What a difference a year makes. The dawn of 2023 saw a confident Ukraine, having against all odds fought back against Russia’s illegal invasion. The year is ending with Ukraine in a gloomy mood.
When President Vladimir Putin ordered his troops to cross the border in force on 24 February the previous year, most commentators expected the “special military operation” to be all over in a few weeks with a puppet government installed in Kyiv, probably headed by Putin’s close Ukrainian friend and oligarch, Victor Medvedchuk.
Instead, Ukrainian troops with limited resources fought back, causing a huge number of casualties among the Russian invaders and even greater embarrassment in Moscow. From the start of the invasion to the end of 2022, Russia lost 174,000 soldiers and half its fleet of tanks.
There were even numerous reports that a desperate Russia was taking out of mothballs those tanks produced in the 1940s and 50s, reactivating them and sending them to the front. The fact that Ukrainian forces were now containing the mighty Russian army was too much to stomach for a humiliated Putin, so he hastily changed the narrative.
The message now, constantly pumped out on staterun media, was that Russia was engaged in a new patriotic war for its own survival against NATO aggression, even though not a single NATO soldier had set foot on Ukrainian soil. So what happened over the course of this year to so dramatically change the mood in Ukraine from euphoria to gloom?
The answer lies in two names: Prigozhin and Surovikin. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner army transformed Russia’s prospects in Ukraine. Alarmed by the number of casualties suffered by Russia’s Ground Forces and initially reluctant to mobilise reservists, Putin approached his old friend and close confidant Yevgeny to help out.
Prigozhin was already an experienced mercenary leader, having formed his Wagner Group of mercenaries during Putin’s illegal invasion of Crimea in 2014. Putin ordered that Prigozhin should be allocated substantial resources and he was even granted permission to recruit inmates from Russian prisons in return for their freedom.
The result was an explosion in the number of Wagner mercenaries from a few thousand in 2018 to more than 50,000 by the end of 2022. Unlike the average Russian soldier who was lethargic and unable to understand why he was fighting in Ukraine, Wagner troops were highly motivated and effective.
While Prigozhin’s troops were halting Ukraine’s advance, General Sergei Surovikin, nicknamed “General Armageddon” by the Russian media for his reputed ruthlessness, was put in control of Russia’s invasion force.
The result was dramatic. Surovikin transformed Russia’s position in Ukraine by building a complex set of fortifications, an array of anti-tank trenches, dragons teeth (pyramids of concrete), dugouts, bunkers and minefields, all known as the “Surovikin Line”.
To date these have successfully blocked any meaningful Ukrainian advance, frustrating their much heralded “spring offensive”. Prigozhin and Surovikin together prevented Ukrainian forces from sweeping south and cutting Russia’s land- bridge to Crimea, thus saving Putin’s skin. But neither benefited personally from their success.
Following his much heralded and foolhardy mutinous march on Moscow last June, Prigozhin was assassinated two months later, probably on Putin’s orders, while flying from Moscow to St Petersburg. Prigozhin’s public support for Surovikin had raised suspicions that he might have aided the mutiny or had prior knowledge of Prigozhin’s plans.
As a result, Surovikin was immediately relieved of his command and disappeared from public view, to the alarm of many in the military establishment. The fate of both Prigozhin and Surovikin are examples of what happens when you fall foul of Russia’s dictator.
With the arrival of winter, Ukrainian soldiers are frustrated about being on the defensive again in a gruelling war, stuck behind the Surovikin lines. Some are beginning to express concerns that Russia is now better equipped for battle. By Ukrainian officials’ own admission, Kyiv’s counteroffensive to fight off Russia’s invasion has progressed more slowly than originally hoped, and positions on the battlefield are set to remain entrenched for at least the next few months because of the unfavourable ground conditions.
Over the past 12 months, during which both Russia and Ukraine launched major offensives, little more than 500 square miles of territory changed hands— less than one-fifth of one percent of Ukraine’s territory.
“Just like in the First World War, we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate”, said Ukraine’s military commander-in-chief, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi in November, “there will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough”. As the war enters its third year, Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against ongoing Russian aggression hangs in the balance.
Kyiv is nervously watching debates in the US and EU over continued security assistance. Congress in Washington remains unmoved by President Biden’s request for $61 billion in aid, stalled by Republican demands for the border funding between the US and Mexico. In Brussels, a 50 billion euro support package for Ukraine was recently vetoed by Hungarian President Victor Orban.
If funding from Washington lapses, there is no possibility that the EU could make up the difference and already there are reports that Ukrainian forces are rationing munitions against a surge of Russian aggression. With the war at a stalemate, President Putin is playing a waiting game, wagering that the West’s support will gradually crumble, fractured by political divisions, eroded by war fatigue and distracted by other demands, such as the war in Israel and China’s menacing of Taiwan.
Even though Western sanctions are biting, they are not crippling the Russian economy which has been placed on a war footing. Its defence industry has benefitted from the support of China and others in overcoming Western sanctions. It will be able to churn out weapons and manpower at a steady pace for as long as necessary, while Ukraine on its own can’t match either.
So, will this unnecessary and pointless war, started by Vladimir Putin simply to secure his legacy, end in 2024 with a victory for Russia? Improbable, say many experts. Moscow and Kyiv aren’t interested in negotiating an end to the war or even settling for a frozen conflict, so it’s highly likely that the fighting will continue throughout the year.
President Putin continues to have a high approval rating and is certain to win the sham presidential elections in March. In his victory speech, Putin will say that he will guarantee success against Western aggression and that he will not allow the West to take over Russia.
He will also state his determination to win the war in Ukraine, which he reiterated this month during his first end-of-year news conference since the offensive began. For their part, two years into this war Ukrainian morale remains high below the surface, despite the current gloom at the lack of success in their spring offensive.
Ninety five percent of Ukrainians are still confident of victory and are determined to push the Russian invaders from their land. In 2024, Ukrainian forces are likely to continue to attempt to separate Russian troops in the south from those in the east with the aim of disrupting Russia’s supply lines and their abilities on the battlefield. But high morale alone cannot win a war.
Western aid remains essential for victory and future success will be determined by its continued supply. Ukraine cannot win without the kind of air power and long-range firepower that the country’s international partners have so far failed to provide, and any delay will slow Ukraine’s success on the battlefield, which in turn will allow Russia to fortify its positions and lead to a longer war.
The elephant in the room is, of course, Donald Trump. Trump has always claimed that he would solve the Ukrainian war in a single day, but has never explained how he would do this. Vladimir Putin will be hoping that his dear friend Donald will win in November, as this most likely will stop all aid from the US and Ukraine would be forced to accept Russian terms, albeit ones that would probably be far less than Putin hoped for when he launched the war.
Any peace settlement based on existing battle-lines in Ukraine, even if it included Ukrainian neutrality, would fall far short of what Putin hoped for when he launched the war. By far the greater part of Ukraine would remain independent of Moscow and closely aligned with the West. It would of course also fall far short of Ukrainian hopes of defeating Russia completely and recovering all territory lost since 2014.
However, short of a win by either side which is currently most unlikely, or of a compromise in their war aims, the only possible solution would be a “North Korean” armistice with no end to the war. And nobody would want that.
John Dobson is a former British diplomat, who also worked in UK Prime Minister John Major’s office between 1995 and 1998. He is currently Visiting Fellow at the University of Plymouth.