On 2 February, Ahmad Waqass Goraya, a Pakistani blogger, was attacked by two men outside his Rotterdam home. Three months later, Sajid Hussain, a Balochi journalist was found dead in Sweden. Finally, on 21 December, Karima Baloch was found dead in Toronto’s Centre Island. All the three incidents happening within the span of a year have three things in common—the victims were Pakistani dissidents, the perpetrators allegedly belonged to the Pakistani spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and, in an unprecedented manner, western cities were the locations.
Observers have begun drawing parallels with the targeted killings conducted by the Israeli Mossad. It is indeed undeniable that Mossad has a reputation for tracking down and hunting national enemies around of the world. However, there is little to suggest that the ISI has been drawing its inspiration from Mossad. On the contrary, there is a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shadow over these attacks. To understand this, it is essential to examine the targets, technique and timing of the operations conducted by Israel, Pakistan and China.
TARGETS: NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE VERSUS DEEP STATE ACTIVITY
The first and foremost difference lies in the individuals targeted by Israel and China/Pakistan. The Mossad’s targets over the years have not been political dissidents, but individuals marked as genuine national security threats. Operation Damocles, one of its earliest operations, was aimed at German scientists and technicians who were working to empower the Egyptian rocket program. Given the strategic environment that Israel inherited during its birth, the Egyptian rocket program was a clear threat to its national survival. After the Yom Kippur War, the “axis of resistance” comprising the Palestinians, Hezbollah, Syrians and Iranian nuclear scientists have become the core targets.
Despite the national security imperative, Israel has tried its best to uphold democratic principles by offering the program a legal basis. A document conforming to international law was drafted in 2003 and approved by the Supreme Court in 2006. Journalist Ronen Bergman’s book on Israeli targeted killings mentions that a target had to be legitimised as an “illegal combatant” who partook in armed operations. Also, the operations had to adhere to the “principle of proportionality” to minimise collaterals.
The deep states, on the other hand, fail to meet this fundamental national security imperative. Here, the incentives and motivations at play are purely political, favouring a select few who control the various levers of power. In the case of China, it is the CCP, while for Pakistan, it is the Army and the ISI. During its formative years, the CCP intelligence had developed two programs, namely, chuhan (traitor weeding) and dagao (assassinations). The rationale for these programs was leadership security, which was then translated as national security. Dissent, which is a perceived form of threat to the leadership, continued to be considered a form of foreign intelligence conspiracy. Thus, targeting of dissidents was acceptable.
Similarly, in Pakistan, the levers of power are controlled by the Army. Political assassinations began as early as 1951 with the killing of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. In the conspiracy that followed, all traces—investigators and documents—were conveniently eliminated. With top leaders like Liaquat, Zia and Bhutto falling victims to assassinations, the fate of journalists and dissidents can only be imagined. Since 1990, 138 journalists are noted to have lost their lives. The Pakistani deep state, which is a complex mix of military and intelligence officials, civilian politicians, Islamists and sympathisers, has been working towards the single goal of maintaining the Army’s position as the protector of Pakistan. Hence, targeted killings towards protecting such vested interests cannot be the same as the national security imperative guiding Israel.
TIMING: GLOBALISATION AND THE RISE OF INTERNATIONAL DISSENT
In the autumn of 1972, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir authorised Operation Bayonet, which tasked the Mossad with targeting the perpetrators of the Munich Massacre. Subsequently, Palestinian terrorists were targeted in various European cities. Four years later, the operational theatre was Entebbe, Uganda, where over 200 civilians were taken hostage. Israel’s enemies were never restricted to one geography, which meant that the Mossad had to always have a global reach. Although Tehran has become the main target since 1979, the global demands have not yet been mitigated.
The CCP and the ISI, on the other hand, did not require a global reach in the initial years. Since the threats were primarily manifesting from within, counterintelligence was given prominence over offensive foreign intelligence operations. Where their respective foreign operations were concerned, they were limited to their immediate neighbourhood. For instance, the ISI used the Middle East and Thailand as chasing grounds for Indian operatives. The western capitals were relatively free from Chinese or Pakistani operations. The era of globalisation, however, changed this trajectory, which was further accentuated by the rise of China.
By the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping’s policies had fructified and China’s rising clout in international politics was obvious. Realising this, in 1993, the CCP launched the Global Times, a daily newspaper to offer the party’s perspectives on international affairs. Yet, for the next decade, as globalisation was still in its infancy, the CCP was not affected by the prospects of dissent from abroad. Likewise, the demise of the Soviet Union and the ISI’s role in it had offered Islamabad a favourable international political climate despite its sponsorship of terror. By the turn of the millennium, however, the rise of commercial media and ease of international travel were complicating matters for both the CCP and the ISI. Henceforth, narratives would become their top priorities.
In 2002, American journalist Daniel Pearl became the first westerner to be killed in Pakistan as he was investigating the links between the ISI and Al Qaeda. Following this, international scholars, deviating from the Army’s point of view, began to be harassed to a point where many have admitted that fieldwork in Pakistan is a nightmare. Around the same time, the CCP intelligence also began targeting dissidents in Australia and New Zealand. In 2000, Lan Fu, former deputy mayor of Xiamen, then in exile in Australia, was forced to return to China after his son was kidnapped. In 2004, Xie Li was kidnapped from Auckland and transported back to China. Nevertheless, these operations were only sporadic. It is only after the arrival of Xi Jinping that a significant shift in momentum has become visible.
In 2013, the unveiling of the Belt and Road Initiative expanded the level of cooperation between the Pakistani Army and the CCP. The implications of this renewed friendship, as evidence suggests, is an increased supervision of Pakistani intelligence operations by China’s Central Military Commission. The present spate of targeted killings of Balochis in western cities must be viewed against this backdrop. Ethnic Balochis have been resisting Chinese investments in Balochistan, which they view as a form of colonialism. Consequently, Rawalpindi has been under increasing pressure from Beijing to suppress the Baloch resistance. Accordingly, the ISI’s intimidation tactics that were hitherto reserved to Pakistan, or Asia at best, has now begun expanding to western countries.
TECHNIQUE: PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY IS MANDATORY
Given the disparity in context and targets, there is also a difference in modus operandi. Owing to the national security imperative, Israel has been willing to risk a degree of diplomatic morass when operations fail. Examples date back to 1973 when Mossad killed an innocent civilian in Norway. In the later years, similar incidents occurred in Jordan and Canada. To overcome the resulting hostile public opinion, many observers have advised Tel Aviv to simultaneously run a psychological campaign to shape international opinion. However, Israeli officials have been content with fulfilling national security obligations through eliminating targets, irrespective of the nature of international opinion. Counterterrorism and prospects of a nuclear Iran are sufficient to silence international criticisms.
Deep state activities, lacking a national security justification, require operational sophistication that demands both plausible deniability and favourable international opinion. Thus, the first step for the ISI or the CCP has been to erase any trace of involvement. For this, they outsource operations to jihadis or organised criminal syndicates. The assassination of Kashmiri journalist Shujaat Bukhari is an example where the operation was outsourced to jihadis. Likewise, the CCP is known to employ gangsters in Oceania and Africa.
The second step has been to activate select journalists and activists who then craft a victimhood narrative. Let’s consider the assassination of Sajid Hussain in Sweden. The immediate reaction to the killing was an obvious suspicion of an ISI hand. However, after the preliminary investigations showed no traces of crime, a Pakistani led European website Global Village Space scathingly asked if those who blamed the ISI would apologise. Interestingly, the website used a tweet by Ashok Swain, a renowned critic of the Indian government, to insinuate that allegations were an Indian media plot. Likewise, organisations like the “Committee of 100” have been actively defending Chinese spies from western security agencies using accusations of racism as shield. So long as such infrastructure exists, the deep states will continue with targeted killings with relative impunity.
Therefore, in summation, analysts are wrong to draw parallels between the ISI and Mossad. Operations conducted for national security are not the same as deep state operations. The latter is typical of counterintelligence states like China and Pakistan.
Dheeraj P.C. holds a PhD in Intelligence Studies from the University of Leicester, UK.