It is not really clear what President Biden hoped to attain with the permission to use long range US missiles to strike into Russian territory. It will amount to nothing and attain only limited tactical gains.
PUNE: On the eve of the 1000th day of the Russia-Ukraine war, President Joe Biden granted Volodymyr Zelenskyy the permission to use long range US missiles to strike into Russian territory, something that had been staunchly denied for over two years. The official reason given for this act was the fact that North Korea troops had entered the warzone and were fighting alongside Russia in a significant escalation to the war. He also granted the permission for Ukraine to use US supplied anti-personnel mines inside Russia. The very next day—the 1000th day of the war—Ukraine fired 6 ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile Systems) missiles into Russia. Five were reportedly shot down, but one slammed into an arms depot at Bryansk—110 km deep within Russian territory. It was not a significant strike in the overall context of the war, and would have had only a localised impact. But the use of western supplied equipment into Russian territory has psychological and geopolitical implications that can have repercussions and lead to a dramatic escalation of the war.
The Russian response was severe, with Putin warning that it could lead to “a direct confrontation between Russia and the West”. The threat of retaliation led the US along with other western nations to close their embassies in Kyiv as a precaution. And the response was not long in coming. Just two days later, Russia fired its newly developed hypersonic ballistic missile ORESHNIK—meaning Hazel tree—that sped at five times the speed of sound, evaded air defences with ease and slammed into the Ukrainian town of Dnipro. The missile was tipped with six warheads—each carrying six sub-munitions that could hit 24 different targets. It was the first successful use of the new missile in combat. The ORESHNIK can carry nuclear warheads and it was the first time that its advanced nuclear capable missiles had been used in war. The Oreshnik is an intermediate range missile with a ranges of 3000 km, and not an ICBM, (which have ranges of around 5,000-5,500 km) but the Kremlin had intimated USA of the impending attack 30 minutes before launch as per ICBM treaty obligations. Russia had demonstrated their capability to penetrate NATO air defences and strike at any target in Europe (And also hit USA with advanced long range missiles) and it was a demonstration of Russia’s capabilities, and more than anything else, a clear statement of intent.
Just a day earlier, Putin had also announced a change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine. It was now amended to state that any attack on Russia by a non-nuclear state (read Ukraine) carried out with the support of a nuclear state (read USA, UK, France) would be considered a joint attack, and Russia would be free to use nuclear weapons against it. It also brought Belarus under its nuclear umbrella, stating that any attack on Russian territory or its allies—nuclear or conventional—could invite nuclear retaliation. This implied that any Ukrainian counter attack to recapture their lost area – which Russia now claims as their own—or to follow up its attack in the Kursk region or strike any part of Russia would leave it free to use nuclear weapons—not only against Ukraine, but against NATO targets as well. And to emphasise their considerable nuclear capabilities they followed up with the hypersonic strike the very next day.
THE IMPACT
The use of long range strikes is nothing new. Both sides have attacked each other’s cities with increasing frequency throughout the two-year long war. Ukrainian drones have even struck as far as Moscow and reached Izhevsk—1450 km deep. So far, the western nations had refused Ukraine permission to use their long range missiles to strike into Russian territory for fears of escalation, and this measure now marks a significant dimension to the war. UK followed USA’s example in granting permission as well and Ukraine followed up with another strike into Russia using UK-provided Storm Shadow missiles. This gets USA and NATO directly in the war and actively involved in the attacks on Russian soil. As Putin himself stated—with this, Russia reserves the right to hit US and NATO facilities which are seen as supporting these strikes. All this gets NATO even closer to the war, lowers the nuclear threshold considerably and heightens the risks of inadvertent escalation.
It is not really clear what President Biden hoped to attain with this move. This carte blanche is just another case of “too little, too late.” It will amount to nothing and attain only limited tactical gains. Ukraine has just a few hundred ATACMS, Storm Shadow and French made SCALP missiles which will soon run out, if not replenished. With ranges of around 250-350 kilometres, they can strike value targets like logistic nodes, ammunition depots, headquarters, air and naval bases, troop concentrations and communication centres inside Russian territory. But while it can cause damage, its impact will only be at the local tactical level and will not change the course of the war significantly. If anything, Russian retaliation on Ukrainian cities and infrastructure will only intensify, increasing the damage. This action comes across more as an act of pique by Joe Biden, undertaken two months before he vacates office, to ensure that the war escalates and prolongs, and perhaps will make it difficult for Trump to keep his promise of “ending the war within a month.”
The ground situation would not change tangibly either. Russia is making progress in its offensives in the Donbas and Kharkiv and have captured 680 square kilometres in the past month itself. It is dangerously close to taking Pokrovsk—a vital communication centre in Donetsk which will open avenues for further advances westwards. Even Ukraine’s much publicised Kursk offensive has run out of steam. Russia has re-taken almost 40% of the territory captured by Ukraine, and contained the incursion to an area around 11-15 km deep inside Russian territory. Russia has reportedly amassed around 59,000 troops—aided by North Korean soldiers—and are poised for an offensive to retake the lost ground, even as they push ahead with their offensive in the Donbas.
With Russia’s battlefield gains and the weaknesses of the depleted Ukrainian army becoming even more stark, the use of long range missiles will change little on ground. At best, it could be seen as a final bid by Ukraine to improve its negotiating position. But yes, it heightens the risk of inadvertent escalation through a miscalculation by either side. It remains to be seen if Trump will reverse the decision when he takes over as POTUS on 20 January 2025. That may be the start point for genuine discussions and negotiations to end the war—even if it amounts to Russia keeping its territorial gains. Till then the war will continue, as the US wages its own long-range actions that prolongs and continues this senseless blood-letting.
* Ajay Singh is the international award winning author of seven books and over 200 articles including his latest book “Ukraine, Gaza Taiwan …. A World at War”, which examines the conflicts around the globe. He is a regular contributor to The Sunday Guardian.