The Indian Armed Forces cannot go back to pre-2020 border management, which was also not normal. Since this phrase of normalised management and control has not been further explained, it becomes apparent for China that the current situation is deemed as ‘normal’.
Speaking about the 23rd meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on Border Affairs (WMCC) on 19 November 2021, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Zhao Lijian first stated that China and India should “strive to switch from emergency response to normalized management and control as soon as possible.” More recently, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, consequent to his visit to New Delhi in July 2022, had stated that India and China “…need to take a long-term view, shift from emergency management to normal border management and control mechanisms, and prevent border-related incidents from causing unnecessary disruptions to bilateral relations.”
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning on 9 September 2022, while calling PP15 (patrol Point 15 on LAC) consensus a “positive development”, categorically stated that “We don’t accept the so-called status quo created by India’s illegal crossing of the LAC, but that doesn’t mean we don’t attach importance to peace and tranquillity along the border… China and India hold different positions on the border issues.” In a speech on PRC’s 73rd Founding Day, on 1 October 2022, Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Weidong again reiterated that the situation along the LAC was moving towards being “normalised” and that the border situation was now switching to “normalised management and control.”
On the contrary, in Bengaluru recently, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had clearly stated that the India-China relationship “cannot be normal as the border situation is not normal,” adding that LAC tensions could lead to a “dangerous situation”, and more talks were needed. Obviously, “normalised management and control” of LAC, an institutional position of China, is not in consonance with the official Indian stand. What PRC implies by normalised management and control, is examined in four key pointers.
First, the examination of complicated borders cannot be divorced from history. The British on decolonising had bequeathed seriously problematic borders that led to wars in Africa and Asia. Indian borders with Pakistan and China follow the same legacy. With China, the issue easily falls back to the confusion created by the 19th century British bureaucrats, left as legacy for generations to come. The 826 km LAC in Eastern Ladakh with China draws its history from Chinese Premier Chou en Lai’s 1959 letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that referred to a line up to which each side exercises actual control in Ladakh. Shivshankar Menon has explained in “Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy”, that the LAC was “described only in general terms on maps not to scale” by the Chinese. The 1993 Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement between China and India recognised the term LAC. Here too, the reference to LAC was unqualified, making it clear that it was not referring to the LAC of the 1959 or post-1962 War, but to the LAC when the agreement was signed in 1993.
Obviously, the LAC has been a grievously flawed and ambiguous concept. There was an unstated but underlying hope in the 1993 Agreement that a formalised LAC would eventually be delineated on maps and demarcated on the ground. That did not happen, and the LAC remained vague, to say the least. For the Indian Army/ITBP troops, the relationship was drawn with designated Patrolling Points (PPs) that had been designated in the late 1970s. Even the PLA patrols remained perpetually confused on the exact location of the LAC, which was evident in the discussions post the skirmishes and clashes of patrols.
Second, is the management of the LAC since the 1993 Agreement. India had seriously attempted ensuring good relations with China. Over the last three decades, India had attempted to explore and create huge interest in relationship building and engagement, building on economic interdependence and negating the likelihood of a conflict. A series of protocols and confidence building measures enunciated in subsequent Agreements, and the LAC was dominated by patrols of Indian Army and ITBP up to the PPs. Till about a decade or so ago, the LAC in Eastern Ladakh was manned largely by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), with a limited presence of Army units.
With increasing PLA transgressions, the border posture and deployment were reviewed to challenge the creeping forward of PLA patrols. This led to repeated fracas and some longish face-offs, contravening the Agreements. The charade and the pressure of dominating the undemarcated LAC were wrought at the tactical level, on the troops, units and formations deployed in dominating their area of responsibility. This was on till May 2020, when multiple simultaneous transgressions and force build-ups in eastern Ladakh, led also to the conflict at Galwan. In hindsight, the CBMs and protocols established under various Agreements, finally failed to serve the cause of peace and tranquillity on the border. Hence the situation that existed in the last two decades, prior to May 2020, can in no way be referred to as “normal management and control of the LAC”.
Third is the analysis of the current situation. There have also been very significant changes in the Tibetan and Xinjiang strategic geography in the last two years. PLA has created newer military or dual-use infrastructure, and the PLA military formations that had been side-stepped from Xinjiang, have now firmed in new semi-permanent habitat/bases and garrisons. There are also demographic changes being sought along the LAC/McMahon Line in the Northeast, with the creation of “well-off villages.” With “buffer zones” or moratorium on patrolling from Raki Nalla to Kailash Range, there is nearly a Belt of Actual Control created, which has amended the total border paradigm from what existed pre-2020. Again the situation currently existing is far from normal.
Fourth is the necessity to analyse the repeated reference to and implications of “normalised management and control.” It is increasingly apparent that for multiple reasons—some internal, some external—the Chinese government seeks to move ahead on bilateral relations. India is the fifth largest economy, steadily moving up the ladder assiduously on the path to reaching her potential.
The Indian Armed Forces cannot go back to pre-2020 border management, which, as argued above, was also not normal. Since this phrase of normalised management and control has not been further explained, it becomes apparent for China that the current situation is deemed as “normal”. To draw inferences, China has no plans or intention to settle the border with India, and there is clear indication that a de-escalation or de-induction is not on the cards. Status quo also implies retaining geostrategic pressure by PLA, with its huge presence. The only saving grace is the Border Personnel Meetings at varied levels and at various places, and the WMCC meetings that are on the diplomatic plane.
Obviously, any further movement of the border-issues will be long-term and will require intensive politico-diplomatic negotiations. The PLA, on its part, must indicate that there is a genuine desire to rapprochement, by suo-moto deescalating and deinduction of its reserve formations to their permanent stations in Xinjiang and elsewhere. There ought to be reiteration that training movements and exercises in proximity to the LAC without adequate notice will be unacceptable and deemed as belligerence. Strategic infrastructure like the proposed G695 highway being constructed as a lateral close the LAC/McMahon Line must be held back, as it singularly shows expansionism and antagonism. Recommencement of the 2002 process of map-exchange can also be a step in the right direction.
There also ought to be a finite time for the buffer zones on the LAC to last. In a climate of trust-deficiency, these immensely elevate the defensive posture and anxiety at tactical levels. Buffer zones by themselves are no panacea for peace, nor do they lead to any normalised border management. On the contrary, these mandate much higher levels of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, as also positioning of reserves. The exhibition of assertiveness or inherent hostility of the PLA must not be taken as having faded away after the diplomatic and repeated enunciation of “normalised management and control of LAC.”
There is a very long road for normalcy to arrive at the LAC.
Rakesh Sharma is a retired Lieutenant General of the Indian Army.