In 2005, Hiranmay Karlekar’s book, “Bangladesh: The Next Afghanistan” warned us of this. It was a timely and sobering reminder of the power of all kinds of fundamentalism in the contemporary world, and that no society is proof against their ravages, even those which have prided themselves on their secularism, tolerance and pluralism. Bangladesh is a country haunted by divisions—not only the Partition of India, but also that of the War of Liberation, and the even more fateful split, between Muslim and Bengali, which is the more menacing because it exists within individuals, within the people themselves. Whether the wholeness of a specifically Bengali version of Islam can be restored is the question which this book posed. The illegal migration of Bangladeshi Muslims into India—and the border moving 10 to 20 km into Indian territory—is challenging the secular nature of our polity by these fundamentalisms supported by external powers. This systematic illegal immigration is demographically changing border states and districts and illegal occupation of tribal and government lands in Jharkhand as well.
The chain of extraordinary events in Bangladesh last month that toppled the Sheikh Hasina government shocked and surprised the region. Commentators and so-called “experts” jumped on the opportunity to analyse the antecedents and outcomes of this significant political, social and religious upheaval in the country. Yet, such quaint analyses failed to capture a few critical outcomes of the changed status quo in Bangladesh—the status of Hindus in the country and the implicit anti-India approach of the interim government.
The change in government is bound to produce a change in policies, yet what unfolded in Bangladesh has largely taken a regressive turn for now. Four critical aspects are largely missing in the news stories and commentaries on Bangladesh. First, unabated Hinduphobia is at an all-time high in the country ever since its creation in 1971. The Indian recognition of the country shortly after its creation was pretexted on the assumption that the ideological and religious fundamentalism that characterizes the Pakistani state of which Bangladesh was born would not be manifest in the nascent state. However, the treatment and targeting of minorities in the aftermath of the 5 August events is a case in point of those assumptions proven unfounded.
Remarkably, the Hindus, who constitute less than 8% of the population, have witnessed a steady decline in their numbers over the years. Still, the interim government is openly catering to Islamist groups and promoting religious schisms, which is likely to widen internal divisions and make the migration of Hindus an unavoidable reality. In around 50 out of 64 districts of the country where Hindus reside, 200 attacks occurred within 10 days of the fall of the Hasina government, including attacks against individuals, incidents of vandalism of businesses/properties, Hindu houses and especially temples. Moreover, there were reported incidents of Hindu property being seized in different parts of the country.
Second, the government’s anti-India approach is counter-productive and regressive development. The change in government is usually viewed positively in any country’s politics, but in Bangladesh, the dominance of the military in decision-making is a dangerous development. We all are aware of the ills of military dictatorship and their pervasive influence on politics in South Asian countries.
The caretaker government has proved equally unfaithful, if not more, in handling the post-coup set-up in the country as Islamists and anti-India groups have been empowered. At the same time, the realities of persecution and attacks against minorities, including Hindus and Christians, are overlooked and even denied. The Chief Adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government, Muhammad Yunus, has referred to attacks against Hindus as “exaggerated” and argued that such incidents were political in nature, not religious. Ironically, a week prior, his interim government ended the ban on the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, whose members supported Pakistani rule in the early 1970s and had historical involvement in violent activities in the country.
Third, there is also the need to remember that Pakistan is becoming a factor in India-Bangladesh relations. The Pakistan factor was an obscure theme in India-Bangladesh relations in the last decade or so. However, given the turmoil and incidents of empowerment of Islamist groups, the Pakistan factor will likely gain higher importance. Only last week, the 76th death anniversary of Pakistan founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah was celebrated at Dhaka’s National Press Club. Such celebrations have also occurred in the past, but happening in the National Press Club adds a new colour to it. Similarly, the incident of installing a sign in front of the Indian High Commission in Dhaka that read “Shaheed Felani Road” to showcase a protest against India’s BSF (Border Security Forces) killings of Bangladeshis is something that needs to be read seriously. Although the sign was removed the following day by the authorities, the insistence on painting Indian border forces as “killers” is akin to what Pakistan did in Kashmir, where the narrative was that the Indian Army kills civilians.
For India’s MEA, diplomacy remains uncertain as the communication from the Bangladeshi counterparts has been less than adequate. Meanwhile, the leadership has taken to the media to convey their positions, whether on economic issues or Sheikh Hasina’s stay in India. Put together, the interim government does not want to engage through official channels, does not intend to communicate effectively, and makes unfactual statements about minority persecution, while enabling recognition to organisations like the Jamat. In the meantime, they assert they are open to good relations. Such a contrast between fact and fiction is a really worrying development.
Fourth, the intelligentsia and woke ecosystem within and outside India is sickly silent on matters of persecution while loudly criticising India for supporting the erstwhile leader Sheikh Hasina. Neither of these realities was unexpected by the consistent standards of the hypocrisy of such ultra-liberals. There are no candle marches, no hashtags, no statements of outrage. While the Hindus, in whatever capacity, are trying to escape the persecution, the Left intellectuals would have them believe that their situation is not that bad. Meanwhile, the protests over the CAA were loud about discrimination and failure to take into account the Muslim population being given prioritized access to citizenship from neighbouring countries.
The obvious takeaway from the unfolding developments is that hard times follow in Bangladesh for the minorities and in the country’s relationship with India. There is a fine line between words and actions. So far, the interim government in Bangladesh seems oblivious to such a distinction. The pretext of free and fair elections that the interim government will be overseeing is also contestable given the mass suppression and persecution of Awami League members all throughout Bangladesh. Things do not seem to be changing in the near future. Still, the events highlight the essential fact about the plight of the Hindu population—Hinduphobia is real and growing, yet with little recognition or support in countering it is worrisome. Hinduphobia is the hate matrix constructed by Wokes and it has found a place in the immediate neighbourhood and in the West in Canada, the US and Europe.
Prof Santishree Dhulipudi Pandit is the Vice Chancellor of JNU.