Contradictions and inconsistencies are common in the nuclear weapons rhetoric, and these are rarely questioned, especially during crisis situations.
A nuclear weapons threat is back on the international agenda again as the Russian government conducts nuclear weapons exercises, threatens to use nuclear weapons against anyone who interferes with its invasion of Ukraine, and raises the alert level of its nuclear forces. For a long time, the nuclear weapons discourse has been deliberately obscured from the public, using vague, technical jargon that is often ambiguous and confusing. The majority of nuclear-armed states do not claim to have weapons of mass destruction. Some countries are preferring to refer to their nuclear weapons as deterrents, strategic deterrents, or deterrent forces.
Contradictions and inconsistencies are common features of the nuclear weapons rhetoric, and they are rarely questioned, especially during crisis situations. Nuclear-armed states, especially the five nuclear-weapon states recognised by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)—China, France, Russia, UK, USA—are bound by international law, their own policies and doctrines. Often, these contradict the statements and actions of these countries. It is often forgotten, for instance, that the NPT obliges these five countries to pursue nuclear disarmament, and that in this treaty, the five countries have committed to “complete the elimination of their nuclear arsenals” and have agreed to “diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies”. Most national doctrines envision nuclear weapons being used only in “extreme circumstances”, such as when a state’s existence is at risk.
States with nuclear weapons typically argue that their own weapons are necessary for the maintenance of security, stability, and peace, while those of their rivals pose a threat, apart from destabilizing and threatening peace. Nuclear-armed states use security and stability arguments to justify retaining nuclear weapons, but these arguments do not apply to non-nuclear-weapons states considering acquiring them; nuclear proliferation is viewed as a grave threat to international security. Despite claiming that nuclear weapons are vital to their security, nuclear-armed states claim to be committed to nuclear disarmament.
With the same argument, North Korea of Iran, or any other sovereign country claims that nuclear weapons are necessary to ensure its security and deter foreign aggression or coercion. If you have the right, any other country has also the same right, because your arguments are promoting nuclear proliferation. If you argue that nuclear weapons are necessary for your security and are the ultimate insurance policy, the same logic applies to other countries also. Today if a non-nuclear-weapons state faces an acute security threat, it has every right to acquire nuclear weapons for the same logic the nuclear-armed states have.
I am not arguing for nuclear proliferation, but I want a world free from nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons rhetoric is replete with double standards and special pleading. Our 50 years of nuclear diplomacy have made one thing clear—nuclear nations are not ready to give up their weapons. One idea, which can be useful is we have to find a way to influence nuclear policy from beyond the shadow of the nuclear states. To end the nuclear hegemony of nuclear states we must negotiate a new nuclear law under which every country has equal rights.
Consider a world where all nuclear weapons are in existence. The way it looks, this is due to two powerful but competing goals. Nuclear weapons have been banned in areas on earth and beyond because the majority of countries support a nuclear weapons-free world. However, a small number of countries still possess nuclear weapons due to the security, prestige, and power they provide, and the number has increased over the past 70 years. The United States, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and China are known to possess nuclear weapons. Many other countries began nuclear weapons programs but gave them up, either voluntarily or under pressure. Several nuclear weapons states have destroyed or transferred their nuclear weapons to other nuclear weapons states. A nuclear conflict between any of the nuclear powers is unlikely, but it remains a possibility. Despite the decline in weapons held by these countries, they remain reluctant to disarm completely because they view nuclear weapons as important to their security. After all, nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons ever created and few countries want to give them up.
Many other countries protected themselves against nuclear threats through a security guarantee, a pledge from a country to protect an ally using military means. Because of this provision, a security guarantee provided by a nuclear-armed country is also called a nuclear umbrella. The US nuclear umbrella covers several countries like NATO members, Japan, Australia and South Korea. In spite of security guarantees the nuclear umbrellas countries that have committed to non-proliferation understand that they live in a nuclear world. And to deal with this reality, countries want to acquire nuclear weapons to achieve a peaceful future secured by weapons as necessary. With growing security threats from nuclear-capable countries, nuclear non-proliferation remains a critical issue today.
My aim is to argue here, just like chemical weapons that are unacceptable in any circumstances, nuclear weapons are also unacceptable because it is more destructive and abhorrent than chemical weapons.
Sanjay Dalmia is the Chairman of Dalmia Group of Companies.