‘US national security officials would like to see India assume a far greater role in efforts to deter Chinese aggression and limit Chinese influence across the India-Pacific region.’
The stage is set for a high-voltage President Biden-PM Modi “DC dialogue” as the world watches. Particularly for Beijing and Islamabad, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s US visit is a matter of strategic concern, with the diplomatic impetus given to the signing of a large number of defence and security deals, as well as the strategic partnership in critical and emerging technology. The US and Indian delegations will strengthen their strategic partnership to address the critical security challenges in Asia, the Indo-Pacific region, and China in particular, and their shared concerns emerging out of domestic compulsions, says Dr Daniel Markey, senior advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The Sunday Guardian spoke to Dr Markey, an expert on India, Pakistan, and South Asia, to know what the agenda is on the table. An expert on international security and diplomacy, Dr Markey is a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies, and has authored several books. He was associated with the State Department on the US strategy in South Asia, especially India and Pakistan. Excerpts:
Q: Indian PM Modi is visiting the US in a volatile geopolitical environment. As the two leading democracies of the world, what will be the key agendas on the table for the Biden-Modi meeting in DC?
A: US leaders have described Modi’s state visit as an historic opportunity for breakthrough agreements that, in the words of senior White House official Kurt Campbell, will “consecrate” the US-India relationship as the most important on the global stage, accelerating it from a past pattern of steady progress to “escape velocity”. The Biden administration clearly aims for these breakthroughs to happen in multiple sectors, including defence and high technology as well as commercial and people-to-people ties. Recent bilateral agreements like the US-India Initiative of Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) and the Roadmap for US-India Defence Industrial Cooperation are likely to be capped with announcements of major defence sales and co-manufacturing deals.
Although all of these efforts are motivated, at least indirectly, by Washington’s sense that a democratic India should be a vital US partner on the world stage, the Biden administration will also have to contend with increasingly vocal domestic criticism of the Modi government. I anticipate that US officials may be more inclined to stress shared national interests, rather than common values, in their prepared remarks celebrating the relationship with India.
Q: As tensions are rising in East Asia, with close naval and air incidents between the US and Chinese assets, and some tough messaging in the Shangri La Dialogue, how do you see Modi’s visit being taken in Asia, especially China?
A: As is the case in Washington, in Beijing the international order is increasingly perceived as defined, above all, by geopolitical competition between the United States and China. All other international relationships and events derive significance from their place within that bipolar framework. On balance, despite some recent conciliatory gestures by the Biden administration intended to jumpstart high level diplomacy, including plans for Secretary of State Antony Blinken to visit Beijing, bilateral tensions remain high.
In that context, Modi’s visit will reinforce Chinese perceptions that India is edging closer to the United States and serving US geopolitical purposes. For years, China has viewed breakthroughs in US-India cooperation—like the civil nuclear deal and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—as surprising and provocative because they deviated from India’s longstanding preference for nonalignment or “strategic autonomy.” If this visit yields new breakthrough agreements, it will receive an icy reception in Beijing.
Q: As Chinese belligerence rises in Asia, what kind of US-India relations do you see developing in the coming years?
A: US national security officials would like to see India assume a far greater role in efforts to deter Chinese aggression and limit Chinese influence across the India-Pacific region. Although they have different levels of ambition for precisely how India can best play its part, there is a strong consensus in favour of closer defence ties that will enable India to be a more capable and effective US partner in a wide range of military contingencies. However, while some US analysts presume that routine cooperation between US and Indian militaries will eventually mature into a comprehensive alliance, I remain sceptical. India’s commitment to strategic autonomy and its ambition for independent national greatness will more likely inhibit such ties and lead the two sides to build flexible and discrete cooperative ventures without ever rising to the level of alliance.
Q: Modi’s visit to the US is coming close to the third anniversary of the Galwan clashes in which 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers lost their lives. In what ways do you feel this incident fundamentally changed China-India and US-India relationship?
A: The Galwan clashes of 2020 were a watershed moment in India’s relations with China. They dispelled any lingering “Wuhan Spirit” of cooperation that Modi and Xi had cultivated and convinced most of the India’s foreign policy establishment that Beijing poses a serious immediate and long-term security threat. Whereas prior to Galwan, Indian policymakers tended to believe that the border dispute with China was manageable through well-established military and diplomatic mechanisms, now they struggle to find a face-saving way back to normal bilateral talks. With the G-20 summit around the corner, there is special pressure on Modi to navigate a workable diplomatic compromise with Xi, but Chinese concessions on the border are nowhere in sight.
All of these India-China tensions have—more than any other factor—intensified India’s interest in defence and intelligence cooperation with the United States. Fortunately for New Delhi, Washington is eager to support Indian efforts to better deter and defend against Chinese aggression because US officials are concerned that China’s effective bullying of India would also intimidate other US partners.
Q: What is your assessment of the recent statements of the Chinese leadership indicating the churning of nationalistic sentiments and exhorting of the military to prepare for conflict situations?
A: Senior US defence officials and many independent analysts are convinced that China’s leadership is preparing for military conflict with the US or its allies and partners. Most perceive Taiwan as the most likely contingency and debate whether military action is imminent or a more distant prospect. These concerns are real, but China’s leaders have rarely taken reckless gambles. They are probably aiming to develop a more decisive military capability before striking or perhaps they hope to build such a powerful coercive advantage that they can dictate Taipei’s behaviour on issues of greatest national importance without resorting to war.
At the same time, I am increasingly concerned that Beijing sees the PLA’s lack of recent warfighting experience as a strategic liability and may decide to use force in other theaters—possibly even along the border with India—as a proving ground for Chinese troops and their impressive new capabilities.
Q: Can India encash the opportunity for stronger ties with Southeast Asian nations given the rising US-China tensions? Do you see a stronger India-US joint diplomacy working strongly with Southeast Asian nations?
A: For years, India has sought to enhance its ties with Southeast Asia. Thus far, however, New Delhi continues to lag well behind Beijing when it comes to regional economic and political influence. Moreover, some US-India initiatives like the Quad have been viewed with suspicion by Southeast Asian states who have voiced concerns that it might pose a threat to ASEAN centrality because it would place a greater emphasis on other institutional structures and, in addition, reinforce perceptions that regional geopolitics are defined by US-China competition.
New Delhi and Washington hope to assuage these concerns and, where possible, to present their joint activities—whether bilateral or through the Quad—as contributions to regional public goods, like maritime domain awareness or vaccine distribution. Yet these messages are circumscribed by the reality that neither India nor the United States has been able to advance an energetic new trade policy for a region that is typically more focused on trade and business promotion than nearly any other issue.
Q: Both countries are soon going to blow the poll trumpet. How do you see domestic political compulsions impacting the long-term trajectory of US-India relations?
A: On the one hand, the US-India relationship of the past two decades has been marked by continuous, fairly steady improvement despite multiple elections and changes in political leadership on both sides. Whether Congress or BJP Prime Ministers in New Delhi, Republican or Democratic Presidents in Washington, all have tried to build on the work of their predecessors and have seen the value of US-India relationship founded in core national interests, unaffected by domestic political partisanship.
On the other hand, upcoming elections could affect US-India relations in at least two ways. First, both sides anticipate that just as the high-profile summitry of 2023 opens the door to bilateral breakthroughs, the distractions of national elections in 2024 will make it very difficult to keep the diplomatic momentum going and even harder to generate new initiatives. The policy burden will increasingly fall to the permanent bureaucracies on both sides. Second, Modi’s political compulsions may lead him to take a more pugnacious line on certain topics—like communal tensions or Pakistan—that would sound alarm bells in the United States. Over the long run, a political agenda increasingly informed by Hindutva would create frictions with the United States over human rights and other liberal democratic values.
Q: How do you see the US mainstream media’s portrayal of the US-India relationship and PM Modi? More importantly, how do you feel the US media is looking at PM Modi’s upcoming visit to the US?
A: The mainstream US media typically follows two basic storylines with respect to India and Modi. The first relates to India’s growing strategic value as a partner in the global geopolitical competition with China, with an emphasis on India’s new and expanding defence and intelligence ties with the United States. The second storyline focuses on Modi’s politics at home in the context of human rights, the global rise of populist leaders, and democratic backsliding. In combination, the two storylines are sometimes presented as a part of a familiar American policy dilemma: how to work with important strategic partners that may not always share common ideals or worldviews.
Because the Biden administration has made a specific point of highlighting its commitment to democratic practices, it is likely that the US media will place added attention on this dilemma, even as it simultaneously reports glowingly about the tangible steps Washington and New Delhi are taking to enhance economic, security, and people-to-people ties.