The lack of consensus on the ongoing violence in J&K is evident from the fact that even after more than three decades we have yet not been able to accurately discern its real character and it’s still referred to as ‘militancy’ by some.
CONFUSIONS GALORE
Though a lot has been said and written about the more than three-decade-old ongoing violence in Jammu and Kashmir [J&K], but thanks to incident-based presumptions and hastily drawn conclusions, the larger picture is unfortunately lost sight of. This creates a confusing situation- when terrorist activities are minimal, those in power jump the gun and not only announce its imminent demise but even start forecasting the specific year in which J&K will become “terrorism-free.”
Conversely, when terrorist activities increase, opposition parties have a field day blaming the government for inability in curbing and its failure to win over the “hearts and minds” of the local population. In this blame game, politicians often lose both their sense and sensibility, and by invariably dragging-in the security forces into their shameful slugfest end up creating an unhealthy environment.
NATURE OF VIOLENCE IN J&K
The lack of consensus on the ongoing violence in J&K is evident from the fact that even after more than three decades we have yet not been able to accurately discern its real character and it’s still referred to as “militancy” by some. Militancy implies use of confrontational or violent means in support of/or to achieve any objective.
Terrorist groups, their sponsors and sympathisers try to justify ongoing violence in J&K as an “armed struggle” against an allegedly “oppressive regime.” However, even a greenhorn can discern that violent acts by these armed groups are aimed at creating mayhem and intimidating locals rather than achieving an ideological objective.
There’s no need to undertake an extensive study to determine the actual objective of the ongoing violence in J&K, as both its sponsor and proxies have themselves made unambiguous admissions regarding its real intent.
Readers would recall Pakistan’s ex-President and former army chief Gen Pervez Musharraf’s admission that “Kashmiris who came to Pakistan received a hero reception here. We used to train them and support them. We considered them as Mujahideen who will fight with the Indian Army. Then, various terrorist organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba [LeT] rose in this period. They were our heroes.”
What needs to be noted is Gen Musharraf’s explicit admission that Kashmiris [and later LeT] were treated as “heroes” and trained by the Pakistan army as ‘mujahideen’ not for the so-called ‘armed struggle’ in Kashmir but solely to “fight with the Indian army.” So, isn’t it abundantly clear what J&K is experiencing is definitely not ideology-driven militancy?
In his 2012 interview with Arab News, Hizbul Mujahideen [HM] chief Syed Salahuddin who also heads the United Jihad Council [UJC] admitted that “We are fighting Pakistan’s war in Kashmir,” adding that “if it [Pakistan army] withdraws its support, the war would be fought inside Pakistan.” Two facts emerge from this statement—one, HM is not engaged in an “armed struggle” for the so called “Kashmir cause”, but is “fighting Pakistan’s war in Kashmir,” and two, that the Pakistan army is fully supporting it. Doesn’t the UJC chief’s revelation clearly indicate that by no stretch of imagination can the organised violence in J&K be referred to as militancy?
With such damning confessions coming right from the horse’s mouth, isn’t it amply clear that what J&K is experiencing is not militancy but a full blown proxy war?
POST-ARTICLE 370 ABROGATION
Just a day after New Delhi abrogated Article 370, Pakistan’s then army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa announced that “Pakistan Army firmly stands by the Kashmiris in their just struggle to the very end. We are prepared and shall go to any extent to fulfil our obligations…” The Government of Pakistan has already declared its “moral and diplomatic support” for the separatist camp in J&K, and its armed forces are duty bound to do likewise.
So, should Rawalpindi’s reiteration of this support be summarily dismissed on the grounds of redundancy, or is it meant to convey a specific message to the pro-Pakistan camp in J&K? The latter seems more probable. Most importantly, what exactly does Gen Bajwa’s assertion that “Pakistan Army firmly stands by the Kashmiris” imply? Other than supply of military hardware and providing training, what else on earth can an army provide to civilians of a foreign country?
Lastly, what exactly does Gen Bajwa’s emphatic “We are prepared, and shall go to any extent to fulfil our obligations” assurance to the separatist camp in Kashmir mean? What are these “obligations,” and other than military intervention/support [direct or covert] what else can Rawalpindi do to fulfil the same?
Doesn’t Gen Bajwa’s declaration make it abundantly clear that what J& K is witnessing isn’t militancy but a full blown proxy war?
IMPLICATIONS OF PROXY WAR
Being the sponsor, Rawalpindi ensures that terrorist groups waging proxy war in J&K have an uninterrupted supply of sophisticated weapons, ammunition and other war-like stores, are provided adequate funds and that the terrorists are administratively well looked after. Providing them safe sanctuaries on Pakistani soil protects Rawalpindi’s “strategic assets” against attacks by Indian security forces. Since Rawalpindi has nothing to lose, it’s extremely unlikely to end this devious enterprise of bleeding India “through a thousand cuts”.
The bulk of those fighting in J&K today are radicalised Pakistani and Kashmiri youth and their “jihad” [Holy War] is not for achieving any political or ideological objectives like “azadi” [freedom]. The HM chief has himself accepted this by saying, “The Kashmiri movement [so-called ‘armed struggle’] was Islamised from day one. Why do you think an educated young man, who has a bright future otherwise, is willing to die? Is he mad? Azadi is not his objective. What will he do with azadi if he dies during the struggle?”
Salahuddin further explains that a person “is into militancy because he knows that if he dies for a noble cause, he would become a martyr, as per Islam. We tell him that he would get into the “real life” after this death and he would get peace. Khuda usse raazi hoga. [Allah would be pleased with him].”
Unfortunately, despite such a clear message coming from the UJC chief himself, many acclaimed analysts and activists continue to romanticise and give quasi-legitimacy to terrorism by glib talk of how grievances of the locals, their unfulfilled aspirations and alienation is spurring violence in J&K.
MEETING THE CHALLENGES
While there’s no reason for alarm as Indian security forces have both the will and capability to effectively deal with Pakistan army sponsored terrorism in J&K, there’s no room for complacency. The harsh reality is that since Rawalpindi has nothing to lose, it will not end this proxy war and instead gradually enlarge its geographical limits as is evident from the spurt in terrorist activities in the Jammu region.
There are two main reasons for this-one, keep the proxy war going and two, assist its “all weather friend” and “iron brother” China by creating a security threat along the entire Line of Control [LoC] to prevent the Indian Army from shifting troops from “dormant” sectors to the Sino-Indian border or Line of Actual Control [LAC].
While chances of a conventional war with either Pakistan or China may appear remote, a collusive threat from both is now a grim reality that India can no longer ignore. Fighting a proxy war needs a strong counter-infiltration grid quick reaction capability, while preventing ingress across the LAC demands permanent occupation of critical areas alongwith adequate availability of forces for timely build-up during any face-off.
Fighting the proxy war being waged by Rawalpindi and preventing the People’s Liberation Army [PLA] from nibbling into Indian territory are both manpower-intensive tasks. Since the situation along the LoC and LAC is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future, ad hoc measures like shifting troops to meet emerging threats and/or increasing troop density in forward areas by inducting forces located in the hinterland will not suffice, as this doesn’t provide operational continuity and also adversely impacts training and administration.
Therefore, there’s definitely a need for revisiting the ongoing manpower downsizing exercise within the Indian army because as explained, the above mentioned threats demand a far larger and permanent presence of boots on ground.
Col Nilesh Kunwar (Retd) served in the Indian Army.