“Every experience is a paradox in that it means to be absolute, and yet is relative; in that it somehow always goes beyond itself and yet never escapes itself.”
T.S. Eliot
Deciphering the Communiqué of the recent G7 Summit in Puglia, Italy, it appears that the West’s relationship with China is a paradoxical dance of the absolute with the relative, of going beyond and yet never escaping its limitations. Russia expectedly was condemned and identified as a real and present threat that must be robustly countered with all means possible. However, some 28 paragraphs of direct and indirect reference to China reflected the duality of a “frenemy”—shades of a Cold War 2.0 that the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi once detected.
ROLE OF THE G7
The G7, essentially a grouping of Western liberal democracies and richest countries, with the US, Canada, UK, Italy, Germany, France, Japan, plus EU as members, has earned the moniker of the Global North. It counterparts ten leading countries of the Global South, including India and China, in the G20. It has held Annual Summits since 1975, to address financial, trade, economic, environmental, and governance issues, as well as those related to international institutions and crisis response. It has also increasingly grappled with strategic and security conundrums that the Western civilisation and NATO, i.e., the “free world” faces from the “Eastern Axis of Russia and China.”
CHINA AND G7
Russia, though seen as an outlier, was invited to join the G7 in 1998 but expelled after its annexation of Crimea in 2014. India has been invited regularly to G7 Summits since 2003, especially in the Modi era, in its capacity as a significant emerging economy and the world’s largest, most populous, and a vibrant liberal democracy. China was invited only once in 2009 as a guest, and never as a member. China’s 18-trillion-dollar economy, the second largest in the world which already outstrips the US in global trade, did not qualify it. For, China’s claim to success as a cohesive ‘civilisational state’, its leap in modernisation, and rise as an economic and military great power, is based on a unique brand of one-party authoritarian political model and state capitalism. It challenges the ‘end of history’ self-belief in the triumph of Western liberal democracy and market capitalism.
The G7 Summit, as Western media was quick to point out, portrayed China as a “malign force”. It reflected a shift from seeing West-China economic relations as symbiotic to being unfairly disadvantageous and creating unsustainable dependencies. This is despite making deep inroads into and having consequential trade, finance, technology, and global public goods stakes in each other’s economies. In security and strategic terms too, China’s irredentist claims and expansionist moves, including in the Indo Pacific and in the West’s historical hunting grounds for influence, minerals and bases in Africa, Asia, and Latin America have raised the G7 hackles. China has its own slew of grievances vis-à-vis the West. It gets to enact the Karman triangle drama of victim, rescuer, and saviour to tamp down hostility and underline the complementarities and mutual benefit.
The G7 averred that it seeks constructive and stable relations with China and recognises the importance of direct and candid engagement to express concerns and manage differences while acting in their national interest. Given China’s role in the international community, it would continue to cooperate in areas of common interest. It asked China to work with the G7 to tackle the climate, biodiversity, and pollution crises; combat illicit synthetic drug trafficking; ensure global macroeconomic stability; support global health security; and address debt sustainability and financing needs of vulnerable countries.
CHINA-RUSSIA AUTHORITARIAN AXIS
However, the G7 expressed deep concern about China’s role as a “saviour of the Russian war machine in its Ukraine campaign.” The G7 called on China to press Russia to stop its military aggression and immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw its troops from Ukraine and support a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace, including through direct dialogue with Ukraine.
The G7 condemned China’s ongoing support for Russia’s defence-industrial base and asked for an end to the transfer of dual-use materials, including weapons components and equipment. It vowed to take restrictive measures against actors/targeted individuals and entities in China and third countries that materially supported Russia’s defence sector. It also sought to “restrict the transfer of sensitive, core dual-use technology to those countries that threaten their national security.”
SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC
The G7 expressed serious concern about the situation in the East and South China Seas, reiterating its strong opposition to any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion; to China’s militarization and intimidation activities; and to “the repeated obstruction of countries’ high seas freedom of navigation.” It denied the legal basis for China’s expansionist maritime claims and asserted that China pursues peaceful resolution of disputes under UNCLOS and the Arbitration ruling of 2016. On Taiwan, it urged a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.
The G7 approach reflects increased focus on the Indo-Pacific as part of the concept of indivisible security beyond the Euro-Atlantic. The US has sought to enhance its Cold War-era hub-and-spoke security architecture in the Indo-Pacific through a “lattice work” of partnerships and alliances such as Quad, AUKUS, and Squad. The EU too has adopted an Indo-Pacific strategy. India will need to continue deftly navigating this lattice while maintaining its multi-alignment stance to reap strategic and economic benefits on both sides.
G7’S BRI COUNTER
China has fostered its own noodle bowl of regional and interregional groupings of influence—BRICS, SCO, RCEP, and the “16 plus 1” Initiative in Europe for infrastructure and financial connectivity—using its BRI and “debt diplomacy”. In response, G7 vowed to promote concrete and quality G7 Partnerships for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) for transformative economic corridors, flagship projects, and complementary initiatives in different regions, such as the IMEC Corridor announced at the New Delhi G20 Summit.
CHINESE TRADE PRACTICES
“We are not trying to harm China or thwart its economic development, indeed a growing China that plays by international rules and norms would be of global interest”, the G7 assured. However, it was concerned about China’s “persistent industrial targeting and comprehensive non-market policies and practices leading to global spillovers, market distortions and harmful overcapacity and dominance in a growing range of sectors.”
The G7 resolved to take actions, to protect its workers and industries from unfair, non-market policies and practices, to level the playing field and remedy ongoing harm, such as harmful subsidies, including by State Owned Enterprises and forced technology transfers. It vowed to use trade tools, including new ones, to identify, challenge, and counter these practices, and to promote stronger international rules and norms, together with partners. These pronouncements are to be seen in conjunction with a slew of trade measures such as the high tariffs and technology restrictions of the West against China in recent years, and warrant close monitoring by India.
SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY
The G7 clarified that while it was not decoupling or turning inwards, it was de-risking and diversifying supply chains; reducing critical dependencies, including those resulting from overcapacity; and building resilience to economic coercion. It called on China to refrain from adopting export control measures, particularly on critical minerals, causing significant global supply chain disruption.
Significantly, it undertook to implement the principles on resilient and reliable supply chains, champion initiatives to increase participation of developing countries in high standards global supply chains which would create local benefits and reduce vulnerability. It announced coordinated initiatives on critical minerals such as the Partnership for Resilient and Inclusive Supply-chain Enhancement, the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP) and its MSP Forum.
The G7 was determined to take necessary actions against economic coercion; increase collective assessment, preparedness, deterrence, and response; develop new tools; and monitor and address potential, emerging, and ongoing cases, including through the G7 Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion, with non-G7 partners and collectively identify critical goods and strategic sectors.
The G7 called on China to uphold its commitment to act responsibly in cyberspace and vowed “to disrupt and deter persistent, malicious cyber activity” stemming from China “which threatened their citizens’ safety and privacy, undermined innovation, and put critical infrastructure at risk.”
INTERFERENCE IN DEMOCRACIES
The G7 expressed concerns about human rights situations in China, including in Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Conversely, it asked China “not to conduct or condone activities undermining the security and safety of communities and the integrity of G7 democratic institutions and processes” and act in strict accordance with its diplomatic obligations. The G7’s concerns about “Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference” (FIMI), including “attempted interference campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and transnational repression that collectively undermine sovereignty and democratic values,” resonate deeply with India being targeted from multiple foreign sources too.
India, as a potential beneficiary of G7’s de-risking, diversification and friend-shoring, and measures against economic coercion and weaponization of economic dependencies, must position itself well and engage proactively to be the partner of choice for G7 countries. This will enable us to diversify, attract investments, build and upgrade industrial capacities and resilient supply chains, and engage with extant and new G7 platforms and initiatives. India will also need to guard against being caught in the crossfires of trade and technology wars. It must factor in the evolving dialectics of G7-China relations into its trade, investment and technology policies, and global governance and rule-making stances.
Lakshmi Puri is a former Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations and Deputy Executive Director of UN Women; and a former Ambassador of India.