The troops contributing countries can make UNIFIL effective if they continue to stand by their peacekeepers and follow through on warnings to Israel with action if their peacekeepers are harmed.
New Delhi:
UNIFIL AND THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE
The history of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon is rooted in the Palestinian cause. In the early 1970s, after the Palestinian armed elements were forced out of Jordan and relocated to Lebanon and Palestinian commandos raided Israel on 11 March 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon on the night of 14 March. Five days later, the UN Security Council authorised two resolutions 425 and SCR 426, and UNIFIL, as it’s known, was established to confirm the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces or IDF.
It was a relatively medium-size mission. The current one, however, was born after the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, through Security Council Resolution 1701. UNIFIL is one of the oldest traditional peacekeeping missions, and its mandate and structure set it apart from similar missions. It is a Chapter VI mission with Chapter VII tasks built into the mandate. Paragraph 11 of the SCR 1701 tasks UNIFIL only for supervising, monitoring and assistance roles. At the same time, vide paragraph 12 of the resolution, the Security Council has authorised “UNIFIL to take all necessary actions in the areas of deployment—”, which is generally associated with using force under the Chapter VII mandate.
Additionally, it is the only peacekeeping mission with armed contingents from a few capable nations from the West, such as France, Italy and Spain. Its current weapons profile is unheard of in traditional missions. For example, besides Armoured Personal Carriers, which are the standard equipment of armed peacekeeping contingents, in UNIFIL, the French contingent is equipped with Leclerc the main battle tank (MBT) of France, self-propelled artillery guns, and gun-locating radars. Besides, UNIFIL is the only mission to have a maritime task force comprising a few battleships.
Taking advantage of the confusion in the mandate, Israel has always expected UNIFIL to disarm Hezbollah, the powerful militia in Lebanon. Analysts have also expected UNIFIL to prevent a conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.
But the mission is best only for mitigating the triggers of violence at the tactical level, which it has done well. The situation in South Lebanon always has a short fuse for triggering violence at the tactical level and leading to a large-scale war. The peacekeepers therefore are ever ready to move from the beautiful beaches of Lebanon to the bunkers within five minutes of warning. It cannot prevent a full-fledged conflict like the one happening now between Israel and Hezbollah, because the troop-contributing countries (TCCs)—mostly the powerful ones—don’t want the mission to do that for two reasons. One, it might lead to a larger conflict, which is not in the interest of the international community. Two, no TCC will like to carry the body bags of their soldiers (because of directly getting involved in the conflict) home as it becomes difficult to justify their soldiers getting killed far away from their homeland. Therefore, it raises the question of the need for allowing UNIFIL to be equipped with such heavy weapons. It is probably to give enough staying power to the contingents until the TCCs extract their peacekeepers to a safer place in case of a full-fledged war. From the time the IDF entered Lebanon about a month ago, Israel has been asking UNIFIL to move away from the south. But the presence of UNIFIL, and especially the contingent from the West, is a political deterrence to Israel, and the consequences of collateral damage will be politically expensive for Israel. If Israel can coerce UNIFIL to vacate South Lebanon, the IDF can have a free run.
Interestingly, even after the 2006 war, Israel never liked the idea of a UN peacekeeping force. Supported by the United States, it wanted a non-UN multinational force under Chapter VII to take down Hezbollah. The negotiation for a ceasefire that began one day after the war began could not move forward because it was scuttled. John Bolton, the former US ambassador to the UN at the time, confirmed this during his interview with the BBC in March 2007. Since Lebanon did not agree to a non-UN force under Chapter VII and the consent of the host state was a must, after enough destruction to Lebanon, the solution to deploy a large UN peacekeeping mission required ambiguity in the wording of the mandate. Israel grudgingly agreed but never failed to raise the flag as and when there was an incident.
HAS UNIFIL OUTLIVED ITS UTILITY?
UNIFIL has decided not to vacate its positions and the TCCs have demanded the safety and protection of their soldiers. Even though forced into the bunkers and shot at—a few peacekeepers have been wounded—UNIFIL has at least slowed the advances of the IDF in the last month. The TCCs however, can make UNIFIL effective if they continue to stand by their peacekeepers and follow through on warnings to Israel with action if their peacekeepers are harmed. Apart from the political dilemma, Israel will find it extremely difficult to face the collective military might of the Western contingents. While the UN is what the member states make of it, peacekeeping missions can be as effective as the TCCs want them to be. The question is will they do it? It is unlikely, because no one wants a bigger conflict and risk sacrificing the lives of their soldiers, except for possibly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is making good use of this predicament of the TCCs.
Israel’s demand for peacekeepers to move out of South Lebanon to attack Hezbollah more freely can be done only if the IDF permanently occupy the area between the Litani River and the Blue Line which is the hotbed for Hezbollah, to ensure the safety of its population of Northern Israel. Hezbollah frequently uses this area for cross-border operations (into Israel). Alternatively, there must be a guarantee from a third party that the area will not be used by Hezbollah to undertake operations inside Israel. Reeling from its past experiences, Israel is not likely to go for the first option but is likely to raise its earlier demand for a non-UN multinational force under Chapter VII as one of the pre-conditions to any cease-fire, which is not likely to happen without Lebanon’s consent. Even then, there will be a need to oversee a ceasefire, however fragile it is. Who can do it better? UNIFIL is intrinsically connected to the Palestinian cause, so it is too early for it to vanish. The mission has done a good job and will stay put even if it must be formulated differently.
* Maj Gen (Dr) A.K. Bardalai is an Indian Army Veteran and former Deputy Head of the Mission and Deputy Force Commander of UNIFIL.