The Protocols of Disengagement, aimed at avoiding an escalation of conflict, have weakened over time and stood jettisoned in 2020.
Since Chinese expansionism in Eastern Ladakh in May 2020, issues of bilateral agreements signed in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013 between India and China and the agreed protocols have been debated ad-infinitum. The 1993 Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Stability stipulated that the two sides would not use force or threaten to use force and respect and obey the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The 1996 Agreement was like a no-war pact stating that neither side shall use its military capability against the other side. There were minimum levels of military forces to be maintained along the LAC, compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations.
The 2005 Protocol said that if the border personnel of the two sides came to a face-to-face situation due to differences on the alignment of the LAC or any other reason, they should exercise self-restraint and take all necessary steps to avoid an escalation of the situation and simultaneously return to their respective bases.
In the last decade, however, the face-offs had witnessed the PLA jostling, pushing, and incidences of scuffles and fisticuffs. Since 2013, many incidents occurred wherein there were gross violations of protocols in Raki Nalla, Chumar, Pangong Tso, Demchok and Doklam, and the face-offs were prolonged. In Pangong Tso and in Galwan in 2020, the PLA displayed total savagery and cruelty in the brawls and fisticuffs, using medieval weapons like nail-studded clubs, rods wrapped in barbed wire and knuckle dusters against Indian troops.
Simply put, the Protocols of Disengagement, aimed at avoiding any escalation of conflict along the non-delineated and non-demarcated border, have weakened over time, and stood jettisoned in 2020. Apparently, with complete transformation in Tibet/Xinjiang and in Ladakh, with escalated deployments and war-like infrastructure in proximity, the Agreements are in a coma. The formality of Protocols of Disengagement is over, though a modicum of understanding still exists in the WMCC talks, the Corps Commanders talks at Chushul/ Moldo, the existence and use of hotlines and the localised border personnel meetings like the one post-Yangste incident in December 2022.
That brings us to the current situation of fisticuffs and brawls with medieval weapons and with tasers, as evident at Yangste, and similar incidents happening every year. There have been significant changes on the LAC in the last two years. The Indian Army holds the LAC with posts and reserves in proximity to react to eventualities. ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) has improved credibly. Obviously, hence, both sides are prepared for the brawls and fisticuffs, or so as to say perfectly anticipating it to happen. This invariably leads to some injuries. Again, these fisticuffs have not escalated to firing and there have been no fatalities, though the same cannot be assured of in future, as events take their own course and the end-state is not predictable, despite restraints.
This open-ended, well prepared for brawling has inherent dangers. Why the PLA would continuously and deliberately involve its units in brawling (for want of a better word), with no favourable outcomes possible and only unfavourable consequences, is incomprehensible. Is the PLA trying to register its claim on a territorial feature, intimating its opinion on non-acceptance of the LAC/MacMahon Line or just indulging in military coercion? Obviously, Indian Army units will not provoke the PLA for undertaking these ventures. At this juncture, the rationale of PLA’s actions matters little.
Is there, then, the need for new ROE (rules of engagement), and intimating those to the PLA to thwart any un-military like attempts? The basic question that can be asked is: why change, when the current situation is functional and would not lead to escalation? Should then Indian Army units train for and equip themselves for this kind of un-military-like brawling? It is well conceivable that the PLA will continue with these border infringements at will. With the trust-deficit, there is also need to be careful of the buffer zones in Eastern Ladakh, lest they too be violated, as the previous protocols have been.
The ROE have political, legal and military ramifications. The ROE are obviously national policy that reflects in the action of commanders and troops in the field, under circumstances in which communication with the higher authority may not be possible. They would fall within the array of political concerns with such issues as the influence of international public opinion, particularly how it is affected by media coverage.
The ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which the forces will initiate combat engagement. Four guiding principles need to be considered. One is the principle of military necessity that emanates from the territorial integrity of the LAC/McMahon Line justifying the employment of force. Military necessity will have to be based upon the nature of the adversity, each specific location and purpose. This will require further explanation, laying down a well-indefinable line in each specific area, crossing which will lead to the likelihood of a brawl or fisticuff. When the hostile intent of the adversary’s forces are evident, the right exists to use minimal force as warning shots only, providing the opportunity to withdraw. The epithet, “don’t provoke, don’t be provoked”, will stand in good stead. Two is the issue of proportionality, that is force used should be minimal. Proportionality would limit the nature, duration, and scope of the engagement to decisively counter any hostile act or intent. Three, de-escalate soonest, when time and circumstances permit, intimating by publicised means, ceasefire of the warning shots. Actions must be so measured that they do not trigger an undesired response or escalation. Four, there ought to be an inherent right of self-defence. A commander has the authority and obligation to use means to take all appropriate action to defend unit and other forces in the vicinity from a hostile intent. Hence, the basic tactics of one foot on the ground, and fire and movement are imperatives to protect our own forces.
The problem of change in ROE at the LAC is the likely provocation and the possibility of escalation. It needs to be ensured that our decisions and actions deter or minimize the possibility of a brawl, and yet do not, to the extent feasible, cause casualties by firing as a positive limit on the escalation of hostilities. In doing so, ROE should regulate the commander’s means and methods of using force by granting or withholding the authority to use certain weapons, weapons systems, or tactics. There may be modifications possible to the ROE in certain circumstances; those should be mandated to require higher approval or place further restrictions on specific actions.
In formulating detailed ROE, it is understandable that tight rules would curtail the freedom of action and endanger our own forces, while loose ones can have political ramifications. Hence a balance will be imperative. Precise rules are impossible to formulate, though vagueness and imprecision can compound dangers. ROE will not be able to support all answers, and hence some latitude to the commanders to exercise judgement is essential. Commanders on ground will also require maximum information to support his mission.
In sum, the ROE at the LAC must be designed to deter physical altercation, and to discourage escalation. They, in this manner, would achieve political and military objectives. It is critical that our troops are aware of and train to the guiding principles. This means that not only the commanders but small unit leaders must continuously train their troops in the knowledge and application of ROE. The ROE must be put through scenario driven testing to the point where the ROE are second nature and instinct to them.
Lt Gen Rakesh Sharma is a retired officer of the Indian Army.