The simultaneous rise of India and China is not only capable of shaping the new global order but also realising the Asian century.
During a media briefing on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Russia for the BRICS Summit on 21 October 2024, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri revealed that “Over the last several weeks, Indian and Chinese diplomatic and military negotiators have been in close contact with each other in a variety of forums. And as a result of these discussions, agreement has been arrived at on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China border areas, leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in these areas in 2020.” China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on 22 October acknowledged that the “two sides have reached a solution (达成解决方案) to the relevant issues” (有关问题). The “solution” paved the way for Modi-Xi bilateral meeting in Kazan that certainly has brought a thaw to the cold relations.
The press release post Kazan meeting stated that “The two leaders agreed that the Special Representatives on the India-China boundary question will meet at an early date to oversee the management of peace & tranquillity in border areas and to explore a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question.” The thaw could be attributed to 21 rounds of talks at the corps commander level, 17 rounds of meetings at the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC), and several rounds between the foreign ministers and national security advisors of India and China since the Galwan hostilities in 2020. Prime Minister Modi’s remarks were brief: “We believe that the importance of India-China relations is not just for our people. Our relations are also important for global peace, stability and progress. Mutual Trust, Mutual Respect, and Mutual Sensitivity should continue to be the basis of our relations.”
Xi Jinping underlined that both the countries should “correctly grasp the historical trend and the direction of the development of bilateral relations. The two sides should strengthen communication and cooperation, enhance strategic mutual trust, and achieve each other’s development dreams.” Xi regarded “Development is the biggest ‘common denominator’ (最大的 ‘公约数’)” between China and India at present. The two sides should continue to adhere to the important consensuses of “seeing each other as development opportunities, instead of threats” and “treating each other as partners, instead of competitors,” remarked Xi.
From the respective statements, it appears a win-win for both the sides. Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh, during the Chanakya Defence Dialogue attributed the “broad consensus” to resolve differences in “certain areas along LAC” to the continuous dialogue between the two. It is obvious from the varied statements before and after the BRICS bilateral that approaches to deal with the situation remains very different. At the outset, China accuses India of “unilaterally undermining the consensus” on the border issue, “illegally crossing the LAC and occupying areas such as the Galwan, the Kailash Range to the south of Pangong Lake, and the Rechin La or the Rezangla Pass”, openly provoking and causing tension on the border. As a result, China argues “the two sides have stopped patrolling at several locations in the Ladakh region.” Conversely, India accuses China of amassing forces across the LAC and denying India the access to patrol the areas she used to. India was forced to match the Chinese deployment.
Two, the agreement of “patrolling arrangement” and “consensus in certain areas” implies that China would dismantle their forward post at the Y junction and India would be able to send patrols to PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13 in Depsang and Charding Nullah in Demchok. Even if the arrangement doesn’t include the earlier agreements on those buffer zones in the friction areas, it could be regarded as a big diplomatic victory for India. Remember, during the 16th round of corps commanders’ talks in May 2023, the Chinese side proposed a buffer of 15-20 kilometres, whereas India was willing to have a buffer of 2-3 kilometres. It would be inconceivable if India agrees to Chinese patrols in the Chinese claimed 38 square kilometres wide Tiannan river valley along the Durbuk-Shyok-DBO road west of the Y Junction. The Chinese who stood the ground for four long years must have relented for some concessions by India either in the Western Sector itself or in the Eastern Sector, only time will tell.
Three, both sides have learnt their lessons from the prolonged faceoff along the LAC, according to an anonymous article on the 163.com. The article says that “The continued deployment of troops on the border between China and India is a huge burden for both countries, not only in terms of military, but more importantly, it hinders exchanges in areas such as culture and trade between the two sides.” This view is supported by Professor Zhang Jiadong of Fudan University who opines that the move shows that both are willing to return to the status quo ante, which may pave way for subsequent dialogue. On the Indian side too, both the political and business circles have voiced their concerns over restricting visas and direct investment from China, albeit there have been voices in China that oppose China propping up Indian manufacturing capacities. It will take time for China to restore its confidence in India, maintains Professor Zhang.
Four, easing of the border situation is “inseparable from the changes in the national and international environment” according to both sides, albeit interpretations are different. The Indian side believes that China is increasingly facing the heat from the West for its continuous support for Russia, its overcapacities in the new energy vehicles, solar panels and lithium ion batteries. Internally, its economic slump since the outbreak of Covid has made it rebalance its relations with India. Chinese scholars such as Lin Minwang have diametrically opposite views. According to Lin, “the uncertainty of the United States (美国的不确定性) is an important factor that prompted India to soften its stance on China.” Furthermore, “high defence spending caused by the military confrontation” and “India’s domestic dependence on Chinese economic investment may also be one of the motivations for its policy adjustment” on the border.
Five, despite of the above rebalancing, there are many other factors that are bound to impact negatively on India-China relations. Professor Zhang Jiadong believes that there are many inherent contradictions and differences which have not been resolved, including the border issues, China-Pakistan relations, Tibet-related issues, India’s trade deficit with China, etc., and India’s perception of China, and great power mentality are all deep-rooted problems. Lin argues that India’s “positive attitude” (积极态度) is mainly implemented on the border issue itself, which is a strategic consideration. On bilateral issues such as the economic field, which are of great practical significance to China, India’s policy has not yet shown signs of change.” However, he holds that the accord on the border “has created the possibility of improving the cold atmosphere (趋冷氛围) in other areas”. Added to these, like other Chinese scholars, Zhang believes that China needs to be mindful of India’s “Indo-Pacific Strategy” that rely on using the US “Indo-Pacific strategy” to deal with China, and promotes the transfer of global industrial supply chains to India, thereby realizing India’s economic take-off and the rise of a great power.
Finally, India-China relations remains one of the most consequential relationships of this century. They are two of the largest markets, accounting for 35% of the global population, around 29% of the global GDP, and contribute to around 46% of the global economic growth. Both have huge potential and complementarities in the field of agriculture, labour-intensive industrial supply chains, urbanization and green development, besides the existing sectors such as electronics and mobile telephony. Therefore, the simultaneous rise of India and China is not only capable of shaping the new global order but also realizing the Asian century. The prolonged faceoff may have offered them some food for thought as how to manage this complex relationship. Nevertheless, the structural issues in the bilateral relations and their perceptions about each other, the Global South and “true multilateralism” remain, and could be stumbling blocks for building “strategic trust” or the “three mutual” advocated by the two countries.
* B.R. Deepak is Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.