Biden’s approach is reportedly focused on opening diplomatic channels to regional players like Egypt and Qatar, which are being seen as key interlocutors with the Hamas.
The West Asian conundrum has always put US diplomacy to a litmus test. This time again was not new for seeing how the US evolves its strategy to maximise its interests in West Asia. The Israeli-Palestinian violent clashes in West Asia have occurred when President Joe Biden intended to focus his energies rather at home, on revitalising the American economy and restoring health in a pandemic-hit America. As far as foreign challenges are concerned, the emphasis has been on dealing with an aggressive China and handling the ramifications of the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan. In West Asia, Biden’s priority has been to find ways of reviving the scuttled nuclear deal with Iran, and not being sucked into the vortex of the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has posed too many challenges to a number of US Presidents in the past.
Nevertheless, the Biden administration was bound to face pressures to respond eventually, as casualties rose and another violent phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict spiralled out of control. As images of Hamas rockets and the Israel’s Iron Dome, the loss of lives and destruction to infrastructure circulate across the world, the Biden administration obviously was hard pressed to deal with the complicated turn of events. Biden’s call for “restoring America” has meant, until now, a calculated vision and mission for US foreign policy, employing America’s political and economic capital, only where it is required. In this context, the more understated response from the Biden administration is not unsurprising, and of all the policy priorities, domestic and foreign, the West Asian crisis might be seen as an unavoidable distraction.
Given the entrenched debates relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the American beltway, the growing voices, both those opposing Israel’s actions, and those supporting it, were expected. The Biden administration has been supporting de-escalation and ceasefire. However, President Biden as well his foreign policy and national security heads took some time to understand the challenges and work towards achieving their goals.
Biden’s approach is reportedly focused on opening diplomatic channels to regional players like Egypt and Qatar, which are being seen as key interlocutors with the Hamas. Since the US considers the Hamas a terror group, any direct talks with the Hamas is not a possibility and Mahmoud Abbas who leads the Palestinian National Authority, with whom, the U.S. engages with, practically has lost any sort of political potency. Biden until now has shown an apparent support for Israel’s actions. Speaking at the White House after his telephonic talk with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Biden expressed an optimism that the violence will end “sooner than later” and commented, “Israel has a right to defend itself when you have thousands of rockets flying into your territory.” However, there seems to be a growing group of Congressional representatives within the Democratic Party, who are voicing out their opposition to Israel’s actions, and calling out Biden’s failure to condemn Israel. For instance, voices within the US Congress are rising that called for conditions to be attached to a proposed shipment of precision-weapons guided weapons for Israel. On the other hand, there are Republican hardliners who have accused Biden of trying to appease Iran, a country that is in turn accused of funding groups like the Hamas. Therefore, between the liberal Democrats and Republican hardliners, the task is cut out for Biden and his team to manoeuvre the West Asian conundrum.
At present, the Biden administration does not seem to want the national limelight to be taken off from the priority mission of national economic recovery and fighting the pandemic. However, the current Israeli-Palestinian hostilities might not allow Biden to keep its eyes and ears off the changes and continuities of US interests in West Asia. So, as the Biden administration sets out to reorient US domestic and foreign policy priorities, what is the priority accorded to negotiating peace in West Asia? How far will Biden’s efforts go beyond supporting a ceasefire to end current hostilities? Compared to Trump’s blatant support for Israel, and brokering new alignments in West Asia, through Israel and Arab countries, will Biden move the needle ahead, or wait for things to play out among the regional players, while he focuses on more salient US foreign and domestic challenges? Given the current scheme of things, it seems that Biden will refrain from a hands-on approach and spending American resources in brokering the elusive Israeli-Palestinian peace. The focus, it seems, will be more on employing US diplomatic channels with regional stakeholders, to broker a ceasefire and de-escalate the hostilities sooner than later.
In the current scenario, the members of the key policy community of the United States are striving hard to recalibrate their policy following the ceasefire between Israel and the Palestinians without much changing other priorities. President Biden has also made it clear that the US will increase its engagement. Gaza has again been converted into a sea of rubble, which will take years and years to recover. Israel has inflicted huge damage to Palestine and killed many Hamas operatives and also destroyed infrastructure. Whether Israel would be able to measure the victory and assess whether it has achieved its strategic objectives will remain a part of the discourse. How the United States will evolve a bipartisan framework and maximise its interests in the West Asian conundrum will remain a tough challenge for the key policy community.
Arvind Kumar is Professor of United States Studies and Chairman of the Centre for Canadian, US and Latin American Studies at School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi. Monish Tourangbam teaches Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal Academy of Higher Education (MAHE), Manipal.