Forging a working relationship with Pakistan, essentially a failed state, presents a formidable challenge, unlike the interactions with most other neighbours. The weight of the historical baggage with Pakistan is substantial, making it a challenge not easily forgotten or overcome. Furthermore, the recent events do not provide an opportune moment for significant initiatives to mend the bilateral ties. However, contemplating several smaller yet meaningful considerations, to help tackle some of Pakistan’s current concerns holds the potential to foster a degree of improved mutual understanding, albeit in fragments.
While doing so, it would be fair to keep in mind that a major factor contributing to Pakistan’s inconsistent stance on issues with India is the dominance of Army Generals who, until now, have held sway over decision-making. This dynamic forces the elected civilian governments and other governance institutions in Pakistan, to align with the military’s wishes and commands.
The question persists: why should India endeavour to mend the relationship when the path ahead is fraught with thorns, and the goal is distant and replete with uncertain consequences? A direct answer, perhaps, lies in the fact that Pakistan is India’s immediate neighbour, sharing a porous common land border of over 3,300 km across three states. With their common Indo-Aryan heritage, the citizens on either side exhibit considerable similarity in ethnicity, appearance, language, and traditions. Events on one side also tend to have an impact on the other.
However, for almost the entire 75 years of their independent existence, these two underdeveloped nations, with much ground to cover, have remained at odds with one other. They have engaged in three full-fledged and one undeclared war, leading to massive and continually growing public expenditure to maintain their ready-tofight military apparatus.
Throughout these years, few agreements have been reached, with the exception of the Indus Water Treaty orchestrated under the aegis of the World Bank and the Simla Agreement signed in the aftermath of the Liberation War of Bangladesh. Their persisting mutual belligerency endures, despite acknowledging that scarce resources could be more wisely spent improving the plight of their impoverished citizens and meeting the substantial demands of economic and social development.
Over the past 35 years, since 1989, Pakistan has engaged in “low-cost warfare” with India, deploying hundreds of trained youth to disrupt normal life and tranquility across the border, particularly in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab. Their handlers function as the lynchpins of insurgency in these border states. Although India’s occasional forceful counteractions temporarily curb Pakistan’s subversive efforts, they come at a significant cost.
In 2009, when the Indian Air force bombed a terrorist base upon the intruders attacking a contingent of Indian paramilitary forces in Pulwama district, Pakistan had readied itself to inflict catastrophic nuclear blows on India. Only effective international intervention led by the United States managed to avert a potential holocaust in the subcontinent. The primary bone of contention between the two neighbours, dating back to the Partition of colonial India in 1947, has been the issue of sovereignty over the Himalayan state of Jammu & Kashmir.
In late 1947, much to Pakistan’s chagrin, the erstwhile Maharaja acceded these to India. This decision was made under the shadow of thousands of Pakistani mujahideens (fighters) armed with stateprovided arms, vehicles, and other equipment, who had rushed into Kashmir with the intent to forcefully take it over. Their preference was to merge it into the Muslim-dominated Pakistan. A UN-brokered ceasefire intervened to halt the military operations between them and the Indian armed forces.
A Line of Control, delineating the Kingdom based on the respective extent of possession, was demarcated. Since 1st January 1949, the status quo has endured, and the Line has functioned as a de facto border, despite the three bloody wars fought over Kashmir. Both sides claim rights over the entire Kashmir region. Pakistan disregards the accession pact of 1947 between the ex-Maharaja and the Government of India.
Over the years, Pakistan has sought international support for Kashmir’s secession from India. During the Cold War years, its efforts to “internationalize” the dispute succeeded in garnering support from several prominent Western nations, including the USA, as well as Islamic countries. In recent years, as India has expanded its strategic partnership with the USA and improved relations with Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the support for Pakistan on this contentious matter has noticeably decreased.
However, Pakistan has managed to enlist the support of emerging superpower China to keep the Kashmir issue alive. The continued dominance of its Army Commanders over both internal and external affairs has kept the dispute unresolved. PanIslamic ideologies trending towards radicalism, with strong undercurrents of separatism, contribute to Pakistan’s persistence in using both terrorism and formal wars.
With the Taliban now in power in neighbouring Afghanistan and Hamas achieving initial success last month in inflicting heavy damage on the much stronger Israel, provocateurs are likely to be encouraged to intensify infiltration and frequent attacks on Indian establishments in J&K and elsewhere. It is in such context that one wonders whether the Kashmir dispute is amenable to any kind of resolution.
The Pakistani offer at Agra in 2001 by its then President General Musharraf to turn the Line of Control in Kashmir into an international border between the two countries is unlikely to be made again in the near future. India has repeatedly made it known that it would not like to have any sort of mediation in what is a bilateral matter, be it an external agency or a nation.
In the prevailing power structure in Pakistan, however, no civilian government is likely to demonstrate, without imperiling its own survival, any kind of worthwhile inclination or the muscle to defy the Army’s well-perceived preference for letting the dispute fester. A military solution does not seem possible either, particularly as both countries are armed to the hilt, including with nuclear weapons, and without it, no decisive war is possible. It cannot also be ruled out that if a conventional confrontation is going India’s way, a rogue element in Pakistan might actually pull the atomic trigger and doom both the nations.
Under such circumstances, a lingering question is whether there are any worthwhile measures that India could initiate to improve ties. Optimists would propose a more sincere exploration of the entire gamut of economic, educational, and cultural options, which have the capacity to enhance person-to-person contacts and, thereby, bilateral relations over time. While advocating for such an exercise, it’s worth noting that its effectiveness would be higher at a juncture like the present when Pakistan is grappling with an unprecedented economic slowdown caused by a host of factors, both man-made and natural.
Its GDP has been in the negative zone for almost three years; unemployment is at a record high, and poverty levels have regressed to where they were five years ago. Consequently, internal strife, not uncommon in Pakistan, has become more intense, particularly in pockets near the Afghan border. Many attacks target security personnel at Army and Air Force bases.
Terrorist acts, including those by fidayeens (suicide attackers) and abetted by the Taliban, have spiked in the first half of this year and increased by almost 80% compared to the previous year, as per the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies. Such occurrences in Pakistan coincide with India’s upward trajectory, marked by rapid growth rates.
India’s current GDP is ten times larger than Pakistan’s, affording it the capacity to be somewhat generous in alleviating the plight of the common man across the border. As a starting point, the acute food shortage persisting since last year’s massive floods in Southern and Central Pakistan can be partially addressed by India, which has surplus wheat and paddy.
These commodities could be sold to Pakistan at the cost of procurement, plus transportation and handling charges. Export via the cheapest mode of transport, namely railways, would help contain the selling price to an extent. Alongside, trade in essential goods, including medicines, through the Wagah border near Amritsar on one side and Lahore on the other, could be permitted once again. For the last four years or so, ever since the Pulwama episode, India’s Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment to imports from Pakistan stands withdrawn.
It is worthwhile to reinstate such a facility to the beleaguered neighbour once again. Historically, India has not imported much from Pakistan except raw cotton, while its exports of a variety of finished products have been more significant—US$0.5 bn vs US$2bn. Additionally, connecting the electricity grids of the two countries and tuning it to allow a certain amount of surplus Indian power to flow into the neighbouring Punjab province of Pakistan, would surely count as meaningful assistance.
India could also consider extending assistance to Pakistan’s youth by enabling them to study in Indian universities and other centers offering professional courses in engineering, medicine, computer sciences, IT, etc. To start with, this assistance could be provided without relaxing any qualification criteria or extending financial help.
On its own, it would be construed as a material aid since several bright Pakistani students lack adequate opportunities at home, and only a handful can afford to study in the distant West. Such an opportunity to better themselves would prove beneficial upon their return home besides creating a positive demonstration effect in favor of India in the minds of their families and friends.
The massive Indian entertainment industry could also be an attraction for the Pakistani citizens who are greatly enamoured of the Indian cinema, theatre and music. Allowing Pakistani youth and others interested in acting, singing, directing, etc., to come to India and join filmmaking and its various facets, be it in Bollywood or other centres, might go a distance in softening the perception of the common man across the border. Restoration of permission granted to a national team to visit India recently and participate in the World Cup Cricket tournament was well received in that country.
India should follow suit in other team and individual sports, thereby restoring the exchanges that were prevalent until the Nineties. All such actions have the potential to generate lasting goodwill. It might justifiably appear that what is being proposed here is a one-way exercise.
True as it might be, a careful drawing up of the details of each measure of assistance cum confidence-building before being put in place, would ensure that the upfront Indian financial outgoings are minimal and do not perceptibly hurt Indian interests. Of course, in their implementation, the highest consideration would need to be accorded to the security concerns of India.
At no time should these be relaxed from the prescribed protocol for Pakistan’s citizens or the inflows of materials from there. Having stated that, it is desirable that such measures be continuously attempted for a few years, even if not reciprocated by Pakistan. By extending such facilities, the unilateral Indian actions would convey the largeness of heart of the bigger neighbour in mitigating the immediate concerns of Pakistan’s citizens. In the longer run, this could turn out to be helpful in preventing the bilateral relations from deteriorating further, if not in improving them.
Dr Ajay Dua is a former Union Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce & Industry. The remaining two parts of the series will follow.