As host for the September G20 Summit, a high water mark in Indian diplomacy, it is doubly important to ‘get India right’.
WASHINGTON, DC
India finds itself today in an especially favourable strategic situation on the world stage—and, as Walter Mead Russell recently wrote in the Wall Street Journal, “getting India right has become a critical task” for policy makers around the globe. Let me make an attempt here. As host for the September G20 Summit, a high water mark in Indian diplomacy, it is doubly important to “get India right”.
Let’s first look at some objective facts on the ground that buttress India’s favourable situation. With 1.4 billion people, it is now the world’s most populous country—and a comparatively youthful one; it possesses the world’s second largest military, which includes nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them. It has recently become the world’s fifth largest economy, growing at between 6.5-7% in 2022-2023, the fastest growing among the major economies (moving up from 11th largest a decade ago); by the end of this decade, it is projected to jump ahead of Japan and Germany to the number three spot and therefore a likely candidate for the G7 forum. Its 18 million plus diaspora is thriving from the Middle East to North America and has made vital inputs to the country’s economy and trade—and security (think here of the important role the American-Indian diaspora in the 2008 US-India nuclear deal involving favourable American decision on India’s civilian nuclear program such as supplying nuclear fuel and constructing civilian-use nuclear facilities). This marked a significant turnaround in the bilateral relationship. Beyond this, India, despite its multi-ethnic population, has a relatively stable political environment with a political environment that accepts the peaceful transition of power. Yet the country faces some real challenges that could affect its economy and political standing (like still high rates of poverty, ethnic violence [as recently demonstrated in the northeastern state of Manipur], and populist spasms that sometimes produce Hindu-Muslim tensions). Yet, India is in a position to strengthen a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and thus restrain China’s growing assertiveness. India, not surprisingly, is seeking to get a recognised place at the high table of international diplomacy that matches its growing economic prowess. In my view that effort will necessarily involve a continuing tilt toward the West, its predominant trading partner, the major source of foreign capital and technology, the major destination for the Indian diaspora; the most sought overseas locale for advanced training—and increasingly a strategic collaborator in the Indo-Pacific region. But this tilt will almost certainly seek to avoid undermining India’s effort to represent the interests of the developing countries of the Global South (without threatening its interest in G7 membership), avoiding a threat to core Russian interests, and avoid joining a formal strategic alliance as well as seeking to avoid a conflict with China. And all that will take considerable skill.
A recent sign of India’s favourable international status is the red carpet laid out this summer for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visits to the US and France. Modi was the special invited guest of both Presidents Macron of Emmanuel France and Joe Biden of the United States—and they both virtually ignored those calling on the two national leaders openly to complain about India’s human rights record under Modi. Both Western leaders offered India access to high tech military equipment such as Scorpene submarines and Rafale jets by France and decision by Biden administration for India and the US jointly to manufacture jet engines in India, a deal involving a significant transfer of high technology. In France, Modi attended the 14 July National Day Ceremony in Paris, the high point of that county’s annual patriotic celebrations. Besides the participation of a contingent of Indian troops in the Parade on that very special day, Modi was awarded France’s highest civilian honour. Just two weeks earlier, Modi was hosted by President Biden in a state visit to Washington DC, only the third such state visit during the Biden presidency. He also had the rare honour of addressing (for a second time) a joint sitting of the US Congress. The Economist, departing from its usual snarky portrayal of India, had a front cover of Biden hugging a tiger (meant to portray India) with the caption “Joe Biden and Narendra Modi are drawing their countries closer”. The subtitle reflected India’s comparative advantage in this relationship, stating: “India does not love the West, but it is indispensable to America”. The West needs a friendly—and strong—India to work together to achieve the goal of strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific region. This importance is reflected in the diplomatic silence by France and the US (and others) regarding India’s diplomatic caution over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and India’s purchase of Russian energy at significantly reduced rates—and Russia, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, supplied some 45% of India’s arms imports over past few years (though down from an earlier 64%; France is second at 29%, and the US is at 11%)
India’s effort to stake out a leadership role for itself is reflected in the billboards for the 2023 G20 year hosted by India—where the theme prominently displayed on them is the Sanskrit term “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” or “One earth, One family, One future”. While the US, and the West in general, currently has a foreign policy priority of supporting Ukraine’s efforts to push Russian troops out of their country, this is not a priority for India. India, in fact, seeks to maintain good relations with both the US and Russia and has not publicly condemned the Russia invasion of Ukraine. On Ukraine, India sees a diplomatic solution as the best solution. Rather, Amitabh Kant, the Indian official in charge of the G20 arrangements, is quoted as saying that India’s priority goals for that grouping are (1) inclusive economic growth, (2) membership of the African Union, and (3) restructuring debt. Modi on the international stage has quietly pushed for a description of the current situation in Ukraine as a quest for a peaceful resolution—and, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in September 2022, he publicly told Russian President Putin that now is not the time for war. India moreover attended the early August conference in Jeddah called by Saudi Arabia (Russia was not invited while the US and China were) and the deliberations focused on Ukraine’s formula for a diplomatic solution. India clearly hopes an international commitment to a diplomatic process can work to avoid another round of bickering over the wording of a resolution on Ukraine. Otherwise, this month’s G20 Summit could end with internal bickering over words that could impede India’s quest for a leadership role for itself on the world stage as well as for international support against an assertive China.
India’s policy against joining strategic alliances fits the traditional goal of Indian foreign policy since Independence in 1947: that is avoiding any alliance system on the assumption that international fragmentation (i.e., a multipolar world) better suits Indian interests in managing its security than a polarized one dominated by one country. An alliance arrangement would limit India’s room for manoeuvre and possibly commit itself to goals that do not conform to national interests, like an open military confrontation over Taiwan. Largely for that reason, as Ashley Tellis argues (“America’s Bad Bet on India”) that however much the US seeks to gets India’s backing against Chinese assertiveness, India will not align itself against China except where China directly threatens its own security. Still another reason for Indian caution regarding China is that its northern neighbour is now significantly stronger, militarily and economically, than India, though India is gradually catching up. Yet, there seems little doubt that many Indians are deeply suspicious of China’s intentions. Xi has asserted Chinese claims in the South China Sea, applied economic pressure on Australia for criticising China’s reluctance to investigate the causes of the Covid pandemic, and clashed with Indian forces in the Himalayan regions of northern Ladakh, combined with a lack of resolution over conflicting Chinese-India territorial claims and which Chinese maps show as Chinese territory.
How then to explain India’s current favourable position? A major factor is the negative international reaction to assertiveness of a nuclear capable China. The growing assertiveness of China over the past decade in regions bordering the Indian and Pacific Oceans has created a common Indian and US interest (as well as impacting interests of many other countries) in free and open sea lanes that cross through these oceans. Two important signs of the kind of cooperation grounded in these shared interests is the recently signed US-Indian partnership on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), and the mid-June 2023 visit of Prime Minister Modi to Washington DC, which, as noted, involved an invitation for him to address the Congress. The growing US ties with India is one of those relatively rare issues that has bilateral political support within the US.
Facts on the ground compel the US to recognise that India plays a significant role in any security strategy involving the Indo-Pacific. Geographically, India is a peninsula that juts down some 1,500 miles into the middle of the Indian Ocean and thus inherently plays a role in any strategy involving that region. This geographic reality drew the strategic attention first of the Portuguese in the early 16th century, followed by the French and then the British, who fought the first truly world conflict in the mid-18th century over the issue of privileged access to Indian products Besides this advantage, it has become the world’s most populous country; economically, it is the fastest growing among the large economies; and it also has a large competent military with nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. As Arzan Tarapore correctly points out, an increasingly strong India is intrinsically important to the US as it seeks stability in the Indo-Pacific.
The security dimension of cooperation among the Indo-Pacific states builds on common economic advantages of stability brought about by recognised rules, especially regarding trade. Maritime trade is critical for the growing economies of the region, home to over half the world’s population. For example, some 90% of India’s international trade is by sea—and similar statistics apply to Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, and Taiwan. A US-led grouping (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction or SHADE) was set up in 2009 to coordinate a response initially to threats of piracy, but has expanded its focus to include terrorism, drug smuggling (Afghanistan, recall, has been the world’s largest source of heroin) and illegal fishing and human trafficking. Over the past two years, some billion dollars of drugs was captured by the Combined Task Force, a naval monitoring grouping set up by 34 participating countries to keep key shopping lanes of the Indian Ocean free of threats to legitimate trade. This is a challenge as surrounding these oceans are areas of political tension and as well as the clandestine shipments of arms to the competing forces. The two oceans also are linked by key sea lines of communication that need to be kept open, especially to enable the flow of oil from the Middle East to markets in the Indo-Pacific region. The most populous states in the region (India, China, Japan and South Korea) are all significant importers of energy.
The 2019 US “Indo-Pacific Strategy Report”, issued during the presidency of Donald Trump, starts out with the assertion that the region is the “propriety theater” for US global security concerns. That earlier US “priority” statement of course is now shared by the implications of the Russian 24 February 2022 incursion into Ukraine—and one of the important implications are the lessons China takes on its Taiwan policy from Russia’s performance on Ukraine issue. That 2019 US document goes on at some length to identify China as a threat to a “stable rule-based order” in the Indo-Pacific region and calls for cooperative efforts with regional states and with formal multilateral groups such as ASEAN, and informal ones such as the then recently revived Quadrilateral group (referred to as the Quad) composed of the US, Australia, Japan and India, to meet that challenge. The Trump administration’s interest in the region is matched by the administration of President Biden, which has also adopted its commitment to constraining the Chinese challenges. An indication of this commitment is the Australia-UK-US security pact (AUKUS) signed earlier this year, unique among multilateral organisations focused on the Indo-Pacific in that it alone is focused exclusively on modernising and enhancing the interoperability of the military capabilities of the participating countries. Among the first issues addressed by US Secretary of State Blinken when he assumed office was to make the Quad more useful on common important economic and security issues.
On the Sino-US competition for influence, there is a problem that the US has yet to offer regional states concrete incentives for closer economic cooperation. For starters, the US has yet to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, an updated version of the Trans-Pacific Partnership that Trump refused to join. The US has also yet to provide firm commitments to grant access to US markets. It has not developed an aid program that is as comprehensive as that offered by China’s Belt and Road Initiative—and only the US is able to put together such a broad-based development scheme. China’s pandemic-related lockdown has restrained its assistance programs over the past few years, but it is likely to resume them now that the lockdowns have largely been lifted.
While the US (and to a lesser extent France and the UK) has a robust military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, there is nothing like the NATO cooperative military relationship among states in Europe. Several Asian states, like India, are reluctant to undermine their strategic manoeuvrability by participating in a close military relationship with any outside power, and the US has been prepared for some time to accept that situation, recognising that strengthening them economically and militarily puts them in a better position to counter threats, initially from the Soviet Union and now from China. The Chinese have, moreover, nudged many of them closer to the US by its aggressive behaviour. There is a long list of examples of this Chinese assertiveness—including the 2017 incursion into Bhutan followed by its 2020 incursion into Ladakh area of Indian Kashmir; Chinese claims to the South China Sea overlap with maritime Economic Zones of Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines; Chinese involvement in Australian politics has soured that bilateral relationship; Chinese claim to the Japanese held Senkaku (Daiyu) islands has created tensions between the two states; and of course the Chinese air and sea presences around Taiwan is a threat to US and Japanese interests. These various actions have had their consequences. Among them is an enhanced commitment to cooperative economic and security programs by the Quad member states. The Philippines have signed off on an agreement permitting the US to resume the use of military bases; then there is the specifically military AUKUS involving Australia, the US, and the UK; and there is, in addition, increased Taiwanese purchases of military equipment from the US and other sources.
Key to the success of these measures is the US assuming a leadership role—and that seems likely as the concern about addressing Chinese assertiveness has strong bipartisan support. The new US House of Representatives, as one of its first acts (by a bipartisan vote of 365 to 65), created a Select House Subcommittee to address threats from China. At the same time, the US, at least since the early 1960s, has recognised that India is almost certainly not prepared to join a security agreement directed against China (or Russia). At the same time, it is widely recognised that a stronger and more prosperous India is one of the most effective constraints on Chinese hegemony.
- Dr Walter K. Andersen has been Senior Adjunct Professor of South Asia Studies at Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He, with Shridhar Damle, has written two books on the RSS, The Brotherhood in Saffron: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and Hindu Revivalism (1987); and The RSS: A View to the Inside (2018).