It is the state of India-China bilateral relations that has also forced Xi Jinping to stay back.
Barely five days before the G20 summit in Delhi, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning announced during a regular press briefing on 4 September that “Premier of the State Council Li Qiang will attend the 18th G20 Summit to be held in New Delhi, India on September 9 and 10.” There were apprehensions about Xi Jinping’s attendance from the very beginning, but Xi skipping the key meeting of BRICS Business Forum; China issuing a controversial “standard map” on 28 August that irked India, Japan, even Russia and many southeast Asian countries; and diametrically opposite versions of the Modi-Xi brief meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg demonstrated that Xi’s chances of attending the G20 were slim. Early in May, when Xi was hosting the first China-Central Asia Summit a few weeks before the SCO Summit hosted by India, it also signalled that China desired to set up a separate kitchen, the summit was held online. What are the reasons and what does his absence tell about the state of India-China relations?
Internally, as the Chinese economy shows deflationary trends owing to the diminishing returns on investment, shrinking consumption and export figures—the three pillars of China’s growth trajectory—requires that Xi Jinping stays home to salvage the economy. Two, the purge of the top commanders of the PLA’s Rocket Force (PLARF) and the mysterious death of PLARF deputy commander, Wu Guohua reveals a high degree of trust deficit between the top leadership of the party and the PLA top echelon. It is speculated that Wei Fenghe, former commander of the PLARF and defence minister is also on the radar. Three, Xi’s absence also indicates that China prefers small groups that allow China to have more say, such as the BRICS and SCO. Finally, the widening chasm with the US and its allies would certainly make Xi Jinping uncomfortable and isolated during the summit.
More importantly, it is the state of India-China bilateral relations that has also forced Xi Jinping to stay back. I wish to draw the readers’ attention to a recent article written by Lan Jianxue, Director of the Asia-Pacific Institute of the China Institute of International Studies in the inhouse International Studies (3), 2023 that reveals Chinese thinking on India and the approaches China has adopted recently. According to Lan, “In order to highlight India as a ‘leading force’ (领导性力量) in reshaping the international order, the Modi government holds high the banner of ‘rules-based, transparent, and reform-oriented multilateralism’, but its enthusiasm for small multilateral mechanisms in which China plays an important role has obviously waned.” Lan argues that India has been trumpeting the position of the US and the West on platforms such as the SCO, BRICS, East Asia Summit, and G20 Summit, and trying to prevent “multilateral mechanisms from becoming a booster for the rise of China as a great power.” Worse, India in the words of Lan, has been conniving with the West in projecting itself as an “ideal choice” (理想选择) for “dislodging China from its position in the global supply chain.” Since Galwan, the scholar says that India has further adjusted its strategy and policies towards China, “resorting to retaliatory and confrontational decoupling” across the spectrum, be it politics, economy, military, diplomacy, etc., exacerbating the dangerous trend of “diminishing cooperation effects” (合作效应递减), intensifying the game of competition (竞争博弈加剧) and continuing the drift and deformation (持续漂移变形) of Sino-Indian relations.
In the field of trade and investment, notwithstanding the burgeoning trade figures that stood at US$84.49 during the first eight months of 2023, the grievances are even more. Lan argues that India has resorted to “digital suppression” (数字打压) of China by blocking hundreds of Chinese apps, deliberately delayed the approval process for mobile phone parts of Chinese brands such as Xiaomi and OPPO, and confiscated huge assets of Chinese companies such as Xiaomi. India has restricted Chinese investment and purchase of Chinese equipment such as solar cell equipment, the import of Chinese-made power generation, transmission and distribution equipment. The scholar also cites that India has used the so-called “rules of origin” (原产地规则) to obstruct Chinese goods and services. Furthermore, India has deliberately blocked people-to-people and cultural exchanges between the two countries and waged a “public opinion war” (舆论战) against China; suppression of Chinese media and investigation of the Confucius Institutes in India have been cited as some examples. India has also been accused of manipulating (操弄) China’s core issues such as Tibet and Taiwan, and of sowing discord with China’s neighbours such as Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka etc., and trying to discredit China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.”
The above-mentioned actions of India, according to the scholar, are intended to force China to make concessions on the border issue and restore the status quo ante as defined by India, but will inevitably have an “unassessable backlash (难以评估的反噬效应) on India’s own interests and the long-term development of China-India relations.” Worsening China-US relations have also been factored in, in the deterioration of India-China relations. Lan posits that the “full-scale suppression and containment” of China by the US, has been taken as “a period of strategic opportunity” (战略机遇期) by India. India and the United States are coordinating to promote the “de-Sinicization” (去中国化) at the economic and technological level. In the future too, the United States will continue to “suppress and contain China” in an all-round way, and India will further “cater to the relevant actions” of the United States (迎合美国相关动作), maintains the scholar.
Multilateral cooperation was once the cornerstone of Sino-Indian relations, however, in recent years, India has deliberately highlighted its differences with China on regional and global governance and sustainable development, intending to push China out of the “Global South” camp, argues the scholar. No wonder, China fears that concepts like Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, one of the core values of the Indian civilisation will further dilute the influence of China’s own foreign policy pillar—“building a community of shared future for the mankind” and “people centric approach” in the Global South.
Finally, Lan asserts that in the coming times, “China will go through a process of “rediscovering India” (重新发现印度). He suggests that it is necessary to abandon the stereotypical approaches towards India, and make corresponding adjustments to India’s strategic thinking and policies for a longer time period. He suggests Kissinger’s “co-evolution” (共同演进) model for cooperation between India and China, so as the “Thucydides trap” is avoided, albeit, the scholar says that India-China relations are on a different footing comparing US-China ties. He recommends that both the countries need to maintain strategic communication, and prevent miscalculations and misfires.
If this is the thinking of Chinese policy formulators on India, we “must be ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms.”
B.R. Deepak is Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.