NEW DELHI: A strategy of ‘warcraft’ premised on all the vital components of national power (economic, academic, diplomatic, military and informational) is a necessity.
THE KARGIL CONFLICT
Pakistan’s long-standing desire to separate Kashmir from India and avenging the immediate loss of face at Siachen in 1984 are the primary causes of the Kargil conflict of 1999. It is thought that in 1988, Pakistan’s then Brigadier Pervez Musharraf discussed a plan with then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto for cutting off Kashmir from the rest India by overlooking the Srinagar-Leh National Highway 1. Winter temperatures in this erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir’s Kargil, Drass and Batalik regions can drop as low as minus 40 degrees Celsius. There was an unspoken understanding between the armies of India and Pakistan that due to the near inhabitable terrain and weather of the area, the border posts on both sides of the Line of Control would be abandoned, and would be taken up once the snows would start to melt. But the plan, which became a reality several years later, was about surreptitiously occupying those posts during the winters, thereby, catching India unaware and eventually, forcing India to negotiate on the Kashmir issue.
As it became evident that Indian land had been occupied, the Indian establishment acted quite swiftly and mobilized approximately 30 battalions of troops to regain its lost territory. Despite the fact that Pakistani Army regulars occupied these positions, Pakistan officially denied its involvement for most part of the conflict. However, this denial backfired since India pulled in a large number of military forces to reclaim lost ground, and Pakistan was unable to mobilise a comparable number of troops in reprisal because doing so would have exposed their deception to the world. Nonetheless, the Indian Army was at a grave disadvantage in the conflict, especially during the initial phase of it. The Pakistanis were stationed at higher elevations and could readily see and target any Indian advances towards them. Over the course of three months, the Indian Army gradually reclaimed all of the occupied sites (140 of them). The removal of Pakistani forces from these sites was accomplished through a mix of ground assaults and artillery support. Indian Army gave a fine account of it—displaying unparalleled grit, valour and skill—and paid a fitting tribute to their training and institution.
The entire campaign was full of pathos as was echoed in the words of the late Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, “Hum Shanti chaahte hain yeh duniya ne dekha, lekin ab duniya yeh dekhegi ki hum uss shanti ki raksha ke liye apni shakti ka bhi pradarshan kar sakte hain (The world has until now seen our efforts to maintain peace, but now it will witness, for the sake of protecting that peace, our resolve and might). Finally, ceasefire was declared by both sides and PM Vajpayee declared “Operation Vijay” to be a success on 14 July 1999. However, Pakistan continued to violate the truce, prompting the Indian military to carry out more operations before finally ending the conflict on 26 July 1999. Those isolated episodes of ceasefire violations must not be reduced to insignificance. Because they, in their own exclusive ways, are lessons that are indicative of a specific type of warfare that had seen its nascence during the Kargil war. That type is the complex and evolving reality of information warfare that targets not just the armed combatants of a nation, but rather its entire citizenry—ultimately seeking to decapitate it without firing many bullets.
INFORMATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Psychological Operations, shortly known as “PSYOPS” are a type of non-physical warfare that intends to influence the emotions, motivation and objective reasoning of individuals, communities and governments. Their purpose is to act as a supplement to conventional tactics as and when required or, in case of failure of the traditional recourses, act as alternative in so far as achieving strategic, political and economic objectives are concerned. To relate it to the Kargil war, a grudge that occasionally gets voiced in our popular conversations is that former Prime Minister Vajpayee was wrong in not letting Indian soldiers cross the Line of Control (LoC) to cut off Pakistani supply lines. Such a view precludes two major factors that were weighing in on the then Indian establishment:
• The general proclivity of many western powers led by America to show undue consideration to Pakistani propaganda.
• Intelligence failures at the start of the conflict.
After the war began, Pakistan was keen to persuade Western powers to support it. The Indian administration executed an act of genius by not allowing Indian forces to cross the LoC. No foreign powers could side with Pakistan or intervene in any way since India refused to allow its troops and aircraft to cross the LoC. A pertinent point to note here is that when Pakistani troops took up positions in Kargil in 1999, one of the first things the Indian military wanted was global positioning system (GPS) data. The US government’s space-based navigation system would have offered critical information, but the US refused to provide it to India. Their indifference prompted India to build its own satellite navigation system, NavIC, which serves as the country’s indigenous GPS. India transformed a difficulty into an opportunity. Now talking of intelligence failure, the Kargil Review Committee Report has stated, “The Committee found compelling evidence that Pakistan’s intervention into the Kargil area caught the Indian civilian and military administration completely off guard. No agency could predict the magnitude of the Pakistani invasion.” The review committee summarized that most of the newly-created intelligence bodies remained occupied with staff work at the expense of field work. Hence, hindsight validates the responsive moves of the Indian establishment in so far as military operations were concerned. One can only imagine the levels of rancour, political mud-slinging and indiscriminate use of disinformation and propaganda had the Kargil war happened today.
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
We only have to go back to the Balakot air strikes to gauge the intensity of this modern form of warfare that strains India. This psychological warfare is diverse, encompassing more than just deception and agitation. It remains a low-cost option for raising various bogeys at international forums, inciting internal discontent and spreading disinformation. Kashmir or Kargil is simply a glimpse of the greater threats that await India. This, however, doesn’t decry or push physical conflicts into oblivion. But it also cannot be denied that the spectre of widespread deaths acts as a strong deterrent for our adversaries, as was evident by apparent undercounting of casualties by Pakistan and China during the Kargil and Galwan conflicts. The future of warfare pulls in opposite directions, putting India in a complicated strategic situation today. It necessitates increased capabilities, investments in cutting-edge systems, precision guided munitions, information warfare, and technology, all the while defending the traditional disputed borders in a traditional context. This quandary is well encapsulated in the words of American political scientist Dr Michael Mazzar, who in his important essay titled “Mastering the Grey Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict,” has opined that such non-traditional methods will be of greater value to conventional tactics and shall see an increase in the times ahead.
CONCLUSION
India, by maintaining effective communication and information flows during Kargil, had begun admirably well in this advanced domain of warfare. But recent experiences like the Galwan valley clashes to Balakot strikes, and our communicative response to them, left quite a bit to be desired. It shows that in as much as we wish to postpone it, our institutions must brace up to this form of warfare. We must blend some principles that guide our defence and diplomacy A strategy of “warcraft” premised on all the vital components of national power (economic, academic, diplomatic, military and informational) is a necessity owing to the emerging threats in India’s vicinity and beyond.
Dr Manish Barma has done his PhD from the School of International Studies, JNU. Currently, he is an Assistant Professor at Rashtriya Raksha University, Gujarat.