Some of Nauru’s decisions made on principle, for example recognizing Taiwan, likely hurt Nauru’s economy. Nauru doesn’t just recognize Taiwan, it has stood up to China in diplomatic venues in ways some Western diplomats could only dream about.
Nusa Dua, Indonesia
Think your job is complicated? Try being a leader in Nauru.
Nauru is an island country of about 8 square miles, around 2,000 miles north-east of Australia, with a population of around 12,000 people.
It is completely independent. With that independence, it makes independent decisions, sometimes to the consternation of other countries that use their overwhelming power to let it be known they disagree. What does that mean?
SOVEREIGN NATION, SOVEREIGN DECISIONS
First positions Nauru has taken.
* Nauru is one of the 13 countries on the planet that recognizesTaiwan.
* In 2019, it recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
* In the U.N., it voted against Russia on Ukraine four times.
* It let Canberra set up a controversial off-shore detention facility for “boat people” who had been trying to get to Australia, effectively off-shoring Australia’s problem to Nauru. This created social and political problems in Nauru, which then resulted in the Australian press saying Nauru had a lot of problems, without fully reporting a lot of those problems were caused by Australia.
So far it seems like Nauru is going above and beyond what most other countries in the West do to back allies.
But it gets more complicated.
Soon after Russia seized Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the Georgian war in 2008, Nauru recognized them as independent republics.
Almost a decade later, in 2017, the U.S. signed an appropriation bill cutting aid to countries that recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
I have repeatedly heard U.S. government officials tell Pacific Islands leaders, in the context of U.S. and China in the region, “we don’t want to ask you to pick sides”.
Well, Nauru has taken some of the most difficult sides to support democracies and its neighbours—Taiwan and Jerusalem, voted against Russia at the U.N., and took in Australia’s problems—but one misstep taken years before a bill was passed by people who likely couldn’t place Nauru on a map, and then suddenly, when it came to certain projects, the rest doesn’t count.
Imagine being a leader in Nauru on the day they learned about the bill. What are you going to do?
POLITICS OF ECONOMICS
Of course, part of Nauru’s reasons for some of its decisions may have been financial—but that’s normal. Notice that Australia is no longer talking about the origins of Covid now that China is talking about dropping the barley tariffs.
And some of Nauru’s decisions made on principle, for example recognizing Taiwan, likely hurt Nauru’s economy.
Nauru doesn’t just recognize Taiwan, it has stood up to China in diplomatic venues in ways some Western diplomats could only dream about.
When Nauru hosted a meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2018, then President Baron Waqa stood firm when the head of the Chinese delegation (China is not a member of the PIF) tried to speak to the meeting before the Prime Minister of Tuvalu (another country that recognizes Taiwan) had a chance to.
Waqacalledthe Chinese diplomat “very insolent” and a “bully”.
Waqa has now been chosen by Micronesian region countries as their choice for the next Secretary General of the PIF. Whether he becomes Secretary General or not will say much about China’s control over the PIF and its members.
Nauru has also been trying to diversify its economy. Given its central location, it made sense to develop an international port.
The original US$80 million project, the Nauru Sustainable and Climate Resilient Connectivity Project was financed by Asian Development Bank (ADB), Green Climate Fund, and the governments of Australia and Nauru.
The main construction contract went to China Harbour Engineering Company. Yes, in a country that recognizes Taiwan.
WB AND ADB FUNDING BRI (BRIBERY AND REPRESSION INITIATIVE)
This issue of Chinese companies winning a disproportionate amount of World Bank (WB) and ADB projects in the Pacific Islands (and elsewhere) is serious.
It often looks like the sort of projects that used to be thought of as typical of theBRI (Belt and Road Initiative)—though given the way PRC companies operate, BRI could just as easily stand for Bribery and Repression Initiative—are now done via Chinese companies funded by WB and ADB. Which means subsidized by the U.S., Japan, etc.
PRC companies seem to have“mastered” the bidding systems, resulting in, for example, a reported 80% of ABD infrastructure projects in 2019 in Papua New Guinea going to Chinese construction companies. There were similar numbersfor Chinese companies in Vanuatu, though mostly WB funded.
BRI isn’t in decline, it’s evolved, and is now being subsidized by others—including the U.S.—instead of just the Chinese government.
What does that mean for Nauru?
What incentive does a Chinese company have in finishing a project that will increase the economic autonomy of a country that recognizes Taiwan and, at the same time, will compete with other Chinese projects in nearby states that are much more compliant to Beijing’s whims?
Nauru’s port project is very behind schedule.
NAVIGATING ROUGH GEOPOLITICAL SEAS
So, you are a leader in Nauru. What do you do? Bow to U.S. pressure and derecognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia? Bow to Chinese pressure and derecognize Taiwan? How can you diversify your economy through multilateral organizations without opening yourself to economic manipulation?
And, throughout all this, there are some basic needs that few of your partners are taking seriously, like how can you patrol your maritime exclusive economic zone (your most valuable resource)—or even run search and rescue operations—without any real patrol vessels or drones. Taiwan gave Nauru two ten-meter-long rigid inflatable patrol boats in 2022, and that’s about it to patrol an area almost the size of Germany.
It is not easy being a leader in Nauru. And many in larger countries think it would be “easier”(or at least easier for them) to just take it over. But take a look at the track record of two of the largest hegemons in the region, Australia and China.
The engagement by Australia and by some Australians in Nauru has often been less than helpful, including muzzling the press, bribery, and participating in the devastation of the environment through phosphate mining, prompting the proposala while back to just move Nauruan to Australia. (Another phosphate island, Banaba was largely depopulated as a result of the mining. It was the sort of “easy” solution that destroyed families for generations.)
What China would like to do to the country is likely even worse for the people of Nauru.
One idea floating around is perhaps seeing if Nauru is interested in a Compact of Free Association-style relationship with the U.S., similar but perhaps more simple than the ones the U.S. has with three other Micronesian countries, Palau, Federated States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands.
The Australians might not like it, as some there seem to have the sense that Nauru is “theirs”, and any bilateral relationship that doesn’t involve them is a threat to Canberra. This limited view of larger regional security doesn’t help anyone, including Australia.
Regardless, whatever Nauru decides is up to Nauru, as it should be. But next time you complain that your job is complicated, spare a thought for leaders of small states on the geopolitical and geoeconomics front lines. It ain’t easy.
Cleo Paskal is a non-resident senior fellow for the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.