Any reset in the Middle East will have to await the outcome of emerging realignments in the region.
The Middle East, currently a cauldron of conflict with changing alignments and a possible reconfiguration of territorial boundaries, has long been the epicentre of foreign intrigue and interventions. History chronicles the invasion by Greek King Alexander of Macedonia in 334 BC, first into the vast, opulent, and more advanced Persian Empire—from Asia Minor by the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas to India’s Hindu Kush region under King Darius III. This was swiftly followed by the strategic capture of Egypt, arguably a wealthier and more civilized society. Most of his conquests now make up what is known as the modern Middle East. The last 75 years have seen at least half a dozen full-fledged wars being fought here, with the explicit involvement of Western nations, all buoyed by their victory over the Axis Powers in the Second World War. A majority of these have been in the context of their continued and extensive backing of the creation of the Jewish nation of Israel in 1948 and its survival as a distinct national entity, amid persistent opposition from neighbours.
The ongoing confrontation between Israeli forces and the Gaza Strip-based Hamas militia group, now entering its fifth month following its surprise attack on Israel on 7 October, can be traced back to the same factors. It is becoming increasingly bloody by the day and threatens to escalate into a regional war, having already spread to half a dozen Arab nations. Multinational efforts are underway to bring about a durable ceasefire in Gaza, expand humanitarian aid to the beleaguered residents of Gaza City, and possibly develop arrangements for a longer-term truce. With the war now involving more countries, the prospects for an early resolution are becoming increasingly remote. Any significant readjustment by India of its bilateral ties with one or more of the 20 Middle Eastern nations—15 in Asia and 5 in North Africa—would necessarily have to await the solidification of rapidly changing equations and the region’s return to peace and stability.
As such, the Middle East, especially West Asia, has been witnessing significant geopolitical shifts in recent years. Iran, once a core part of ancient Persia, under its puritanical Shia regime for nearly two decades aspires to regional supremacy. Reports suggest it is now equipping itself with a nuclear arsenal and a formidable military force. Despite enduring a prolonged period of stringent Western economic sanctions, Iran, with its not inconsiderable financial resources, remains in pursuit of its historical pre-eminence and dominance. It has forged a network of well-armed affiliates in several countries to extend its influence and to acquire the capability to strike at its adversaries indirectly. Its current regional proxies reportedly include Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen. These groups are instrumental in the ongoing conflicts, launching frequent attacks on American forces in Jordan and other parts of the region, disrupting vital maritime routes, particularly through the Red Sea, and engaging the Israeli forces along the Lebanon -border.
Another emerging regional superpower is Saudi Arabia. Anticipating a future shift away from hydrocarbons, the kingdom is rapidly transitioning to renewables, particularly solar power. Under the de facto rule of Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, the country is attempting progress in easing traditional social mores, dress and work restrictions on women, and gradual recognition of broader human rights. Its large economy is opening up to foreign capital and technology. USA, UK, and several European nations are fostering close relations with him and supporting his transformation of the nation into a potential counterbalance to Iran. Concurrently, Western nations are keen to increase sales of expensive military and civilian hardware, aircraft, missiles and luxury items. Prior to the conflict between Hamas and Israel, US was actively facilitating Saudi Arabia’s formal recognition of Israel and entering into a security treaty with the Saudis. Moving forward, the West may promote such an alliance, but only after persuading the Crown Prince of its and Israel’s, unwavering support for creation of a separate Palestine with East Jerusalem as capital, and after the US signs a treaty assuring Saudi Arabia’s security and agrees to its development into a nuclear power.
Yet another recent development of consequence is Israel’s “defiance” of the Western proposal to immediately cease the bombing of Gaza and to move to the negotiating table. President Biden has been urging Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to accept the two-state solution and to allow for a separate Palestine, as long demanded by Arab nations. His right-wing-dominated government, however, continues to bid for time to more effectively secure its borders by, once and for all, eliminating Hamas in Gaza and elsewhere. Understandably, the US leadership is not pleased with the outright rejection by an ally whom it has consistently supported, unhesitatingly extending financial assistance, modern arms, and technology, in addition to the more important international backing. Once the war subsides, the Democratic administration in the USA might wish to see the departure of Netanyahu and his far-rightist cabinet, and instead work with a more moderate government.
In any case, the US is finding that it is no longer the sole determinant force in resolving the Israel-Hamas conflict, or, for that matter, in the broader emerging dynamics in the Middle East. In brokering the short first ceasefire last November, in exchange for a few Israeli hostages and Hamas prisoners, it was the Qataris who had mediated. The Egyptians, eager to resume traffic flow in the Red Sea and re-earn valuable dollars in revenue, are working behind the scenes along with Qatar, with both warring sides and their intermediaries. They have gained a degree of leverage by allowing a staggering 2.3 million residents of Gaza, displaced due to Israel’s assaults, to move over to Rafah through its territory.
The US efforts, led by its frequently criss-crossing Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, are beginning to address such weaknesses. Now on his fifth trip to the war-torn Middle East, Blinken’s itinerary includes Qatar and Egypt, besides Saudi Arabia. Perhaps another important objective is to soothe Israel, whose Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir publicly expressed dissatisfaction in an article in the Wall Street Journal on February 4, lamenting that its key ally, the US, had not shown sufficient support and accused Biden of prioritizing humanitarian aid and fuel to Gaza, which he claimed benefits Hamas. Though Ben-Gvir was reprimanded by Netanyahu, the concern in the US about Israel taking an independent course is evident. In Iraq too, where 2, 500 American troops are stationed to enhance its security, there was a contradiction to US National Security Council spokesman John Kirby’s statement that “Washington did inform the Iraqi government prior to its strikes.” This was regarding the US warplanes’ air attack in late January on 85 targets used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and their militant groups, three in Iraq and four in Syria. A greater emerging challenge for the USA, is China aligning with Russia and more explicitly supporting Iran in its quest to claim a leadership role.
An early activation of the Sino-Russian-Iranian axis in the Middle East can be expected. Not only is the region strategically located at the virtual centre of the globe, it also hosts convenient sea routes connecting the East and the West. This geographical advantage is complemented by it possessing vast reserves of crude oil and gas. Despite some countries being similarly endowed, almost the entire world covets these deposits. Given their finite nature, developed nations prefer to keep their own reserves untapped. West Asian countries are not densely populated, and their standards of living are high. Western nations rely on them for the export of a wide variety of goods and services. Additionally, the overseas investments made by affluent Arabs are substantive and highly sought after.
Eager to sustain its past levels of economic growth, China, in particular, is keen to enhance exports to the Middle East and thereby finance the substitution of coal with oil and natural gas in its energy -transition. It strives to sell electric vehicles, lithium and chemical batteries, advanced solar cells and panels. It has begun to utilize its Belt & Road Initiative (BRI), though the number of ‘takers’ has been limited. For Russia, currently preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, such factors—except for hydrocarbons, which it possesses—would perhaps be of greater significance once the Ukraine conflict ends. Following the dissolution of the erstwhile Soviet Union, its access to ports in the West has declined, as has its international standing. To reclaim it, Russia may step in to challenge the West’s influence. Its task should become easier upon joining hands with China and Iran, which has already promoted an “axis of resistance” of Shia forces.
While waiting for the war in the Middle East to subside and for new internal and external alignments to evolve more concretely, India could intensify the exploration of its economic and social ties with nations in West Asia and North Africa. With their significantly higher per capita incomes, several of these countries fall into the middle-income or developed country categories. Their domestic production of manufactured and processed goods being limited, there is considerable reliance on imports from Europe and, increasingly, Southeast Asia. With Western goods and services generally being costly and oil revenues declining, there is potential for India to increase its exports. This potential stands demonstrated through the recently effected Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between India and the UAE—over the last year and a half, trade has doubled and diversified. India’s service exports, which were earlier mainly of the low-end semi-skilled workers, are now moving to the higher end, with senior engineers, supervisors, accountants, and auditors being provided by Indian firms. With the aging and declining of Western population, most jobs traditionally manned in West Asia by the “white man” have become amenable to being taken up by Indians.
The future trade agreements or Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with the countries of the region must place much greater emphasis on services and manpower as well as project- exports. The emerging opportunity in this segment must not be allowed to be captured by other Asians or Central Europeans who have a few similar advantages as India. This is particularly imperative as India’s imports of hydrocarbons from the Gulf region are bound to expand with its expected higher pace of economic growth. In fact, the Paris-based International Energy Association (IEA) predicts that by 2030, India will be the world’s largest importer of crude oil and gas.
Dr Ajay Dua, a development economist, is an ex Union Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Part 2 covering the specific countrywide ties would follow.