The situation in Syria, rooted in the complex geopolitical landscape shaped by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, remains volatile and unpredictable with global implications.
When the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) stormed Damascus on 8 December 2024, bringing an end to 53 years of Ba’athist rule, the world was taken by surprise at the tame surrender of the ruling establishment. Indeed, even the HTS and its head, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, would have been astonished at the sudden collapse of the Assad regime. Bashar al-Assad, the deposed President who took over from his father in 2000, fled the country, taking refuge in Russia. The HTS, once affiliated with Al Qaeda, aims to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state in Syria.
The fall of Damascus, however, does not signal the end of the decades-long conflict which began in 2011. Various factions, including other rebel groups, Kurdish forces, and remnants of the Syrian government, continue to contest for power. The situation in Syria, rooted in the complex geopolitical landscape shaped by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, remains volatile and unpredictable with global implications.
Syria’s rich history is deeply intertwined with its strategic geography. Watered by the Euphrates River, this fertile land has been a coveted prize for empires for millennia. Countless civilisations have left their mark on this region, from the ancient Egyptians and Assyrians to the Persians, Greeks, and Romans. In the 16th century, the Ottomans conquered the area, holding sway over the region for over 400 years until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. After World War I, the Sykes-Picot Agreement divided the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence. Syria and Lebanon fell under French control, sparking numerous uprisings and revolts against colonial rule. Syria eventually achieved independence in 1946. However, political instability remained, marked by frequent coups and counter-coups. The Ba’ath Party takeover in 1963 ushered in an era which brought relative peace till, following the Arab uprisings of 2011, Syria was plunged into a civil war.
The conflict drew in regional and international powers, transforming Syria into a complex geopolitical battleground. This protracted war has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Syrians and displaced nearly 13 million people—more than half the country’s pre-war population of 22 million. Today, Syria is a fractured nation, divided by multiple groups with seemingly irreconcilable interests. That is why, despite the overthrow of the Baathist regime, the takeover of Syria by an Islamic group is unlikely to result in a lasting peace. The region remains a battleground for proxy forces primarily for its geographic location.
Lying along potential routes for transporting oil and gas from the resource-rich Persian Gulf and Caspian regions to Europe, Syria will remain the subject of geopolitical competition involving regional and international actors. Syria’s potential as a transit point for gas pipelines from Iran or Qatar to Europe makes control over these routes a significant factor in shaping global energy markets. In addition, Syria’s proximity to major European and Asian powers makes it an essential part of any strategy to influence these regions. These factors came into sharp focus during the Syrian civil war, drawing regional powers like Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, as well as global actors like the United States and Russia into the conflict. Each sought to shape the war’s outcome to align with their strategic interests. For the Muslim world, Syria’s geographical location makes it a kind of resistance front against Israel. Iran took up that role after the overthrow of the Shah in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, using the Hezbollah and Hamas as proxies in its war against Israel.
In the civil war, Ankara viewed Syria as vital to its national security, particularly concerning Kurdish groups that are primarily concentrated in East and Southeast Turkiye. Ankara thus sought to maintain influence in northern Syria to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous region that could inspire separatist movements within its borders. Terrorist groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda sought control over the area in furtherance of their aim to form an Islamic Republic and as a launch pad for attacks across the Middle East and into Europe. The United States and European nations viewed Syria as critical to regional stability and energy security. For Russia, Syria represents a gateway to the Eastern Mediterranean. Its naval base in Tartus and airbase in Khmeimim give Moscow a foothold in a region historically dominated by Western powers. This presence enables Russia to influence energy routes, maritime trade, and regional security.
Iran used Syria as a land corridor to supply Hezbollah in Lebanon, consolidating its influence in the Levant. For Iran, Syria serves as a critical link to its “axis of resistance” against Israel. Iranian-backed militias operate in Syria, and the country provides a conduit for arms and support to Hezbollah. This has made Syria a key battleground in the broader conflict between Iran and Israel.
A post-Baathist era is unlikely to bring about peace because of the divergent interests of all the major players. The sudden collapse of the Assad regime after over a decade of civil war was catalysed by ongoing conflicts outside the region. Russia, which supported the Assad regime, stood weakened after nearly three years of the ongoing war in Ukraine. Iran, too, was considerably weakened after its proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah, suffered significant setbacks after over a year of conflict with Israel.
The downfall of the Assad dynasty has dealt a severe blow to Putin’s aspirations to become a key player in the Middle East. Some analysts believe that this will also weaken Russia’s ongoing war with Ukraine, but that is unlikely. With waning European support and a change in the US presidency in January 2025, it is more likely that the Russia-Ukraine war will draw to a close, mainly on Russian terms. However, whether Russia will lose its two military bases in Syria—a naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean, which the Soviets established, and an air base at Khmeimim, built in 2015, is still open-ended. These bases are Russia’s only military outposts outside the former Soviet Union and have been essential for the Kremlin’s activities in Africa and the Middle East. Russian media outlets have reported that the rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham had guaranteed Moscow the security of its two military bases. That remains to be seen.
Israel has significantly weakened the Hezbollah in Lebanon. The fall of Damascus disrupts Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” severing a critical link to Hezbollah. After the HTS moved into Damascus, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) took over the Syrian side of the Mount Hermon mountain range to expand a demilitarised buffer zone along its border with Syria. The Hermon range is strategically advantageous because it enables Israel to anticipate any potential threat from Damascus. Israel has, however, stated that it would not get involved in Syria’s internal conflict, provided that no forces in Syria endanger Israeli security interests. While the HTS may not want to get involved in a confrontation with Israel at this moment, this will more likely become a bone of contention in the future.
The US is unlikely to reduce its presence in the region and would continue to support the Kurds. The fall of Assad would likely be used as an opportunity for the US to recalibrate its approach to the area, with the US exercising caution for the moment. President-elect Donald Trump tweeted, “This is not our fight. Let it play out. Do not get involved.” The US will likely adopt a wait-and-watch stance in the immediate future.
The Kurds have fought to consolidate a de facto autonomous territory in northern Syria, which has made them alternately friends and foes of Arab opposition groups. In the civil war, the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) were an effective group against the Islamic State. In the present scenario, the US will likely continue aiding the YPG. This group is, however, tied to the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara and Washington have designated a terrorist organisation. The US dilemma of trying not to alienate either the YPG or Turkiye, a NATO ally that was also a vital partner in the war against the Islamic State, will be carefully orchestrated.
India’s interests in the region lie mainly in securing its energy supplies. The rise of Islamist groups such as the HTS could potentially threaten this, especially if a wider conflagration breaks out involving the major oil producers. India’s interests will be best served if peace and stability prevail, and India will focus on that end. For now, we can expect a semblance of normalcy, but the country will again be embroiled in conflict sooner rather than later. The future is not promising.
* Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch (Retd) is Director, India Foundation.