Washington, DC: Vance’s focus on China is not surprising. In his personal and professional life he’s seen the way People’s Republic of China actions have affected the lives of Americans.
One subtheme emerging from what has been the most consequential week in American politics in decades is the question of how a Trump/Vance administration would handle China.
The inciting incident was a June 25th Bloomberg Businessweek interview in which former President Trump said (among other things), “I know the [Taiwanese] very well, respect them greatly. They did take about 100% of our chip business. I think Taiwan should pay us for defense.”
This resulted in, for example, The Atlantic publishing a piece entitled Trump Signals Weakness to Xi Jinping with the subhead, “He’s all but said he wouldn’t defend Taiwan from a Chinese invasion. What else would he give up to Beijing?”
Given this may develop into an election issue—and will be a global issue should Trump be elected—it is worth looking beyond a single interview to see what might be gleaned about a Trump/Vance China policy.
WE’VE BEEN HERE BEFORE
First stop is Trump’s last administration. There were clear tensions between those wanting to make deals with Beijing, for example Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, and the “superhawks” like Trump advisor Dr Peter Navarro.
By the last year of the administration, and especially after the devastation wrought by Covid, the position on China had hardened. There was an all-of-government, top-level, public focus on the threat posed by China—something only possible with the President’s blessing.
On June 24, 2020, US National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien made a speech about the implications of CCP ideology. On July 7, 2020, FBI Director Christopher Wray spoke about CCP espionage, influence, and interference operations. On July 16, 2020, Attorney General William Barr spoke about CCP economic influence and intimidation. And on July 23, 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo spoke about “Communist China and the Free World’s Future” at the Nixon library, making the point that the engagement approach launched by Nixon—while perhaps well meaning—has failed, and it was time for a new approach.
And it wasn’t just speeches. On July 23, the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas, was shut down, with Pompeo saying it had been “a hub of spying and intellectual property theft”.
Also that month, there were arrests of Chinese researchers who lied about their links to the Chinese military in order to gain access to US research labs and over 1,000 Chinese students deemed to have military links had their student visas revoked.
In August 2020, Pompeo designated Confucius Institutes “an entity advancing Beijing’s global propaganda and malign influence” and required them to register as foreign missions.
And, after action by the President, the Thrift Savings Plan—which includes pensions of veterans—dropped a plan to invest tens of billions in China.
At the same time, there was a focus on building up partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific. The Quad (the United States, India, Japan, and Australia) was resurrected and held foreign minister-level meetings in Tokyo at the height of Covid. It was important enough to be attended by Pompeo in person, even though President Trump had recently been diagnosed with Covid-19.
India was a particular focus. A whole slate of foundational defense agreements with India were finalized. On October 26, a week before the US presidential election, Pompeo and Secretary of Defense Mark Esper visited New Delhi for high-level talks. And the acknowledgement of the importance of India was one of the reasons for the May 2018 change of the name of US Pacific Command (USPACOM) to US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).
This was not haphazard. In January 2021, the administration declassified its US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific. The release note reads: “For the last 3 years, this document has provided overarching strategic guidance for implementing the 2017 National Security Strategy… Approved in February 2018 for implementation across Executive Branch departments and agencies, the document is being released to communicate to the American people and to our allies and partners, the enduring commitment of the United States to keeping the Indo-Pacific region free and open long into the future.”
And, in one of the administration’s last acts, it released a report stating that China was committing “genocide” against Uighurs. Pompeo stated: “we are witnessing the systematic attempt to destroy Uighurs by the Chinese party-state”.
Trump’s 2017-2021 administration had fits and starts on China but, overall, it was the most focused and clear-sighted of any that came before it. Will that continue?
PERSONNEL IS POLICY
If, as the old saying goes, personnel is policy, who will be the key personnel in a new Trump administration?
The only one we can be sure of is Vice Presidential candidate James David Vance.
Where does he stand on China? He called China the “biggest threat” to the US, adding that Russia’s attack on Ukraine has “completely distracted” Washington from the “real issue, which is China”.
Vance’s focus on China is not surprising. In his personal and professional life he’s seen the way People’s Republic of China (PRC) actions have affected the lives of Americans. His book, Hillbilly Elegy, chronicles the gutting of US manufacturing and drug addiction, both of which were at least exacerbated by the PRC—the first through unfair trade policies and IP theft, and the second through Beijing’s role in flooding the US with fentanyl.
As a retired Marine, he understands the way the People’s Liberation Army is growing in size and ability—unlike the Russians who seem to be stagnating. As a lawyer, he understands the PRC’s use of lawfare.
As a result, he is unusually well placed to understand what China is accomplishing through both kinetic and political warfare and how it is affecting the United States, and Americans—his voters.
Additionally, two other key players (either officially or not) are likely to be Steve Bannon and Peter Navarro. Bannon has enormous reach in “MAGA world” through his War Room show. He is currently in prison for contempt of Congress—charges MAGA world considers unjust. Navarro has just been released from prison after a four-month term on the same charges and he went straight from jail to speaking at the Republican National Convention.
Both have stayed loyal to Trump, have deep credibility with the base, and are among the biggest “superhawks” on China. There are also other less controversial but influential China experts, like Gordon Chang, David Stilwell and Miles Yu—who Trump has publicly acknowledged—that could play a role in shaping policy.
There will be many in a Trump/Vance administration who assume the PRC is out to severely weaken (at the least) the United States. Their response is likely to be more like the one Trump had when an assassin tried to kill him: Fight! Fight! Fight!
Additionally, as seen in the first Trump administration, there will likely be a bolstering of partners and alliances, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Look to more practical support for India, Philippines, Japan, Korea, Australia and elsewhere. But it will likely be “Trumpian”.
Which brings us back to the quote that started this whole ball rolling. Would Trump defend Taiwan?
WHAT DID TRUMP MEAN?
When Trump’s former National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien was asked about the quote, he said Taiwan has “got to ramp up their spending to contend with the PRC and CCP, and we can help them, we can be part of that. But I think what President Trump is saying is … we’ve got to have burden sharing”.
This shouldn’t come as a surprise to anyone in the region. They’ve been here before. During the last Trump administration, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s conceptualization of a free and open Indo-Pacific started to take shape—with Indian leadership, and American support. Countries around the region stepped up—and ties between them grew, with US encouragement.
Yes, there were “transactional” components to working with the US but there was also a common goal—protecting sovereignty in the face of an aggressive and expansionist China. And China didn’t like its targets strengthening their defenses, and their partnerships.
It is unlikely Taipei is fazed by the idea of a Trump/Vance administration. But as for Beijing? That is a different matter.
Cleo Paskal is Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defence of Democracies and columnist with The Sunday Guardian.