Both the US and India have an interest in the restoration of peace in the region as soon as possible.
INTERESTS
This holiday season confronts the United States and India with a set of fraught tensions in the Middle East, Eastern Europe and South/East Asia, some of which have the potential of impacting significant interests of both countries, not the least being the danger of those local tensions expanding into larger international conflicts. Among the most dangerous of those local tensions are: (1) the Russian attack on Ukraine; (2) Chinese assertiveness along its periphery; and (3) the Iranian proxy conflicts against the US in the Middle East that could morph into a regional conflict (and even beyond)—with the most serious example of that being the Israel-Hamas conflict that has become a focus of policy-making in the US. This last issue touches fundamental interests of India and the US as it addresses mutual concerns regarding terrorism, could quickly expand in scope, and carries major negative economic consequences.
The trigger to the current Israel-Hamas tensions dates to the 7 October 2023 attack by large numbers of Hamas militants (though some of the intruders were affiliated with Islamic Jihad and even some radical freelancers) against villages in southern Israel. (The US is one of several countries that has previously labelled Hamas a terrorist organization.) That attack resulted in the killing of over 1,200 Israelis in those border villages and the kidnapping of some 250 people of several nationalities. In a seven-day pause of hostilities (24-30 November), to exchange hostages/prisoners, Hamas released 110 hostages (including 86 Israeli citizens who were part of the formal exchange agreement) in return for the release of 240 arrested Palestinians. Besides the Israeli citizens, some of whom were dual citizens, Hamas separately managed the release of 24 captured foreign nationals; they were mainly Thai contract farm labor caught by Hamas intruders on 7 October.
The brutality of the 7 October incursion, much of it recorded and disseminated by the attackers, enraged the Israelis. The Israeli unity government of Prime Minister Netanyahu vowed to destroy Hamas so that it could not again rise to attack Israel, and with a military campaign against the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip that hugs the Mediterranean coast. This fighting has left some 20,000 Palestinians dead (as of 23 December), a figure that includes Hamas fighters, as well as mass destruction that has displaced some two-thirds the 2.2 million people living in the Gaza strip, and a severe shortage of water, food, medicines, and energy. Israel has resolved to continue the fight until (1) all hostages are freed, and (2) Hamas is destroyed, though unclear what security measures/governance it would accept on “the day after”. Prime Minister Netanyahu, writing in the 26 December Wall Street Journal, argued that in addition Israel would insist on a “deradicalization” of Palestinian society.
So far, Israel has refused to consider a permanent ceasefire until these the first two goals noted above are substantially achieved, though it has agreed to one seven-day-long temporary “pause” at end November and reports exist of negotiations for a second “pause.” The US, for its part, has vetoed a 13 December UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire, though the US has publicly pressed Israel to avoid civilian casualties and abstained on a 22 December UN Security Council resolution calling for creating conditions for increased humanitarian aid to Gaza. The US abstention allows the resolution to stand. India supported the earlier UN General Assembly vote for a ceasefire.
My first general point is that both the US and India have an interest in the restoration of peace in the region as soon as possible. This is a challenge as the Middle East seems to be constantly in turmoil. There are unresolved border disputes, ethnic and religious animosities, an assertion of extremist Islam, and a growing social discontent among the millions of poor with their authoritarian rulers.
Secondly, restoration of peace is important as this is a region where the US and India have vital interests. For India, it is a source of much of the country’s imported oil and gas; several million Indians work in the region; and the oil-rich states are providing significant investments in a rapidly growing Indian economy. India and the cash-flush United Arab Emirates moreover have developed an ambitious project involving India, the UAE, Israel, and the US to combine technical know-how with private capital to address alternative energy sources. India at the past G20 summit proposed a transportation system linking India to Europe—and that proposal received the enthusiastic support of the US as well as the tacit support of Israel. For the US, a continuation of the fighting is a danger as it enhances the influence of Iran and provides opportunities for China and Russia to undermine the regional standing of the US.
Third, it is in the interest of India (and the US) to prevent tensions from spreading by working for a negotiated settlement. India is better placed to do this as it has good relations with both sides and has an interest in a peaceful region. India has traditionally taken a sympathetic view toward the Arab side in its disputes with Israel, but India in the past two decades, particularly since the Narendra Modi government came to power in 2014, has sought to improve its links with Israel, a source of sophisticated arms and high technology imports and home to a large Indian Jewish population. A significant threat to the commercial interests of Israel, India and the US are the recent attacks on shipping from several countries in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, usually by drones launched from Yemen ostensibly to show support for Hamas. The results have been a virtual closure of the Israeli Red Sea port of Eilat and the diversion of shipping away from the Red Sea (and thus the Suez Canal) by such major shipping companies as Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd.
US Secretary Austin on 19 December announced the creation of “Operation Prosperity Guardian”, a naval grouping including warships from the US, France, Canada, Norway and Bahrain to protect the shipping lanes. India, heavily dependent on shipping in the Red Sea, has itself dispatched three warships to the region, a timely deployment as one ship bound for India from the west has been targeted. The US has also dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region to deter attacks on Israel.
Fourth, while there was a similar US and Indian response expressing sympathy for Israel for the 7 October Hamas attack, this does not mean that this reaction signals a broader alignment or even a cooperative response between India and the US toward the conflict. The US has taken a largely pro-Israeli stance to this conflict while India has been more nuanced. The US, however, has begun to take an openly critical stand on the Israeli bombing in Gaza that has resulted in a growing death count.
Fifth, the US, like India, expressed sympathy for Israel in the wake of the Hamas 7 October attack on civilians in Israel. The US in fact has labelled the Hamas as a terrorist organization, while India has not, though it is sensitive to such activity.
Sixth, both sides have an interest in preventing the fighting from taking on regional dimensions, specifically drawing in Iran—though there are different motivations. India maintains good ties with Iran, a source of energy and diplomatic support on issues such as Kashmir and to appeal to its large Muslim population, especially the Shia. The US clearly wants to avoid a fight that would stretch its forces thin and get in the way of the desired rapprochement between Israel and several additional Arab states (to add to the agreements Israel already negotiated, and especially the prospect of an Israeli-Saudi Arabian agreement) The American dilemma is to convince Iran and its regional proxies to take a hands-off approach to the fighting without triggering a fight with them.
Seventh, both the US and Israel look on a quick Israeli military victory as the ideal outcome to keep out non-regional powers from gaining influence (especially Iran and China)—and to halt the spread of radical Islam in the region and beyond. India has been more discrete in its public reaction to an outcome, though it must surely want a quick resolution of the fighting for basically the same reasons as the US.
Eighth, following the current fighting, both the US and India support a two-state solution with a governing authority that is basically Palestinian—and here the problem might be Israel, driven by two important factors:
A) Fear of a revival of Hamas-like radicalism that could repeat another deadly attack on Israel (which brings to mind the unresolved issue of a sustained Israeli military/security presence in “the day after” to keep order—and for how long).
B) The presence of a large Israeli Jewish population on the West Bank and in east Jerusalem and on the Golan Heights.
Both India and the US have domestic political constituencies that criticize their government’s official responses of sympathy for Israel, though that criticism is likely still a minority view. But there are large segments in each country which are prone to take a pro-Palestinian view—or at least take a sympathetic stance toward the Palestinian side.
Given the sometimes differing domestic and foreign policy drivers to policy, what explains the general US-India agreement on fundamental issues in this and other related cases.
1) I think the most significant is the common desire of the US and India to work together better to address their common challenge from an assertive China. This security factor is one motivating factor for the quadrilateral grouping of Japan, India, the US, Australia (often referred to as the Quad), which has both collaborative security and economic objectives. While Israel is not a member, it is sympathetic to the Quad’s goals. China’s efforts to portray itself as a representative of the so-called South, has led it increasingly to tilt toward the Hamas. That showed up clearly in the UN Security Council discussions calling for a ceasefire (and vetoed by the US). China, historically close to Pakistan, has virtually no standing in Israel or India or the US as an honest broker.
2) Secondly, the US sees a stronger India in the US interest, something that came out clearly in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington this past summer and the sale of sophisticated arms to India. Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer recently told an Indian audience that the US and India had reached a point where “we can work through our differences in a constructive way without derailing our constructive agenda.”
3) The top US leadership in the State Department, the National Security Council and the White House seek a close relationship with India. The impending promotion of Kurt Campbell as the Deputy Secretary of State brings another friend of India to a top position in the State Department. In congressional hearings over the past few days, Campbell’s statements reveal a desire to work closely with India. He will join Richard Verma, another senior State Department official who was formerly US Ambassador to India.
4) In addition, the increasingly large and well-placed Indo-American community plays a role in improved India-US relations. (Most dramatically revealed in the nuclear deal between the US and India in the 1990s). The same could, I think, be said of the large number of Indians in India with close links to the US. One source of this is the large number of Indians studying in the US, soon to become the largest foreign contingent on college campuses in the US. Also, the large and well-off Indian American community is playing a growing role in the American political system (e.g., two of the Republican candidates for the presidency, Nikki Haley and Vivek Ramaswamy and Vice-President Kamala Harris on the Democrat side, and they are openly proud of their Indian heritage).
My final point is that India, with good relations with the Arab states and Palestine (it was one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the PLO) as well as with Israel, is in a good position (probably better than the US) to help bring about talks for a resolution of the current Israel-Hamas war and perhaps the release of hostages. And I think the US should quietly encourage India to do.
Dr Walter K. Andersen has been Senior Adjunct Professor of South Asia Studies at Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
This draft was an address given by Dr Walter K. Andersen at the annual meeting of the Foundation for India and India Diaspora Studies (FIIDS).