The rapidly evolving bilateral relationship between India and Afghanistan has seen significant strides, particularly as India emerged as the first country to support Kabul following the Pakistani airstrike that claimed the lives of more than 50 civilians.
This act of solidarity was followed by a high-level meeting in Dubai between Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s Acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi on Wednesday. This marks a significant affirmation of the trust the Taliban government has secured among Indian policymakers since assuming power in August 2021.
However, this growing closeness between India and Afghanistan is likely to face covert attempts by deep-state players in Washington, Pakistani military officers in Rawalpindi, and Beijing, all of whom have differing reasons to derail this burgeoning relationship.
Even before the Taliban took power, during the crucial negotiations in Doha between US diplomats and Taliban representatives, top Taliban leaders assured Indian officials, through interviews and communications—including to this newspaper—that Afghanistan would not become a proxy for Pakistan’s deep state. They promised that Afghanistan would not turn into a sanctuary for Pakistan-based terrorist groups, a primary concern for India’s North Block and South Block. Nearly three years after the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover, the Taliban has largely honoured these commitments.
In an ironic twist, Faiz Hameed, the former head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), who rushed to Kabul shortly after the Taliban came to power to assert Pakistan’s influence over the new government, now finds himself imprisoned in Rawalpindi. His former agency, the ISI, continues to struggle with its failed vision of making the Taliban and Kabul a proxy for its terror networks—a scenario that many commentators in Washington and Delhi had peddled.
Despite Islamabad’s attempts to portray the Taliban as subservient to its interests, that mirage has slowly faded. Pakistan, which has to contend with developments on its eastern border facing India, is now forced to shift its military assets to its western borders to stop Afghanistan from challenging the Durand Line, the legality of which Kabul has never accepted.
Throughout this period, India maintained a measured approach, refraining from interfering in Afghanistan’s internal matters. Unlike Pakistan, which sought to portray the Taliban as subordinate to its own interests, Delhi refrained from casting Kabul as “inferior” to India’s strategic goals.
After the meeting between Misri and Muttaqi, India’s Ministry of External Affairs said that India would provide humanitarian support to Afghanistan that would include material and assistance related to the health sector. Cooperation from Delhi in the field of health sector is something that Kabul and Taliban have been pushing for a long time.
Last month, senior Taliban government officials had told this newspaper (Kabul moves towards stronger ties with Delhi, regional dynamics shifting, 1 December 2023) that they were hopeful of India investing in improving Afghanistan’s healthcare sector to reduce the reliance of the Afghans on neighbouring countries. Delhi’s focus on developing healthcare assets in Afghanistan, officials had said, would go a long way in generating goodwill among the people and the officials, which would last for decades.
Officials in Delhi are expecting a pushback from multiple fronts to stop the increasing closeness between Delhi and Kabul to become more mature. The “usual suspects” in this case, are believed to be members of the deep-state players in Washington, General Headquarters, Rawalpindi and military hawks in Beijing. In this context, India’s decision to publicly support Kabul and the Taliban shows both courage and an understanding of the risks involved.
This bold move is being seen as India’s strategic pivot in the region, acknowledging the shifting dynamics of power and positioning itself as a key player in Afghanistan’s future, even amid potential opposition from global and regional adversaries.
These covert attempts from the US, Pakistan and China, officials and analysts believe, will involve primarily using media entities to create a narrative using “internal documents” attributed to former Afghanistan officials and Western agencies to show how the Taliban leadership wanted to create disturbance in India and was working in close coordination with Rawalpindi and terror groups backed by Islamabad.
Washington has been concerned about the Taliban’s return to power since the US withdrawal in August 2021. While the US has attempted to engage diplomatically with the Taliban, it is wary of the Taliban’s alleged ties to extremist groups and its potential to destabilize the region. A closer India-Afghanistan relationship could inadvertently strengthen the Taliban’s position and legitimize its rule, which certain officials in Washington are not comfortable with.
Secondly, a stronger India-Taliban bond might complicate what these US officials claim are counterterrorism efforts in the region, as it will limit US leverage over the Taliban.
Thirdly, despite the fissures now, Washington traditionally had a long-standing strategic partnership with Pakistan, and if India and Afghanistan deepen their ties, it will not go down well with Pakistan and would complicate US relations with Islamabad.
As things stand now, the Pakistani military has already lost its strategic leverage over Afghanistan. This goes against the norm, as Pakistan has historically seen Afghanistan as part of its sphere of influence. The Pakistani military, especially its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, has sought to manipulate the Afghan government for years. The growing India-Afghanistan relationship has undermined this leverage.
Strengthening of India’s position in Afghanistan is being seen as a strategic setback for Pakistan, as it will allow India a foothold in a region Pakistan has traditionally dominated. This, GHQ feels, threatens Pakistan’s broader regional security calculus, which for a long time has been investing with the aim to keep India away from its western borders.
The prospect of a strong, stable, and potentially Indian-friendly Afghanistan significantly undermines Pakistan’s own ambitions in Central Asia and its ability to exert influence in the region, which is crucial to its national security.
China, the self-declared iron-clad brother of Pakistan, is also against the growing closeness between India and Afghanistan. China has invested heavily in the region, especially through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Afghanistan’s proximity to key Chinese interests in Pakistan and Central Asia makes it strategically important. If Afghanistan moves closer to India, it could complicate China’s own geopolitical projects in the region, including its infrastructure investments and ambitions to link its economy to Central Asia through Pakistan. A stronger India-Afghanistan relationship could tilt the balance of influence in Central and South Asia in India’s favour, which would be counterproductive to China’s strategic goals in the region.
Beijing also needs Kabul’s support to address its security concerns, particularly given the potential for Uighur militants in Afghanistan who target China’s Xinjiang region. China is also looking at Kabul to “rein-in” armed groups that have repeatedly targeted CPEC projects. Beijing, parroting the line of Islamabad, in many cases, has claimed that these armed groups operate from within the Afghan border.
Beijing believes that a closer India-Afghanistan relationship might lead to more complex dynamics, particularly if it encourages policies that could provoke instability or challenge Chinese interests in the region.
While officials in Delhi believe that there is not much that can be done to change the perspective of Beijing and Islamabad, they are of the view that the incoming Donald Trump administration, which has shown real intent to tackle the elements of the deep state, will realise that India and its officials carry a legacy of goodwill in Afghanistan, which neither American, Chinese, nor Pakistani officials can claim. India can, if needed, act as a bridge between Kabul and the global world.