The Hamas thought it would undertake a brutal offensive sooner than later, as the intensive ‘rapprochement’ endeavours in West Asia with Israel at the centre were foreclosing any window of opportunity to centre-stage the Palestine question.
The 7 October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel has been called Israel’s 9/11 comparable to the spectre of the falling Twin Towers. Indeed, the dastardly physicality of the attack and its shock-effect, caused deep and lasting scars on Israel’s national psyche and on global geopolitics. Of course, the post-script of 9/11 was different, with UN Security Council resolving that the US had the right to self-defence, that led to the war being fought faraway from US soil, in Afghanistan. In case of Israel, the response was immediate and fierce against contiguous Gaza Strip.
Thousands of missiles were fired from Gaza, targeting indiscriminate locations in Israel, which sparked terror. Simultaneously, hundreds of armed fighters from the terrorist group, many on motorcycles, breached fences using bulldozers and charged into cities. The catastrophic Hamas assault involved its terrorists crossing the border by land, air, and sea. They ruthlessly slaughtered hundreds of Israelis, including women and children, and kidnapped an unknown number, penetrating to a depth of up to 24km from the border fence. “Israel is at war,” declared Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
What the Hamas undertook was a militarily and professionally planned, highly complex operation conducted with precision. The assault required intensive training and equipment, as well as a superb blanket of operational secrecy. The planning showed clear indications of experienced conventional military planning, which is quite unlike the typical approach of a terrorist organization like Hamas. However, the assault was executed exactly as a brutal and cruel terrorist organization would—in stark contrast to a professional military—complete with celebratory videos of barbarism as a form of advertisement. Israel has experienced attacks and wars, but never on such a scale in a single morning, which shattered its sense of impunity.
The significant questions, the “whys” and “wherefores,” will continue to be analyzed by geostrategists and military historians for years, if not decades. It may not be correct to pass judgment on the fairness of historical positions that long predate the crisis, as opinions tend to become colored for various reasons. The overarching question seeks immediate reasons for the onslaught that overshadow the past issues of ideology and territory, such as the 16-year-long Gazan Blockade by Israel, the ad-lib expansion of settlements in the West Bank, and the issues related to the Al-Aqsa Mosque.
Three critical issues need examination. First, there are the obvious, intensive power shifts happening in the region, particularly in greater West Asia—the Abraham Accords of August 2020 and then a series of agreements later to normalize relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and subsequently Sudan. Several of these countries benefited from these agreements, with the UAE receiving F16s, Morocco gaining sovereignty over Western Sahara, and Sudan being removed from the sanctions list. As part of the Accords, an Abraham Fund was established, allocating approximately US$3 billion to development initiatives in West Asia.
Later the I2U2 (Israel, India, UAE and the US), an offspring of the Abraham Accords, was unofficially described as the “West Asian Quad” and the “Indo-Abrahamic construct.” As part of the G20 meet of September 2023, an agreement was signed on India-Middle East-Europe (IMEC) corridor between India, the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, the European Union, Italy, France, and Germany. The proposed IMEC will consist of railroad, ship-to-rail networks and road transport routes extending across two corridors, that is, the East Corridor—connecting India to the Arabian Gulf and the Northern Corridor—connecting the Gulf to Europe.
Meanwhile, China stepped up its larger role in this region and, after years of hostility, brokered a landmark agreement between the regional rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran, in March 2023. Saudi Arabia was also reported to be discussing the possible resumption of consular services with Syria. Iran, on the other hand, has appointed an ambassador to the UAE, mending ties that had been broken in 2016. Adding to this, the proposed normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel was, in itself, the most significant development. The Middle East apparently witnessed intense political upheaval, power shifts, and rapprochement, marking a departure from the previously unseen status quo.
It would have been construed in Gaza and West Bank that the Arab countries were gradually decoupling from the Palestine question. Palestinians could believe that their cause was being marginalised by agreements being reached by Israel with the Arab states. To bring the Palestinian cause back on the high table, an event that would cause a massive, disproportionate response by Israeli military against Palestinian civilians would be essential. Normal pin-pricking rockets and missile fire would be insufficient for obtaining a massive reaction. So the Hamas thought it would undertake a brutal offensive that would cut through the national psyche and force the hands of the ultra-nationalist Israeli Government. For Hamas, this had to be sooner than later, as the intensive “rapprochement” endeavours in West Asia with Israel in the centre, were foreclosing any window of opportunity to centre-stage the Palestine question.
Second is the Gaza versus West Bank dilemma. The Gaza strip and the West Bank are two Palestinian territories that were part of Mandate Palestine and were captured by Israel during the Six-Day War in 1967. More than two million Palestinians with over 50% children live in about 365 sq km of Gaza, with over 97% literacy and 60% unemployment in the ages of 15 to 29. With poor Gazan living conditions, health system and infrastructure, the 16-year-old blockade was felt by Palestinians as collective punishment which had exacerbated their dire economic and social conditions. As a comparison, the West Bank has 5860 sq km territory with 2.7 million Palestinians and nearly 600,000 Jews in settlements that cover 60% of the occupied territories.
For years, various Israeli governments took an approach of divide and rule between the Gaza strip and the West Bank, aimed against Palestinian Authority that even propped up Hamas. Hamas, hence, was the beneficiary of this policy with which Israel held indirect negotiations via Egypt, and was allowed to receive infusions of cash from abroad, largely from Qatar. Hamas also managed to obtain 20,000 work permits for Gazan labourers from Israel, to allow them to earn better salaries, meaning food for families and the ability to purchase basic products. Even sporadic attacks by Hamas from Gaza were overlooked by Israel, or only minor response were undertaken. Hamas in Gaza was the goody-goody organisation in comparison to the Palestinian Authority based in West Bank.
Since Hamas named the bloody assault Operation Al Aqsa Flood, Al Aqsa Mosque needs mention. In Palestine it was being felt that with the ultra-right Israeli Government, nationalist Jews may attempt to rebuild their temple in Jerusalem’s Old City, which was destroyed around 70 AD during the Roman period. With imported sacrificial cows, ancient hymns and growing support, the National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s two visits in 2023, had given rise to such apprehensions of rebuilding the Jewish Temple. Of West Bank it was felt the situation on the ground was likely to implode, like another intifada, at some point, with or without a trigger, with sustainable shift in political and security situation. It was also being predicted that an Israeli invasion of West Bank, like in 2002, was on the cards. Apparently, Israel’s aim to maintain separation between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza was to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. This policy bolstered Hamas as it grew stronger and stronger until 7 Oct 2023, when it created Israel’s 9/11, the bloodiest day in the latter’s history.
Third is the importance of the very clever pre-emptive strike by Hamas. Indeed, the failure of the intelligence agencies, Mossad and Shin Bet, to pick up planning and training for the assault, that included bulldozers, motorcycles, boats and paragliders is inexplicable. It also includes failure of imagination and strategic analysis, appreciating that the larger threat lay from West Bank, which led to some military units shift from Gaza.
Consequent to the 7 October bloody assault, it is apparent that Hamas did not have a serious follow-up offensive plan, or a planned end-state to the onslaught. Hamas has brought in greater misery to the population of Gaza by the Israeli offensive that was to be anticipated. Why is it, then, that the execution of this brutally planned 7 October operation was felt so advantageous, that it overlooked the costs that would follow? Hamas worked hard on creating illusions of a growing relationship with Israel. Hamas obviously baited Israel, relying on Israel’s natural reaction, as would have been with most countries. With the ferocity and the brutality of the Hamas assault deeply affecting and anguishing the national (and international) psyche, Israel took the bait hook, line, and sinker. While the world is focused on the war in Gaza, tensions have risen in the occupied West Bank too, where 54 Palestinians were killed over the week ending 15 October 2023, in clashes with Israeli troops, arrest, raids and attacks by Jewish settlers. It was the deadliest week for Palestinians in the territory since at least 2005. Conversely, Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar responded to the Hamas attack by distributing 10,000 weapons firearms, as well as combat gear, protective vests and helmets, to the already well-armed settler population and tasking settlers with security.
The terror inflicted on the civilian population in Israel is so enormous that the wounds from it will not heal for years, with the challenge compounded by the large numbers (199 latest number) abducted into Gaza. Naturally, the Israeli government cannot back-track, also under pressure from ultra-rightist parties. A ground offensive to “destroy” Hamas and its underground infrastructure in a dense urban setting, and with Hamas prepared for it, will be costly in any which way, including collateral damage. To obtain forceable release of hostages in the labyrinth of tunnels and the maze of urban setting will be Herculean. A place like Gaza also cannot be bombed into oblivion. Killing of a few leaders will be inconsequential in the long run for the hydra-headed Hamas, whose leadership will regenerate. The occupation of Gaza by Israel and its subsequent administration will be like a swamp. With West Bank temperatures also rising, Hezbollah throwing its hat in the ring, it is an exercise in futility to prognosticate the future course or any way forward. Status quo in West Asia has been altered, maybe irreparably. In summary, it is essential for India to recognize the deliberate illusions and deceptions of peace created by Hamas under intense operational security, which were followed by a grave assault. Such deliberate illusions of peace lead to complacency within the system. India has faced very costly surprises in the past—such as Kargil, Mumbai (26/11), and May 2020 (Eastern Ladakh). It is not possible to precisely predict the type, timing, and scale of threats from adversaries. These threats could span various domains, including non-attributable cognitive warfare, disinformation, economic and military coercion, information warfare, or conventional warfare. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop a new paradigm of civil-military fusion for policymaking and strategy formation. India also needs to enhance its capabilities in establishing a low-threshold detection system, providing the political leadership with a wide range of response
options.
Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma (Retd) is the Gen Bipin Rawat Chair of Excellence at USI; Faculty at Indian School of Public Policy; Distinguished Fellow VIF and CLAWS; Member Executive Council MP-IDSA.