The ‘looking down on India syndrome’ within the Chinese strategic community is deeply rooted. For China, the issue is less about bilateral relations and more about how both countries perceive the current international order.
On 27 January 2025, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a six-point statement following the recent meeting of the Foreign Secretary-Vice Foreign Minister mechanism between India and China, highlighting several key decisions. Both sides agreed to resume the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, discuss the resumption of hydrological data sharing, and implement measures to enhance people-to-people exchanges, including interactions between media and think tanks. Additionally, they decided to restart direct air services between the two countries and to organize various commemorative activities to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
These developments represent the most tangible outcomes since the ice was broken in Kazan, Russia where Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met on the side-lines of the BRICS Summit on 23 October 2024. This was followed by a meeting between India’s National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, in Beijing on 18 December 2024. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s discussions with Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong form part of the broader consensus and understandings reached between the leaders of India and China to accelerate the improvement in relations. The MEA statement remains silent on the first point of the Chinese statement which asserts, “India is willing to fully support China’s work as the rotating chair of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and will actively participate in various activities hosted by China under the SCO framework.” Reference to Kailash Mansarovar as the “sacred mountain and lake of Xizang in China” reflects China’s sensitivities regarding the Tibet issue.
India-China reset in Beijing is a welcome development, for the “pragmatic cooperation” which Misri referred to during his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, had been stalled except the trade since the June 2020 Galwan conflict. By way of having NSA and vice-ministerial talks in China, Beijing has given the impression as if it was India that has destabilised the relations, and it is India which is desperate for seeking peace. Liu Zongyi, a fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, argues that since it was Prime Minister Modi, who “specifically proposed” to resume the Special Representatives mechanism, suggests that “Prime Minister Modi is indeed taking measures to normalize and stabilize relations.” Qian Feng, a researcher at Tsinghua University’s National Strategy Institute toes a similar line when he says, Vikram Misri’s visit “indicates India’s hope to quickly bring China-India bilateral relations back on a healthy, stable, and predictable track.” In an interview to The Paper, Liu Zongyi further maintains that “the issues discussed during Misri’s visit are actually problems unilaterally created by India over the past five years.”
In the words of Liu Zongyi, India’s recent “proactive measures” (主动的措施) to improve relations with China are driven by several factors. These include domestic political shifts influenced by economic and social development pressures, fluctuations in U.S.-India relations, and concerns that Trump’s presidency could alter international dynamics and impact bilateral ties between India and the U.S. He suggests that Trump might revise the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, impose tariffs on Indian goods, and introduce immigration policies that could negatively affect India-U.S. relations.
Liu further notes that India deliberately avoided mentioning the “Political Parameters and Guiding Principles” of 2005 during the 23rd meeting of the National Security Advisers, because “it has not adhered to any of them.” Another reason he cites is that India views the boundary issue as a bargaining chip to strengthen its ties with the United States, leveraging the so-called “strategic opportunity period” and the U.S.-China strategic rivalry to advance its aspirations as a major power. However, Liu argues that China’s recent demonstration of the sixth-generation fighter jet has “dashed India’s hopes” that the U.S. will ultimately prevail over China, as it signals a shift in the military balance between the two powers. DeepSeek disrupting US AI big-tech firms would further validate this perspective. He also does not rule out the possibility of the U.S. and China establishing some form of a “G2 mechanism” during Trump’s presidency.
The arguments above suggest that the “looking down on India syndrome” within the Chinese strategic community is deeply rooted. For China, the issue is less about bilateral relations and more about how both countries perceive the current international order. Liu Zongyi underlines the Chinese thinking that “India aims to achieve a so-called ‘multipolar Asia and multipolar world’ by collaborating with other Indo-Pacific nations to collectively counterbalance China.” This, he asserts, remains the “fundamental difference” (根本差异) between the two nations. For this reason, many in China and India too, maintain that China’s main focus is on the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. They are correct, yet this was also the case in the 1950s.
Additionally, Zhang Jiadong, professor at Fudan University, highlights that several unresolved contradictions persist, including border disputes, China-Pakistan relations, Tibet-related issues, India’s trade deficit with China, and India’s broader perception of China and great-power dynamics. These deep-seated issues contribute to an inherent strategic mistrust, which both sides recognize. Given this reality, Liu cautions that Chinese entities, whether in government or state-owned enterprises, should not have “overly high expectations” (太高期待) regarding the recent diplomatic reset.
In India, too, the strategic community remains sceptical about the so-called reset, the way China puts blame on India, and particularly as disengagement at certain patrolling points has yet to be achieved. On 13 January, Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi publicly acknowledged that “a degree of standoff” still persists between the rival armies in Eastern Ladakh. He further stated that while India possesses “adequate strategic patience” to resolve the military standoff with China, he ruled out any troop reduction during the winter.
It may be recalled that, a 2020 report in The Hindu had highlighted that, in the aftermath of the Galwan clash, India lost access to 26 out of 65 patrolling points—including PP 5-17 in the Depsang Plains, PP 24-32 in the Chang Chenmo Basin, PP 37 in Skakjung, PP 51 & 52 in Demchok & Charding Nala, and PP 62 in Chumar. The “patrolling arrangement” frequently mentioned in the media primarily referred to disengagement in Depsang. Furthermore, Chinese media had reported that China’s withdrawal from Depsang was a trade-off for securing similar patrolling rights in the Yangtse area of the Eastern Sector.
Given China’s approach to the border issue and India’s rise, the recent reset along the border appears to be only temporary. The fundamental reason lies in the lost equilibrium, which, I have all along argued, has led to significant asymmetries between India and China. It is no surprise that, in an effort to assert its territorial claims over Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, China has renamed a total of 62 locations inside Arunachal Pradesh between 2017 and 2024, along with two locations in Aksai Chin, Ladakh. The latter includes the newly established He’an County in Hongliu Township and Hekang County in Xeyidula (Shahidulla) Township, both under the jurisdiction of Hotan Prefecture. According to Xu Baiyong, a professor at the Institute of Western Borderlands Studies at Shaanxi Normal University, “The Chinese government has never recognized Ladakh as part of India. Now, India has unilaterally changed Ladakh’s status by designating it as a Union Territory, which constitutes an infringement on China’s territorial sovereignty.”
While recent high-level engagements suggest a willingness to normalize and stabilize relations, “overly high expectations”—particularly from the Chinese side, as argued by Liu Zongyi—remain unlikely. Concerns also arise from China’s evolving perception of India’s rise and its regional and global role as a security threat. Consequently, there are murmurs within China’s strategic community that Beijing should avoid supporting India’s manufacturing capabilities. In light of these factors, the path forward requires cautious optimism, acknowledging both the opportunities for cooperation and the complexities inherent in the bilateral relationship.
* B.R. Deepak is Professor, Center of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.