In August 2018, finally, India’s defence planning architecture underwent a significant change with the Narendra Modi government deciding to establish an overarching Defence Planning Committee (DPC) under the National Security Adviser. The aim is to leverage this cross-governmental body—comprising the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, three Service Chiefs, the Defence, Expenditure and Foreign Secretaries—to enhance India’s ability to do some long-term strategising.
The DPC has been tasked with drafting reports on “national security strategy, international defence engagement strategy, roadmap to build a defence manufacturing ecosystem, strategy to boost defence exports, and priority capability development plans”. Four subcommittees have been created under the DPC to focus on policy and strategy, plans and capability development, defence diplomacy, and the defence manufacturing ecosystem. Appointment of two more Deputy National Security Advisers, as opposed to just one in the earlier structure, is part of a major restructuring.
It has also been reported that a National Security Strategy document has been finalised, though it is unlikely that it will be made public. Given the growing focus of Indian security policy on China, the MEA is now running the Centre for Contemporary China Studies, an in-house think-tank which is exclusively devoted to studying China. It has personnel from across various branches of the government and will aim to provide inputs to policymakers on managing China, both on a day-to-day and long-term basis.
While addressing the Combined Commanders Conference in December 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi had underlined “At a time when major powers are reducing their forces and rely more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces. Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult and unnecessary goal. We need forces that are agile, mobile and driven by technology, not just human valour.” In line with this, certain steps have been taken.
In the first such exercise of its kind since Independence to be completed by the end of 2019, the Modi government is also moving ahead with major restructuring of the Indian Army with a view to enhance its combat capabilities, as well as streamline budgetary allocation. The Ministry of Defence had constituted a committee under Lt Gen D.B. Shekatkar to recommend measures for enhancing combat capability and rebalancing defence expenditure of the armed forces which had submitted its report in December 2016. Most of its recommendations (65 out of 99) have been accepted and are now at various stages of implementation.
The very nature of warfare is evolving rapidly and India’s neighbours are undertaking their own restructuring. Indian armed forces cannot remain beholden to their past practices without an assessment of the rapid evolution in technological and socio-political forces. The 1.3-million strong Indian Army hardly has any funds for modernisation, burdened as it is by revenue expenditure and pensions. A planned Army restructuring, aimed at reducing its strength by 1.5 lakh men, is expected to save up to Rs 7,000 crore a year in revenue expenditure.
These decisions come at a time when Indian defence planning stands at a crossroads. The silo-driven approach to defence planning has resulted in the lack of an integrated view. The three Services as well as the civilian and defence agencies are often seen to be working at cross purposes. Such an ad hoc approach has meant that more often than not, issues like threat perception and force structure are not managed via a centralised and authoritative overview. Instead, individual Services tend to be driving the agenda at their own levels.
This lack of synchronisation is manifested in various ways. On the one hand, the Indian Army Chief has been talking of a two-front war. On the other, the Vice-Chief of Army Staff testified before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence that the budget allocated to the defence forces was hardly enough to complete the committed payments for the emergency procurements already made, let alone for pursuing an ambitious defence modernisation plan.
The headlines on Indian defence policy often tend to be completely divorced from the ground reality. India’s $250-billion military modernisation programme is often talked about. But even as New Delhi remains keen on acquiring significant weapons platforms, there have been persistent doubts about its ability to harness these resources in service of a long-term strategy. Indeed, the absence of an Indian “grand strategy” that sets out political objectives for Indian power projection—and then ensures military, economic, intelligence and educational development—coordinated toward these objectives, has been a perennial topic of discussion within Indian strategic circles.
India’s defence reform campaign has existed nearly as long as the current system itself. This drive focuses on extending resource integration and coordination throughout defence policymaking. Moreover, it recommends a state infrastructure able to adequately implement political judgements and to combine state resources to meet these judgements. This is currently missing in India.
Since the very beginning, the defence reform drive has implicitly targeted the need for a sufficiently integrative and coordinative state structure—required for an operationally effective defence policy. But not much success has been achieved. Reforming this system remains a core requirement for India to adequately manage its scarce resources and align these with political objectives.
Effective defence planning and force structuring is a function of an institutional framework that allows for a clear delineation of political goals, efficient mobilisation of resources and effective use of these resources for developing instrumentalities of state power. The Modi government seems to have finally acknowledged the need for new structures and processes, but time is not on India’s side.
At a time when advances in technology are revolutionising warfare, India is still debating the need to move towards leaner force structures. India needs to cut the flab on an urgent basis as over half of the annual defence budget going to meet salary and pension requirements is clearly not sustainable. The priorities of India’s “Make in India” initiative and cumbersome defence procurement process will also have to be brought in sync with each other. India’s status as the world’s largest arms importer hardly does justice to its ambitions to emerge as a defence manufacturing hub. The debate on integration, both among the Services headquarters, and between the Services and the Ministry of Defence, also continues unabated and should be concluded.
Effective defence planning tends to put a premium on assuring future strategic and operational adaptiveness. In the Indian context, a transformative shift in mindset, structures and processes is needed. Rapidly evolving security environment as well as a near permanent pressure on scarce resources underscores the need for strategic defence planning. The Modi government has made moves in the right direction. Hopefully, it will be able to take this process of strategic restructuring to its logical conclusion.
Harsh V. Pant is Director, Studies at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi and Professor of International Relations, King’s College London.