. In fact many Arab countries might be happier with the embarrassment of Iran.
WHAT HAPPENS TO GAZA?
If Hezbollah launches an offensive, Israel might be compelled to pull some more troops from Gaza, scale down combing operations and rely more on standoff strikes, as it has been doing in the past. Indicators are that the IDF is pushing for scaling down large scale operations in Gaza to specific intelligence based targeting. Ceasefire will be difficult in the near term. Netanyahu’s ambition of “Greater Israel” will block any two-state solution on some pretext or the other. Palestinians will continue to suffer due to lack of effective, sensible, moderate leadership, under uncontrolled Israel, backed by the US, and the global community not acting beyond lip service.
The US is trying for a two-state solution independent of Hamas, with a puppet leader from Fatah to govern Gaza and West Bank, which is unlikely to be accepted by Israel or Hamas. Hamas, with its quest for an independent state and hatred towards Israel, will not die down. The leaders will get replaced but the ideology will remain. The war, even if it sees some sort of conflict termination under brute pressure, is likely to continue in the mind of the Palestinian sufferers and radicalised terror groups, motivated to seek revenge through any means, anywhere in the world and is likely to erupt again in future.
GLOBAL IMPACT
Any Israel-Iran escalation will bring the world under further inflationary pressure. The Red Sea may become even more risky and shipping through Persian Gulf too may face serious threats. A disturbed oil flow may further cause price rise and turbulent economic environment. From the Indian perspective, initiatives like I2U2 and India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor may get postponed indefinitely. Israel, as a supplier of military hardware, may face problems in meeting Indian supply orders. With Iran-Russia-China-North Korea and Syria will get closer to oppose the US, Israel and their Western Allies. Iran’s chances of going nuclear may increase much more.
Major General (Dr) S.B. Asthana (Retd) is a strategic and security analyst.